Drop Western ‘mental maps’ for Asian new order, says Kishore Mahbubani

Asia Pacific Report – August 27, 2020

Singaporean philosopher, former diplomat and academic Professor Kishore Mahbubani has warned the world is entering a global “Asian new order” and he has called on researchers in the Asia-Pacific region to shed Western dominance of the social sciences.

Speaking as a keynote at the Symposium on Social Science 2020 in Indonesia this week, Dr Mahbubani, author of the recent book Has China Won? The Chinese challenge to American Primacy, told more than 200 participants on the webinar that Asian “mental maps” needed to change to address the new reality.

“The world has changed fundamentally – we must understand that,” he said. “But our problem is that the mental maps that we have to understand this new world, our mental maps given to us by our 19th century, 20th century [social scientists] – mostly Western – cannot guide us in the 21st century.”

This was because the current century would be far different from the two previous centuries, said Dr Mahbubani, a member of the Asia Research Institute.

“What I have tried to do in my writing is to provide a glimpse of what the 21st century will be like.

“And I have also tried to explain why this is relevant to those studying social science.”

As well as his books, Professor Mahbubani has published extensively in leading journals and newspapers overseas such as Foreign Affairs, the National InterestThe New York Times and The Wall Street Journal.

New trends, new challenges
His wide-ranging speech explored new trends in the world, new challenges and new solutions.

“A shift of power to Asia [is taking place] and the 21st century will be the Century of Asia. We need to be very clear about that. There is absolutely no doubt,” he said.

This was not surprising, he said, because for 18 centuries of the past 2000 years, the world had been dominated by two Asia economies – China and India.

“It is only in the last 200 years that Europe and North America have taken over. So the last 200 years of Western dominance of world history has been an aberration,” he said.

“All aberrations come to a natural end. So it is only natural to see the return of Asia.”

The covid-19 coronavirus pandemic was hastening the world change, partly because the most competent countries in dealing with the global crisis had been in East Asia, he said, echoing what he told BBC Hardtalk’s Zeinab Badawi recently.

He said then that the number of deaths per million in East Asia was less than 10 compared to Europe and the US where it was in the hundreds.

‘Top three out of four in Asia’
“Even today, in terms of purchasing power as a measurement, if you look at the top four economies: number one is China, number two is the United States of America, number three is India, and number four is Japan.

“So three out of the top four economies are already Asian.”

Professor Mahbubani also told the live video symposium participants, hosted by the Centre for Southeast Asian Social Studies at the Universitas Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta, that Indonesia would be a “big beneficiary” of this global change.

And in market terms it was much harder.

“Indonesia in 2017 was the 16th largest economy in the world. By 2030 it will become the ninth largest economy, and by 2050 it will be the fourth largest – bigger than Japan.

“That is amazing.”

These were the big changes coming, but the world was still outdated with mind maps being set in the 19th and 20th centuries.

‘Dangerous’ to rely on West
“It is dangerous for us to depend on Western social science to understand the Asian century,” he said.

Professor Mahbubani was critical of the double standards in the United States over corruption when it was illegal for American businessmen to bribe foreign legislators while it remained legal for businessmen to influence lawmakers at home, especially over the privatised health system.

He said he believed that the US had lost its moral compass and its current failure under President Donald Trump to stem the coronavirus pandemic and to deal constructively with China and other countries was a warning to the world.

The country was no longer a democracy, it was a plutocracy.

Climate change was an event greater issue than covid facing the globe.

Professor Mahbubani said the world needed a strong US to balance China.

The stimulating two-day webinar had speakers and research papers from all over Asia, but also included foreign presenters such as Australia’s Dr Daniel McCarthy of the University of Melbourne on “another face of power” and New Zealand’s Professor David Robie of Auckland University Technology on climate change and covid-19 – “redefining the relations between humankind and the environment”.

Selected papers will be published in a book to follow the publication from the first Social Science Symposium in 2018.

The Pacific Media Centre was a partner of Indonesia’s Centre for Southeast Asian Social Studies for this symposium.

Find the article on the website of the Asia Pacific Report

The World Cup Effect: A New Avenue of Thought in Search of an Effective De-confinement Strategy

Policy Center for the New South | June 10, 2020

Aomar Ibourk , Karim El Aynaoui 

We explore a new avenue that could contribute to an effective de-confinement in the context of COVID-19. This phenomenon is known as the ‘World Cup Effect’. We first define this phenomenon and highlight its existence and its possible amplifying effect with regard to the spread of the pandemic, in light of the number of infected cases recorded at the pandemic’s peak, and the duration before reaching its highest level. Based on hypothetical scenarios in terms of the initial conditions at the lockdown exit, we show that under constant probability of infection, the World Cup Effect always results in a higher number of infected cases at peak (Δy>0), and in a shorter period before the peak is reached (Δx<0). Finally, we discuss the elements that can contribute to mitigating this effect. Partial or complete lockdown lifting should be accompanied by the maintenance of social-distancing measures and the use of face masks, limitation of contacts, cautious management of population flows and special control, if not closure, of mass gathering places, including ‘Moussems’, cinemas, stadiums, and schools.

 

Download the full paper on the website of the Policy Center for the New South

L’Etat au Révélateur de la COVID-19

Policy Center for the New South | July 07, 2020

A. Bassou , A. Boucetta , K. Chegraoui , N. Chekrouni , Y. Drissi Daoudi , M. Dryef , K. El Aynaoui , R. El Houdaigui , A. El Ouassif , L. Jaidi , M. Loulichki , M. Rezrazi , A. Saaf

La crise de la COVID-19 aura été tant un point de départ que le révélateur de profonds bouleversements économiques, sociaux, et humains au Maroc et dans le reste du monde. Cette pandémie aura également été à l’origine d’un vent d’incertitude pour les populations, entraînant ainsi de fortes répercussions sur la santé publique, la quiétude de l’humain et sa sécurité. En effet, les dimensions sécuritaire et sanitaire, ainsi que les enjeux posés, ont contribué à la consécration de l’Etat comme seule entité capable de protéger les populations et contrecarrer les impacts négatifs de la crise. L’influence des Etats – qui se caractérisait par un désengagement progressif et leur retrait de plusieurs secteurs clés – se voit ici renforcée par l’idée que seul un Etat social fort, régulateur et doté de moyens importants, est capable de recevoir et d’amortir les chocs. Néanmoins, plusieurs défis se posent aux institutions des pays. Bien que les populations voient leur relation avec l’Etat changer afin d’inclure leurs intérêts et besoins, la question de l’impact et du rôle des collectivités territoriales reste en suspens. En effet, il a été donné d’observer une faible implication des élus locaux et des services déconcentrés dans leur traitement de la pandémie. Une décentralisation inachevée et une déconcentration hésitante sont dans une large mesure la cause de ce phénomène. Il faudra ainsi penser un renouvellement des relations entre l’Etat et les collectivités locales pour parvenir à la formulation de politiques novatrices qui viseraient à réduire les fractures sociales et territoriales. Les Etats se voient également amenés à gérer le flux de l’information à l’ère du digital, où la presse traditionnelle se voit supplantée dans son rôle au profit d’individus souvent véhiculant rumeurs et désinformations à travers les réseaux sociaux. Ces derniers se voient avantagés par leur instantanéité, universalité, mais également grâce au fait qu’ils ne sont pas tenus par l’opinion publique aux mêmes standards que les institutions journalistiques et médias. L’avenir de la communication de crise s’annonce ainsi complexe et multicanal. Elle devra s’adapter à des populations, moyens, et pratiques en constante évolution.

 

Téléchargez le dossier complet sur le site du Policy Center for the New South

La stratégie du Maroc face au Covid-19

Policy Center for the New South | April 30, 2020

Abdelaaziz Ait Ali , Abdelhak Bassou , M’hammed Dryef , Karim El Aynaoui , Rachid El Houdaigui , Youssef El Jai , Faiçal Hossaini , Larabi Jaidi , Mohamed Loulichki , El Mostafa Rezrazi , Abdallah Saaf 

Face à la pandémie du COVID-19, un plan d’action a été établi autour de trois axes : santé, économie et ordre social. Dans chacun de ces champs, le concours des institutions publiques, du secteur privé et des membres de la société civile a permis jusque-là de limiter les dégâts et d’avoir un certain contrôle sur la pandémie.

Sur le plan sanitaire, l’intervention vise une maîtrise de la progression de la maladie pour une meilleure absorption des flux par le système de santé, aux moyens limités et inégalement répartis sur le territoire national. La priorité est donnée à l’augmentation de l’offre en infrastructure sanitaire. Des relais sont également apportés par la société civile, et notamment les établissements hôteliers qui mettent des chambres à la disposition du personnel soignants mobilisés au premier rang face à la pandémie et des personnes convalescentes. Ce processus se fonde sur une politique de communication crédible de la part du ministère de la santé, qui veille à diffuser quotidiennement le bilan d’évolution de la maladie et des recommandations d’hygiène.

Sur le plan économique, face à une conjoncture économique nationale et internationale incertaine, la création du « Fonds spécial pour la gestion de la pandémie du coronavirus », doté d’une capacité de 3% du PIB, et la contribution de différentes entités privées et publiques est à voir comme un mécanisme de mutualisation des risques. Il y a une conscience de l’interdépendance des différents secteurs, qui seront tous affectés, directement ou indirectement. La batterie de mesures adoptées par les autorités se conforme à la nature multiforme du choc qui touche à la fois à l’offre et la demande, sur le marché domestique comme sur le marché international. Ainsi, les aides distribuées aux ménages dans une situation précaire et les aides apportées aux entreprises visent un même objectif de lisser l’atterrissage de l’économie et d’aplanir la courbe de la récession. Le recours au financement externe obéit également à cette approche globale qui vise à prémunir l’économie contre le choc externe qui affecte au premier chef les secteurs exposés sur le marché international et le tourisme et préserver les équilibres externes en compensant une partie du recul des IDE et des transferts courants. Enfin, la politique monétaire vient apporter une réponse transversale en facilitant l’accès au financement pour accompagner les entreprises avec des problèmes de trésorerie et soutenir la demande à travers le report des échéances de crédit.

 

Téléchargez le dossier complet sur le site du Policy Center for the New South

Deporting foreign students: The United States avoids self-inflicted injury

23 July 2020

Peterson Institute for International Economics (Piie)

Sherman Robinson (PIIE), Marcus Noland (PIIE), Egor Gornostay (PIIE) and Soyoung Han (PIIE)

Under congressional pressure and facing lawsuits, on July 14 the Trump administration rescinded an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) rule that could have meant the deportation of more than one million foreign students from the United States. The rule, announced on July 6, eliminated temporary exemptions for nonimmigrant students taking all classes online due to the pandemic and would have taken effect for the fall 2020 semester.1

During the 2017–18 academic year, foreign students in the United States spent $45.3 billion a year and directly supported over 455,000 US jobs, according to latest data from the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis. Another study by NAFSA: Association of International Educators reports that during the 2018–19 academic year foreign students in colleges and universities in the United States contributed $41 billion to the US economy and supported 458,000 jobs.

Using an economywide simulation model that takes both direct and indirect effects of the ICE policy into account, we estimate in a PIIE Working Paper  that the policy would have cost the US economy up to 752,000 jobs, $68 billion in lost GDP, $18 billion in lost tax revenue, and $46 billion in lost income of nonstudent households in the short run (a shock as soon as the program was implemented). The direct impacts would have been felt most heavily in US cities and towns with colleges/universities, and the indirect effects would have been spread across the country.

For the moment, the United States has avoided self-inflicted injury, but as in the case of the “Muslim ban,” there is no guarantee that the administration will not tweak and reintroduce the regulation.

Deporting foreign students would damage US institutions of higher learning. Foreign students make up roughly half of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) graduate students in the United States. The distributional consequences are complex, but on the whole it appears that American students benefit from the presence of foreign students, through the expansion of programs and the upward pressure on educational standards from their enrollments, as well as the enhanced financial support that the tuition payments of foreign students enable.

The impact differs slightly for undergraduate education. With overall enrollments more fixed than in the case of graduate students, foreign undergraduates crowd out domestic undergraduates. But they also enable universities to raise entrance standards and provide greater financial support for deserving American students. At the margin, the distributional impact is to shift capacity away from students who are wealthy but less smart toward those who are poor but smarter.

The mooted immigration policy would also reduce the size and research productivity of American institutions of higher learning and adversely affect innovation and entrepreneurship. Research demonstrates that foreign students contribute to research productivity measured by either scholarly papers or patents.

Postgraduation foreign graduate students continue to contribute to the US economy as measured by patenting, commercializing or licensing patents, and publishing. There is evidence of greater entrepreneurship as well. One survey of MIT graduates found that foreign-born students account for a disproportionately high share of MIT alumni-founded companies. More broadly, many studies have found that immigrants are an important source of scarce human capital for the United States and restricting their ability to come to the country as students would be short-sighted and damaging.

In addition to all the economic gains, the United States has benefited greatly in terms of soft power from its program of welcoming foreign students. Over a long period, the United States has educated millions of foreign students who have returned to their home countries, largely with warm feelings about their education and the country that provided it. The United States has also trained influential policymakers in many countries who understand and engage easily with the United States. All these benefits would come to an end if the United States were to restrict the number of foreign students coming here.

NOTE

1. The new policy, which was to go into effect in the fall of 2020, stated that “nonimmigrant students within the US are not permitted to take a full course of study through online classes. If students find themselves in this situation, they must leave the country or take alternative steps to maintain their nonimmigrant status.”

 

Read the full article on Piie’s website.

The short- and long-term costs to the United States of the Trump administration’s attempt to deport foreign students

Marcus Noland at the WPC 2017 in Marrakech.

20-11 July 2020

Peterson Institute for International Economics (Piie)

by Sherman Robinson (PIIE), Marcus Noland (PIIE), Egor Gornostay (PIIE) and Soyoung Han (PIIE)

On July 6, 2020, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) announced modifications to the Student and Exchange Visitor Program eliminating temporary exemptions for nonimmigrant students taking all classes online due to the COVID-19 pandemic, beginning in the fall 2020 semester. Foreign students violating the rule would be subject to deportation. Under public pressure, the Trump administration rescinded the order on July 14. Had the policy been implemented, more than 1 million foreign students studying in the United States could have been deported. The authors use an economywide simulation model to estimate the economic impact on the United States if the policy had been implemented. They find that the policy would have cost the US economy up to 752,000 jobs and $68 billion in lost GDP in the short run. Their estimates are larger than those reported in other studies because they consider both direct and indirect effects of the policy. In the long run, the move would have reduced the research productivity of American universities and adversely affected research, innovation, and entrepreneurship across the economy, in both the private and public sectors.

Download the full paper on Piie’s website.

East Asia’s new edge

24.07.2020

The Financial Express

East Asia's new edge

Death tolls don’t lie. The most striking disparity in COVID-19 fatalities to date is between East Asian countries, where the total number of deaths per million inhabitants is consistently below ten, and much of the West, where the numbers are in the hundreds. For example, Japan has so far reported 7.8 deaths per million, followed by South Korea (5.8), Singapore (4.6), China (3.2), and, most remarkably of all, Vietnam, with zero deaths. By contrast, Belgium now has 846 confirmed deaths per million, and the United Kingdom has 669, followed by Spain (608), Italy (580) and the United States (429).

What accounts for this extraordinary difference? The answers are complicated, but three possible explanations stand out. First, none of the East Asian states believe that they have “arrived,” much less achieved the “end of history” at which they regard their societies as being the apotheosis of human possibility. Second, East Asian countries have long invested in strengthening government institutions instead of trying to weaken them, and this is now paying off. And, third, China’s spectacular rise is presenting its regional neighbors with opportunities as well as challenges.

It’s always dangerous to oversimplify. Yet, the evidence shows that whereas Europeans tend to believe in state-sponsored social security, East Asians still believe that life is composed of struggle and sacrifice. French President Emmanuel Macron is battling to overhaul his country’s pension system and decrease retirement benefits in order to achieve much-needed reductions in budget deficits. As a result, France was convulsed for months by “Yellow Vest” protests. But when South Korea faced a far more serious financial crisis in 1997-98, old ladies donated jewelry to the central bank in an effort to help.

East Asians are aware that their societies have done well in recent decades. But constant adaptation and adjustment to a rapidly changing world is still the norm – even in Japan – and huge investments in public institutions have helped these countries to fulfill it.

Here, the contrast with the US could not be starker. Ever since President Ronald Reagan famously declared in his 1981 inaugural address that, “government is not the solution to our problem, government is the problem,” the very phrase “good governance” has been an oxymoron in America. We have again seen the consequences of this mindset in recent weeks, with the weakening even of globally respected institutions such as the US Federal Aviation Administration, the US Food and Drug Administration, and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Even today, with America beset by multiple crises, no prominent US leader dares to say the obvious: “Government is the solution.”

East Asian societies, on the other hand, retain a strong and deeply-held belief in good governance, reflecting the traditional Asian respect for institutions of authority. Vietnam’s spectacularly effective pandemic response, for example, can be attributed not only to one of the world’s most disciplined governments, but also to wise investments in health care. Between 2000 and 2016, per capita public-health expenditures increased by an average of 9% per year. This enabled Vietnam to establish a national public-health emergency operations center and surveillance system in the wake of the 2002-03 SARS epidemic.

Vietnam’s track record is all the more astonishing given the country’s low starting point. When the Cold War ended three decades ago, and Vietnam finally stopped fighting wars after almost 45 years of near-continual conflict, it had one of the world’s poorest populations. But by emulating China’s economic model and opening up to foreign trade and investment, Vietnam subsequently became one of the world’s fastest-growing economies.

As then-World Bank President Jim Yong Kim pointed out in 2016, Vietnam’s average annual growth rate of nearly 7% over the previous 25 years had enabled the country “to leapfrog to middle-income status in a single generation.” And during the same period, Kim noted, Vietnam had managed the “especially remarkable achievement” of reducing extreme poverty from 50% to just 3%.

The country’s success did not happen in isolation. After the Soviet Union collapsed, Vietnam integrated itself into many of East Asia’s existing regional bodies, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). There, it learned quickly from its neighbors, including China. More recently, Vietnam joined the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, an 11-country trade pact.

China’s spectacular resurgence has naturally heightened Vietnamese insecurity, given that the two neighbors have fought as recently as 1979. But rather than paralyzing Vietnamese policymakers, that insecurity has fostered a sense of strategic discipline and vigilance, which has contributed to the country’s extraordinary performance during the pandemic. China’s rise has had a similar galvanizing effect on some of its other neighbors, including Japan and South Korea.

Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has often cited the former Intel CEO Andy Grove’s mantra that “only the paranoid survive.” Paranoia is usually a negative emotion, but it can also trigger a powerful impulse to fight and survive. A deep determination to battle against great odds may explain why East Asia has so far responded far better to the pandemic than most of the West. And if the region’s economies also recover faster, they may well offer a glimmer of hope to a world currently drowning in pessimism.

 

Kishore Mahbubani, a Distinguished Fellow at the Asia Research Institute of the National University of Singapore, is the author of Has China Won?

(Public Affairs, 2020).

 Project Syndicate

 

Read the full article on The Financial Express.

La riposte contre le coronavirus affectée par le regain de tension sino-américaine

24.07.2020

RFi

Le président américain Donald Trump et le président chinois Xi Jinping se serrent la main après avoir fait des déclarations conjointes à la Grande Salle du Peuple à Pékin, Chine, le 9 novembre 2017.Le président américain Donald Trump et le président chinois Xi Jinping se serrent la main après avoir fait des déclarations conjointes à la Grande Salle du Peuple à Pékin, Chine, le 9 novembre 2017. REUTERS/Damir Sagolj/File Photo

Par : Sophie Malibeaux

Alors que le Covid-19 continue de se propager dans le monde -en l’absence de traitement efficace et de vaccin-, il aurait fallu un effort de coopération sans précédent à l’échelle de la planète pour enrayer la pandémie. Mais, la guerre économique fait rage entre Pékin et Washington et constitue une entrave à la gestion de la crise sanitaire et économique, qui touche l’ensemble de la planète.

Nos invités :

– Carine Milcent, économiste au CNRS, spécialiste des systèmes de santé, tout particulièrement chinois

– Pierre-Antoine Donnet, ancien rédacteur en chef de l’Agence France Presse, qui a également passé de nombreuses années en Asie, dont la Chine, mais aussi aux États-Unis, auteur du livre : « Le leadership mondial en question- l’affrontement entre la Chine et les États-Unis », aux éditions de l’aube

– Jean-Pierre Cabestan, sinologue, à l’Université baptiste de Hong Kong et chercheur associé à Asia Centre, il a la particularité d’avoir aussi parcouru de nombreux pays d’Afrique dans le cadre de ses recherches

– Clément Therme, chercheur au CERI-Sciences Po, spécialiste de l’Iran, qui a dirigé avec Mohammed Reza Djalili le dernier numéro de la revue « Confluences Méditerranée », sous le titre « L’Iran en quête d’équilibre ».

Ecouter ce podcast sur le site de RFi.

Sylvie Goulard sur le plan de relance : “L’expansion infinie des dettes est une illusion”

26/07/2020

L’Express

“L’Europe va enfin pouvoir marcher sur ses deux “jambes”, économique et monétaire”, Sylvie Goulard, sous-gouverneur de la Banque de France et ex-députée européenne.

afp.com/Kenzo TRIBOUILLARD

Pour l’ex-député européenne, la critique des pays dits “frugaux” est injustifiée car c’est bien leur sérieux budgétaire qui permet aujourd’hui la réalisation du plan de relance européen.

Après les flons flons et les satisfécits de circonstance provoqués par l’accord sur le plan de relance européen de 750 milliards d’euros, le plus dur commence peut-être pour l’Europe confrontée à une récession historique et une explosion des dettes. Pour l’ex-député européenne et sous-gouverneur de la Banque de France Sylvie Goulard, la mise en musique du plan s’annonce aussi périlleuse que son accouchement. Essentielle aussi pour l’avenir de la construction européenne.

Les déclarations triomphantes des chefs d’Etat de l’Union au lendemain de l’adoption du plan de relance européen ne masquent-elles pas en réalité un accord en demi-teinte ?

 

Lire la suite de l’article (réservé aux abonnés) sur le site de l’Express. 

Angela Merkel Guides the E.U. to a Deal, However Imperfect

By Steven Erlanger and Matina Stevis-Gridneff

July 21, 2020 – The New York Times

With her long experience as German chancellor, she shapes a necessary compromise on virus aid for the battered European south. But it’s consensus at a cost.

Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany and President Emmanuel Macron of France after their video news conference at the end of the E.U. summit meeting in Brussels early Tuesday morning. Credit…Pool photo by John Thys

BRUSSELS — After days and nights of rancorous haggling, European Union leaders reached an $857 billion pandemic recovery plan on Tuesday that, for the first time, committed them to borrow money collectively and distribute much of it as grants that do not need to be repaid by the countries hardest hit by the virus, like Italy.

But as the dust settled after the marathon negotiations — the European Union’s longest summit meeting in 20 years — the compromises that allowed Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, whose country holds the E.U.’s rotating presidency, to guide 27 nations toward consensus became all the more apparent, and none were too pretty.

The fissures in the bloc that Ms. Merkel needed to bridge ran up, down and sideways. There were divides between the frugal north and a needy, hard-hit south; but also west to east, between Brussels and budding autocracies like Poland and Hungary that have tested the limits of the bloc’s liberal democratic values.

But allowing the crisis stirred by the pandemic to worsen was in the end considered more dangerous than trimming some of the bloc’s larger budgetary ambitions or even allowing continued challenges to the rule of law.

The compromise that got most attention was between President Emmanuel Macron of France, who pushed for large-scale grants to southern European countries like Italy and Spain hit hardest by the pandemic, and Prime Minister Mark Rutte of the Netherlands, who pressed for more loans than grants and for structural economic reforms in return.

But how Ms. Merkel mollified the prime ministers of Hungary and Poland, Viktor Orban and Mateusz Morawiecki, may prove more consequential.

Not only was their money from Brussels protected and increased, despite regular questions about the misuse of those funds and efforts to condition the aid on adherence to the rule of law, but she promised to help them conclude bloc disciplinary measures against them for their alleged anti-democratic abuses.

“Prime Minister Orban told me he wants to take the necessary steps and does not want this to hang in the air,’’ Ms. Merkel said early Tuesday about the disciplinary procedure that had been opened against Hungary. “We will support Hungary,’’ she said, “but of course the crucial steps will need to be taken by Hungary.’’

That concession, little remarked upon, may have sealed the agreement, even if it outrages critics who think that Brussels is showing weakness in the face of abuses of bloc laws and values by some Central European member states. And that aspect of the deal may end up being the most contentious in the European Parliament, which must approve it.

The agreement “looks like a disaster for the rule of law,’’ said R. Daniel Kelemen, a scholar of Europe at Rutgers University. “Merkel and Macron were determined to reach a deal demonstrating the E.U.’s ability to respond to the crisis, and they proved willing to keep E.U. funds flowing to autocratic governments in order to close the deal.’’

Still, by tying the recovery fund into the seven-year budget, the first without Britain, they managed to solve two extremely difficult and tendentious problems at once. For all its messiness, there was little doubt that what they had achieved for the bloc was groundbreaking.

Ms. Merkel understood that failure would badly undermine the new leaders of the European Union itself — Council President Charles Michel and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, a former member of Ms. Merkel’s government.

Having joined with Mr. Macron in supporting a virus recovery fund borrowed for collectively — a first — she then patiently worked for consensus, understanding the political needs of both Mr. Macron, whose expansive vision for the E.U. remains unfulfilled, and of Mr. Rutte, whose government hangs by a thread, depending on politicians even more tightfisted than he.

Mr. Macron and Mr. Rutte proved themselves two sometimes angry, sometimes emotional leaders of the two main contending groups, and the weekend talks were unusually acrimonious.

With Britain gone, Mr. Rutte and his Austrian counterpart, Sebastian Kurz, have stepped forward to create a bloc of smaller countries, known as “the frugals,’’ which are trying to restrain the big-spending, integrationist ambitions of Mr. Macron and the poorer southern countries.

Prime Minister Mark Rutte of the Netherlands led a group of countries, including Austria, Sweden, Denmark and often Finland, that became known as “the frugals.”Credit…Pool photo by Stephanie Lecocq

But while they came to Brussels saying that they were opposed to any outright grants based on collective debt, it was obvious that there would be some once France and Germany pushed for them.

Then the only question — however difficult — was to negotiate an amount and some mechanism to monitor the spending, so that everyone could go home talking of victory.

France and Germany had proposed 500 billion euros in grants; the Commission took that and added another 250 billion in loans; in the end, after intense squabbling, the balance was 390 billion in grants and 360 billion in loans.

Still, that is a remarkable victory for Mr. Macron, who has broken a major taboo on creating collective debt and built a possible architecture for handling future crises — if Ms. Merkel’s successors agree.

For the future of the euro currency, the elephant in the room is Italy, the bloc’s third-largest economy by most measures, and already drowning in debt. Italy is both one of the least reformed economies in the eurozone and one of the hardest hit by the virus.

So while both groups agreed that Italy must be a major beneficiary of funds that do not increase its already sizable debt pile, Mr. Rutte and his group — including Austria, Sweden, Denmark and often Finland — also wanted tough monitoring on the use of those funds. And they wanted member states to have a say in that monitoring, not just the Commission, the bloc’s unelected bureaucracy, which they regard as weak and often blind to abuses.

That could create significant bitterness for the future. But for now, bending to reality, the “frugals’’ in return got the numbers down, got some form of state monitoring and got paid off with higher rebates in the budget.

“Despite all this progress, we should not delude ourselves,’’ said Friedrich Heinemann, research department head at ZEW Mannheim, the Center for European Economic Research. “The lack of competitiveness and low growth prospects in countries like Italy cannot be solved with transfers and loans from Brussels. Only comprehensive reforms of labor markets, public administration and the education and innovation system will help.”

 

Naples, Italy, last month. Italy, the European Union’s third-largest economy, is seen as the member most affected by the coronavirus pandemic.Credit…Gianni Cipriano for The New York Times

Others were angered by the concessions to Mr. Orban, in particular, which may plant the seeds for future conflict.

“Planned sanctions for E.U. member states that violate fundamental rights and the rule of law have been watered down beyond recognition,’’ said Daniel Freund, a German European legislator from the Greens. By now requiring a reinforced majority to impose sanctions, “the whole mechanism is rendered useless.’’

Ms. Merkel clearly decided she needed the fund more and “has always been lenient on Orban,’’ he said. The result, he said, puts leaders “on a collision course with the European Parliament and makes a quick agreement unlikely.’’

 

Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary, third from right, with the leaders of the European Council, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia on Sunday.Credit…Pool photo by Francois Walschaerts

Not least, to reach consensus, the E.U. ended up with a smaller post-Brexit European budget, and one that eliminates or reduces spending for some ambitious projects designed to prepare Europe for the future — like in research and climate transition, a fund to promote consensus on carbon goals for 2030 that was slashed by one-third.

Even with the virus, a proposed health fund evaporated entirely. There were also reductions from Commission proposals in other areas of investment, foreign policy and defense.

Ms. von der Leyen called it “a difficult point” and said that such cuts, made in the search for a compromise, are “regrettable, it decreases the innovative part of the budget.’’

“It was all about give and take, so the victims seem to have been the E.U. public goods, which deliver value added to all,’’ said Jean Pisani-Ferry, a French economist, in a Twitter message. “The price of the deal looks high.”

“This is not frugal. This is stupid,’’ said Henrik Enderlein, a German economist who heads of the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, in a Twitter response. But he also applauded the larger deal and the recovery fund. “We shouldn’t be frugal in our judgment,’’ he said. “This is historic.”

As Mr. Enderlein noted, the summit must be considered a breakthrough in a time of crisis when the European Union, now without Britain, could not be seen to fail. European fights about money and budgets are never pretty. But Ms. Merkel more than most understands that for all the talk of European solidarity, the European Union only proceeds when its varied leaders can convince their voters that they have fought the good fight for national interests.

As Janis Emmanouilidis, director of Studies at the European Policy Centre, commented:

“The price of no deal would have been much higher — potentially incalculable both economically and politically at the E.U. and national level.’’

But however important, this deal cannot be the last, he suggested, noting: “We are still at the beginning of the Covid-19 crisis.’’

Steven Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe, based in Brussels. He previously reported from London, Paris, Jerusalem, Berlin, Prague, Moscow and Bangkok. @StevenErlanger

Find the original article on The New York Times. 

Alliances under stress: South Korea, Japan, and the United States

Marcus Noland at the WPC 2017 in Marrakech.

19.11.2019 – East West Center

by Marcus Noland

HONOLULU (November 19, 2019)—Rising diplomatic tensions between South Korea and Japan are putting American security interests at risk. Yet the United States government appears detached, unable to facilitate a rapprochement between its two allies. This is a critical moment because a South Korea-Japan intelligence-sharing agreement, aimed at North Korea, is due to lapse on 22 November this year.

Anti-Japanese demonstration in Seoul

On Aug. 24 2019, South Koreans in Seoul participated in a rally to denounce Japan’s new trade restrictions. Photo: Chung Sung-Jun, Getty Images.

The current imbroglio has its origins in both the geopolitics and domestic politics of the two Asian countries. Due to their differing historical experiences, nationalism has been captured by different ends of the political spectrum in South Korea and Japan—in South Korea by the left and in Japan by the right. The current combination of a left-wing government in South Korea and a right-wing government in Japan feeds nationalist sentiment in both countries.

At the same time, North Korea has shifted to a less confrontational diplomatic stance. In its 2018 New Year’s message, it appealed to South Korea for Korean solidarity. In order to take advantage of this opening, South Korean President Moon Jae-in began distancing himself from Japan.

In October 2018, the South Korean Supreme Court ruled in favor of compensation for South Koreans who were forced to work for Japanese companies during the period of Japanese colonial rule. One month later, the court ruled that the 1965 treaty that established normal relations between the two countries, and was meant to resolve claims arising from the colonial period, did not cover the issue of “comfort women”—Korean women compelled to sexual servitude by Japanese authorities during the Pacific War—because the treaty did not recognize that Japanese colonial rule had been illegal. One month later, President Moon unilaterally dissolved the 2015 bilateral comfort women accord, which was unpopular in South Korea.

In response to these developments, Japan requested consultations under provisions of the 1965 treaty. When South Korea did not respond, Japan initiated export controls, removing South Korea from its “white list” of countries exempt from security-oriented export regulations. This action disrupted trade in chemicals used in semiconductor production.

It was widely assumed that the Japanese move was motivated by commercial interests because the export controls that were introduced damaged South Korean rivals to Japanese firms. Conceivably, there could have been a national security rationale as well because the move impeded South Korean sales to China, where advanced chips are used in artificial intelligence (AI) and surveillance applications.

South Korea responded by removing Japan from its own “white list” and filing a World Trade Organization (WTO) case against Japan over the export controls. The initiation of the WTO case followed close on the heels of an unrelated WTO case in which South Korea lost to Japan over issues involving pneumatic valves. Apart from the context of deteriorating diplomatic relations, South Korea’s export control filing could also be interpreted as a tit-for-tat move in purely trade policy terms.

Critically, however, the South Korean government followed by indicating that it would decline to renew the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), a bilateral intelligence-sharing agreement between South Korea and Japan. The dissolution of this agreement between two important allies would be a serious blow to American security interests. From an economic and diplomatic standpoint, the question now is whether the Moon government will begin seizing Japanese-owned property in South Korea as a response to the Supreme Court’s ruling allowing compensation for forced labor during the colonial period.

Some have interpreted South Korea’s withdrawal from the GSOMIA as a “cry for help” aimed at the United States. And indeed, normally the United States would have acted with alacrity to bring its two allies together.

If this was the Moon government’s aim, it may have badly miscalculated. President Trump is inattentive, and resolving this issue would require a degree of serious personal involvement in diplomacy for which he has shown little inclination. Indeed, as the impeachment effort proceeds, Trump’s involvement in foreign affairs is likely to grow even more uneven and episodic.

To the extent that the Trump administration has any kind of North Korea policy, it appears to lean toward engaging in diplomacy with North Korea, which would imply distancing itself from Japan. That said, the United States and Japan just reached a minor trade agreement, suggesting that the U.S. administration might feel favorably disposed toward intervening to help its allies reconcile.

So, what can be done? In the short term, it would be desirable to extend the GSOMIA between South Korea and Japan provisionally while the parties attempt to work out their disagreements. The WTO is a useful forum for working out trade disputes in a relatively depoliticized setting. Its protracted processes could actually be a benefit in this case.

Substantively, a softening of Japan in its stance toward North Korea might close some of the gaps between Seoul and Tokyo, but this is unlikely. Politically, a redirection of South Korean protest away from Japan as a country and toward specific Japanese policies, or even toward the government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, might modestly turn down the heat or at least form a better basis for moving forward.

Of the three governments, the United States has the greatest room for maneuver, but the Trump administration appears to be missing in action. This lapse could have serious long-run implications for U.S. security interests.

Meanwhile, defense cost-sharing talks between the United States and South Korea are becoming more contentious. This is not only contributing to rising frustration in Seoul but also to a perception among a small but growing constituency in both Japan and South Korea that the United States may be an unreliable partner and that both countries will need to shoulder responsibility for their own defenses against a nuclear-armed North Korea.

The eventual result could be the development of independent nuclear capabilities in both South Korea and Japan, not an outcome that many Americans or others would welcome.

Find the original article on EastWestCenter.org. 

The pandemic in North Korea: Lessons from the 1990s famine

Marcus Noland participated at the WPC 2019 in Marrakech.

08.06.2020 – East West Center

by Marcus Noland

HONOLULU (8 June 2020)—North Korea’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic is oddly reminiscent of the catastrophic famine that overtook the country in the 1990s. Then as now, the onset and severity of the famine caught the North Korean leadership unawares, and their first response was to deny that a problem existed. A look back at how the response played out after the initial denial offers some clues as to how the current regime may respond to the COVID-19 crisis today.

The 1990s famine

In the 1990s as now, North Korea’s political culture discouraged low-level officials from communicating distress to those higher up. Although food-insecurity problems were already emerging in the late 1980s, it may not have been until 1993, when North Korean leader Kim Il-sung’s guerrilla colleague Kang Song-san went directly to the Great Leader with firsthand evidence of the famine, that the leadership began to understand how badly things were going. Even then, North Korea made only hesitant appeals to the outside world for assistance, underplaying the severity of the problem.

Eventually the government reversed course and began exaggerating the distress in order to obtain aid. At the same time, however, North Korea ferociously contested the terms on which aid would be provided, insisting on practices that violated the basic principles of humanitarian assistance. The number of aid workers was limited, their ability to travel was severely restricted, and the government even banned aid workers who spoke Korean. Relief agencies were hobbled in their ability to evaluate need and ensure that relief supplies reached the intended recipients.

At its peak, food aid, in principle, fed one-third of the population, but the North Koreans made offsetting cuts to commercial food imports rather than expanding overall food availability. Freed-up funds were directed to other priorities, including the military.

Parallels with the pandemic

North Korea’s political culture still inhibits the communication of bad news, and it is notable that the government claims that there are no COVID-19 cases despite a variety of indicators that would suggest otherwise. There are unconfirmed rumors of outbreaks, observable disruptions in normal behavior—events cancelled, the wearing of masks, and Kim Jong-un’s disappearance—all possibly undertaken as precautionary measures. General Robert A. Abrams, commander of US Forces Korea has publicly stated that there are COVID-19 cases in North Korea, although he did not disclose his sources of information.

Pyongyang suspended foreign tourism on 21 January and has largely closed its border with China, its major trading partner. Prices are rising, and deprived of revenues from trade, the government appears to be attempting to confiscate foreign exchange, reminiscent of a 2009 botched currency reform.

Despite the decline in trade and all the bad news, the value of the North Korean won is rising on the black market as citizens, fearing expropriation, dump their foreign exchange to purchase physical goods as a store of value. This economic dislocation could be expected to intensify popular discontent, but there appears to be no civil-society organizations capable of channeling mass discontent into effective political action.

The fact that North Korea claims it has no cases of COVID-19 means that appeals for assistance are by necessity tepid and elicit little outside support. China is surreptitiously providing aid, and if Chinese support proves inadequate, it is possible that North Korea might reverse course and exaggerate distress as it did during the famine. The scope is considerable— according to a widely cited study from Imperial College, London, COVID-19 might kill 150,000 North Koreans if left unchecked. This would be equivalent to 1.9 million Americans.

What role for South Korea?

North Korean behavior puts South Korea in a difficult position. Understandably South Korea sees itself as central to events on the Korean peninsula, and the current pandemic would seem to be an ideal venue for North-South cooperation.

But Pyongyang has consistently tried to marginalize Seoul. At the outset of the famine, it secured aid from Tokyo before turning to Seoul. And in 1995, when the first shipload of South Korean rice was sent north, the North Korean authorities, in contravention of an agreement, forced the ship to fly a North Korean flag.

The inter-Korean relationship has always been embedded in broader international politics, and in the 1990s the North Koreans proved adept at splitting coalitions and playing donors off against each other. Washington and Seoul were generally in step in the 1990s, but the gap widened when George W. Bush assumed the American presidency, which coincided with a period of progressive leadership in Seoul.

In light of this history, what might we expect today?

Seoul will see itself as central to the situation and seek to promote its interests. Pyongyang will prioritize relations with other powers such as China, and possibly the United States, in an attempt to marginalize Seoul. It is likely that the North Koreans will try to play donors off against each other and play on South Korean insecurities, especially regarding Chinese influence on the Korean peninsula.

As in the 1990s, the North Koreans will likely exhibit a predilection for material aid—such as medical equipment that can be portrayed internally as a kind of political tribute to the Kim regime—over technical assistance. In particular, the North Koreans will be loath to appear to be taking advice from their South Korean counterparts.

And what about international sanctions?

Today, the pandemic is occurring against a backdrop of comprehensive multilateral sanctions against North Korea, undertaken in response to its missile and nuclear tests. North Korea is rightly being given sanctions exemptions for humanitarian assistance, but any broader relaxation of sanctions is likely to be controversial.

Even before the COVID-19 crisis, some countries were displaying “sanctions fatigue,” showing a lack of enthusiasm about enforcement and quietly tolerating sanctions evasion. This trend is reinforced by evident frustration with the inconsistent diplomacy emanating from Washington. The pandemic is likely to weaken further diplomatic support for the sanctions regime.

History does not repeat itself, but it would not be surprising if many of the same tendencies, witnessed 25 years ago, emerged in the coming months. Recent reports of the demise of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un turned out to be false, but they serve as a reminder of dangerous information gaps, unresolved tensions, and the potential for instability on the Korean peninsula.

 

Find the original article on EastWestCenter.org. 

Women scaling the corporate ladder: Progress steady but slow globally

Soyoung Han (PIIE) and Marcus Noland (PIIE)

May 2020
Despite steady progress, women remain grossly underrepresented in corporate leadership worldwide. The share of women executive officers and board members increased between 1997 and 2017, but progress was not uniform. Partly in response to gender quotas, the shares of female board members have risen rapidly in some countries while lagging elsewhere. This Policy Brief reports results derived from the financial records of about 62,000 publicly listed firms in 58 economies over 1997–2017, which together account for more than 92 percent of global GDP. The authors conclude that if, as emerging evidence in the literature indicates, gender diversity contributes to superior firm performance, then progress in this area could help boost productivity globally. Policymakers and corporate leaders should consider supportive public and private policies, including more gender-neutral tracking in education, firm protocols that encourage gender balance in hiring and promotion, enforceable antidiscrimination laws, public support for readily available and affordable high-quality childcare and maternity and paternity leave, and quotas.

Josep Borrell : « Je suis profondément préoccupé par le recours croissant aux sanctions contre les entreprises et les intérêts européens »

L’UE dénonce la politique des sanctions de l’administration Trump

Josep Borrell, chef de la diplomatie européenne, a dénoncé vendredi la politique des sanctions de l’administration américaine, estimant qu’elle était contre-productive.

Le chef de la diplomatie européenne Josep Borrell a dénoncé vendredi la politique des sanctions de l’administration américaine, la jugeant contre-productive.

« Je suis profondément préoccupé par le recours croissant aux sanctions, ou à la menace de sanctions, par les États-Unis contre les entreprises et les intérêts européens », a-t-il déclaré dans un communiqué publié en son nom pendant un sommet européen consacré à la relance de l’économie européenne.

« Tendance croissante »

« Nous avons été témoins de cette tendance croissante dans les cas de l’Iran, de Cuba, de la Cour pénale internationale et, plus récemment, des projets (de gazoducs) Nordstream 2 et Turkstream », a-t-il souligné.

Le chef de la diplomatie américaine Mike Pompeo a ouvert la voie mercredi à des sanctions plus dures pour empêcher la mise en service du projet de gazoduc Nordstream 2 entre la Russie et l’Allemagne. Ces sanctions ont été dénoncées par Berlin.

Le projet Turkstream doit lui acheminer du gaz russe en Turquie et en Europe. Il a été inauguré en janvier par les présidents russes Vladimir Poutine et turc Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

« Contraire au droit international »

« Par principe, l’Union européenne s’oppose à l’utilisation de sanctions par des pays tiers contre des entreprises européennes exerçant des activités légitimes », a rappelé M. Borrell.

« En outre, elle considère que l’application extraterritoriale de sanctions est contraire au droit international », a-t-il insisté. L’Espagnol a souligné que « les politiques européennes devraient être déterminées ici en Europe et non par des pays tiers ».

« Lorsque des différences de politique existent, l’Union européenne est toujours ouverte au dialogue. Mais cela ne peut pas se faire contre la menace de sanctions », a-t-il conclu.

 

Jean-Pierre Cabestan : “Peut-on laisser une dictature devenir la première puissance mondiale ?”

Par Brice Pedroletti – le 18 juillet 2020

Entre la Chine et les Etats-Unis, l’escalade des tensions

Washington soumet Pékin à un pilonnage de sanctions pour des motifs politiques, une première. Mais la défense des droits de l’homme sert aussi un autre objectif : ralentir le géant asiatique dans sa quête technologique.

Mike Pompeo évoque les cas de deux citoyens canadiens détenus en Chine depuis 2018, lors d’une conférence de presse à Washington, le 1er juillet.

Mike Pompeo évoque les cas de deux citoyens canadiens détenus en Chine depuis 2018, lors d’une conférence de presse à Washington, le 1er juillet. MANUEL BALCE CENATA / AFP

Un peu plus de deux ans après la guerre commerciale déclarée par le gouvernement Trump à la Chine, les Etats-Unis ont ouvert de nouveaux fronts pour exercer des pressions sur Pékin, au nom des principes qu’ils défendent et au moyen de lois extraterritoriales. L’offensive porte sur des questions politiques – l’autonomie pour Hongkong, les droits de l’homme pour la région du Xinjiang, et l’espionnage pour Huawei et les médias officiels chinois aux Etats-Unis, désormais désignés comme des « missions étrangères ».

« C’est la première fois depuis Tiananmen, en 1989, que des sanctions aussi systématiques sont prises contre la Chine. A l’époque, c’était un massacre. Là, cela punit la répression, mais ce qui est visé, c’est l’affirmation de puissance chinoise. La vraie question est désormais : Peut-on laisser une dictature devenir la première puissance mondiale ? », analyse le sinologue Jean-Pierre Cabestan, de l’université baptiste de Hongkong.

Le « blitzkrieg » juridique américain repose sur le Hongkong Autonomy Act, signé le 14 juillet, le Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, signé le 17 juin, ainsi que sur le Global Magnitsky Human Rights Act. Cette loi, originellement destinée à la Russie, étendue en 2016 aux auteurs de violations des droits de l’homme dans le monde entier, cible pour la première fois la Chine. Plusieurs hauts responsables du Xinjiang ayant eu un rôle-clé dans la politique d’internement massif de la minorité ouïgoure sont désormais interdits de séjour aux Etats-Unis, et leurs avoirs, s’ils en ont, gelés par le département d’Etat.

La nouvelle loi sur Hongkong, qui s’ajoute à la révocation du traitement préférentiel réservé au territoire par les Américains en matière commerciale et financière, doit sanctionner les entités et les individus ayant contribué à éroder le haut degré d’autonomie de Hongkong au moyen de la loi de sécurité nationale promulguée par Pékin le 1er juillet dernier. Aucun nom n’a été précisé, mais « tout est sur la table », a signalé un porte-parole du Conseil de sécurité nationale américain.

Ralentir la quête technologique chinoise

Bloomberg a rapporté, mercredi 15 juillet, qu’étaient pressentis pour rejoindre la liste le responsable des affaires de Hongkong au sein du Comité permanent du Parti communiste chinois (PCC), Han Zheng – soit, potentiellement, le dirigeant chinois le plus haut placé jamais ciblé –, ainsi que la chef du gouvernement de Hongkong, Carrie Lam. Le New York Times faisait état, le même jour, d’un plan à l’étude à la Maison Blanche pour interdire de visa les 92 millions de membres du PCC. Une décision toutefois délicate à mettre en œuvre en raison de la difficulté, pour les Américains, de vérifier ce statut pour les membres ordinaires.

[…]

Lire l’article complet (réservé aux abonnés), sur le site du Monde. 

NATO Is Dying

Ana Palacio

15.07.2020

Last December, NATO commemorated 70 years of underpinning peace, stability, and prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic. But cracks in the Alliance are deepening, raising serious doubts about whether it will reach its 75th anniversary. The time for Europe to shore up its defenses and capabilities is now.

MADRID – NATO may be “the most successful alliance in history” – as its secretary-general, Jens Stoltenberg, claims – but it may also be on the brink of failure. After a turbulent few years, during which US President Donald Trump has increasingly turned America’s back on NATO, tensions between France and Turkey have escalated sharply, laying bare just how fragile the Alliance has become.

The Franco-Turkish spat began in mid-June, when a French navy frigate under NATO command in the Mediterranean attempted to inspect a cargo vessel suspected of violating a United Nations arms embargo on Libya. France alleges that three Turkish ships accompanying the cargo vessel were “extremely aggressive” toward its frigate, flashing their radar lights three times – a signal indicating imminent engagement. Turkey denied France’s account, claiming that the French frigate was harassing its ships.

Whatever the details, the fact is that two NATO allies came very close to exchanging fire in the context of a NATO mission. That is a new low for the Alliance – one that may herald its demise.

Lord Hastings Ismay, NATO’s first secretary-general, famously quipped that the Alliance’s mission was to “keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” The dynamic obviously changed over the subsequent decades, especially the relationship with Germany. But the broad basis of cooperation – a common perceived threat, strong American leadership, and a shared sense of purpose – remained the same.

Without US leadership, the whole structure is at risk of crumbling. It is no coincidence that the last time two NATO allies came this close to blows – during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 – the US was preoccupied with the Vietnam War. In fact, the spat between Turkey and France occurred just days after it was revealed that Trump had decided, without any prior consultation with America’s NATO allies, to withdraw thousands of US troops from Germany.

Germany may no longer be on the front line, as it was during the Cold War, but US forces there still serve as a powerful deterrent to Russian aggression along NATO’s eastern flank. By drawing down those forces, Trump has sent a fundamental message: ensuring European security is no longer a top US priority.

While America’s drift away from Europe has accelerated under Trump, it began over a decade earlier. In 2011, when Trump’s predecessor, Barack Obama, was touting his “pivot to Asia,” then-US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned that, unless NATO proved itself relevant, the US may lose interest. NATO did no such thing: until last December, its summit declarations failed even to acknowledge the challenges posed by China’s rise. By then, the US had lost interest. And now, under Trump, that disinterest has become open hostility.

Without the US as a rudder, NATO allies have begun to head off in different directions. Turkey is the clearest example. Before the recent squabble with France, Turkey purchased a Russian S-400 missile-defense system, despite US objections. Moreover, it has brazenly intervened in Libya, providing air support, weapons, and fighters to the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seems confident that his direct relationship with Trump will protect him from suffering any consequences for his behavior. Trump’s decision not to impose sanctions over the missile purchase, beyond cutting Turkey’s participation in the F-35 fighter jet program, seems to vindicate Erdoğan’s reasoning.

But Turkey is not alone in striking out on its own; France has done the same, including in Libya. By providing military support to the Russian-backed General Khalifa Haftar, who controls eastern Libya, to fight Islamist militants, France has gone against its NATO allies. While President Emmanuel Macrondenies supporting Haftar’s side in the civil war, he did recently express support for Egypt’s pledge to intervene militarily against Turkey, which he says has a “criminal responsibility” in the country.

As tensions with Turkey rise, France is more insistent than ever that a European approach to security and defense – one that would be de facto led by France – is vital. The fact that popular support for Macron within France is waning only augments his sense of urgency.

Political motivations aside, Macron has said aloud what few others have acknowledged: NATO is experiencing “brain death,” owing to Trump’s dubious commitment to defend America’s allies. Given that the US drift away from NATO began well before Trump, there is little reason to believe that this trend will be reversed, though it may be slowed if he loses the November election. Unless Europe begins thinking of itself as a geopolitical power and takes responsibility for its own security, Macron argues, it will “no longer be in control of [its] destiny.”

Last December, NATO commemorated 70 years of underpinning peace, stability, and prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic. But cracks in the Alliance are deepening, raising serious doubts about whether it will reach its 75th anniversary. The time for Europe to shore up its defenses and capabilities is now.

Read the article on Project Syndicate.

Britain takes a clear stand on Hong Kong

15.07.2020

In reaction to a new national security law giving the Chinese government extensive powers over Hong Kong, Prime Minister Boris Johnson has offered residents of the former British colony an opportunity to settle in the United Kingdom. The gesture was a welcome show of leadership amid half-hearted reactions from other Western nations. An influx of Hong Kongese immigrants could also boost the British economy.

The Hong Kongese are committed to preserving their freedom and the British system of law and governance (source: dpa)

Beijing’s new security law for the autonomous Hong Kong area will infringe civil rights and further curb freedom. According to the United Kingdom, it is a clear breach of the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, which was the basis for the transfer of the former Crown Colony to China. The region’s autonomy was guaranteed under the “one country, two systems” clause of the agreement. Hong Kong was then handed back to the Chinese government on July 1, 1997.

The “one country, two systems” arrangement benefited Hong Kong. Its rise as an independent financial center also boosted the Middle Kingdom’s economic progress. However, the situation was still a bitter pill for Beijing to swallow. Hong Kong had been ceded to the UK under military pressure at the end of the First Opium War in the 19th century. China quite understandably considered this a national dishonor. It was therefore to be expected that it would eventually violate the agreement.

The Chinese government had been trying for some time to erode Hong Kong’s autonomy through salami tactics. In March 2019, the city’s inhabitants responded with widespread demonstrations. The authorities, which report to Beijing, struggled to keep the protests under control. To rein in the opposition and allow security forces from mainland China to enter, Beijing passed the security law.

“The new legislation clearly contravenes the 1984 Sino-British agreement”

However, the legislation clearly contravenes the 1984 Sino-British agreement. The majority of Hong Kong residents support the autonomous status granted in the declaration, which lends it democratic legitimacy. The Hong Kongese are committed to preserving their freedom and the British system of law and governance.

The United States reacted by including Hong Kong in the sanctions already imposed on mainland China. The European Commission issued an apathetic warning.

The political and military balance of power has reversed since the opium wars. The European Union and Britain do not have the clout to prevent China from resorting to force. Furthermore, judging from the Ukraine crisis, neither the European Union nor its member states are willing to make courageous decisions.

UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his government, on the other hand, have shown their decisiveness. They demonstrated strength by taking the only honorable measure in their power: offering to welcome the three million citizens of Hong Kong by allowing them to settle in the UK and apply for citizenship. Although Beijing might try to interfere with emigration, the gesture shows resolve and acumen.

UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his government have shown their decisiveness

To the extent that it can, London wants to fulfill its obligations to the people of its former colony. But the measure could also have a positive effect in the UK. Unlike migrants who want the benefits of welfare, but do not accept and respect the local culture, traditions and customs in their host country, newcomers from Hong Kong would value British society. The Hong Kongese are known to be assiduous, diligent and hardworking. Their aspiration to freedom and financial independence would likely give a boost to the UK’s economy.

Beijing’s strong reaction indicates that the offer is effective, even though the Chinese Communist Party might try to restrict emigration, like the countries under Soviet leadership did during the period of the Iron Curtain. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab have given the world an example of leadership.

by Prince Michael of Liechstenstein

Find the original article on GIS Report’s website. 

Philippe Chalmin : Cette pandémie sonne le glas de trente années de «mondialisation heureuse ».

15.07.2020

Richard Etienne

Covid-19: «Il n’y a pas eu de crise alimentaire»

Les chaînes d’approvisionnement sont confrontées à des tensions historiques, mais les experts, dont Philippe Chalmin, le père fondateur du rapport «Cyclope», estiment qu’elles tiennent le choc.

Après l’amuse-bouche, nous avons droit à des asperges au pamplemousse et à l’estragon, à une volaille rôtie aux morilles de feu et aux pois puis à un trio chocolaté. Dans la salle de bal de l’hôtel Richemond ce 24 juin, les tables sont drapées de blanc, les serveurs munis de gants en plastique et de masques. Du directeur financier de Trafigura au fondateur de Lambert Commodities, la fine fleur du négoce est réunie pour l’un de ses rendez-vous annuels: la présentation du rapport «Cyclope», un millier de pages dédiées aux matières premières, souvent considérées comme la bible du secteur. On écoute Philippe Chalmin, le père fondateur du rapport, qui présente sa 34e édition, forcément spéciale cette année..

Pour la première fois depuis 1348 et la peste noire, une maladie a plongé l’économie dans un état de léthargie profonde, relève l’historien, qui estime que cette pandémie sonne le glas de trente années de «mondialisation heureuse ». Mais quand il en vient aux céréales, il est très clair: «En 2008, il y a eu une flambée des prix, car on sortait de plusieurs années de mauvaises récoltes et d’El Niño, mais pas en 2020. Il n’y a pas eu de crise alimentaire cette année.»

Il y a eu des tensions et elles demeurent. Le contexte chahuté a conduit nombre d’observateurs à faire référence à la crise céréalière de 2008. «En France, le chiffre d’affaires des supermarchés a été multiplié par trois à partir du 16-17 mars, les gens se sont précipités sur la farine, les œufs, les pâtes, ce qui a donné une impression de pénurie. Il y a bien eu quelques pénuries, surtout d’emballages, mais c’est tout. Le prix du blé et du riz ont un peu augmenté, pour le reste, ça a baissé et ça va encore baisser», anticipe-t-il alors que presque toutes les récoltes s’annoncent bonnes.

Stocks en hausse

Le Conseil international des céréales annonce que les stocks de blé, fin juin 2020, sont en hausse de 10 millions de tonnes sur un an. En comparaison avec 2007, les réserves de céréales sont deux fois plus importantes, le shipping en vrac 20 fois moins cher et le baril vaut 30 dollars, relève The Economist.

En Suisse, les patates de table et leurs cousines utilisées pour les chips se sont écoulées comme jamais pendant le confinement, mais les variétés destinées aux frites (surtout consommées dans les restaurants et aux fêtes) n’ont pas trouvé preneur. Aux Pays-Bas, les agriculteurs se sont retrouvés avec un million de tonnes de pommes de terre en trop. On a même demandé aux Belges de manger plus de frites.

Les travailleurs saisonniers – indispensables pour les récoltes de fruits et légumes – se sont faits rares dans le monde et en Suisse. Pour les grossistes spécialisés dans la restauration, passer en quelques semaines de sacs de 20 kg de farine à des paquets de 500 grammes – pour la grande distribution – relève du défi. La demande en entrepôts réfrigérés s’est accrue en Europe dans la foulée.

A l’hôtel Richemond, certains évoquent l’exemple des denrées qu’ils traitent. J’apprends que jamais le Brésil n’a autant exporté de soja en Chine, où l’élevage de porc redémarre après la peste porcine africaine, que les Brésiliens se sont remis à produire du sucre à partir de maïs (ce marché étant désormais plus intéressant que l’éthanol, dont les prix ont chuté), que le coton subit la fermeture des boutiques vestimentaires et la concurrence du synthétique.

«La pandémie est un choc exceptionnel, car elle affecte en même temps les pays producteurs et les pays consommateurs. Normalement, quand il y a un accident, de mauvaises ou de trop bonnes récoltes, c’est un choc d’offre. Des chocs de la demande, il n’y en a pas. Depuis une trentaine d’années, la demande progresse avec l’augmentation démographique et les prix sont stables», estime quelques jours plus tard au téléphone Jean-François Lambert, le fondateur du cabinet du même nom.

«Cette année, il y a eu un choc de panique, simultané, partout, ce qui a mis les chaînes d’approvisionnement sous tension, mais on peut dire qu’elles ont réussi leur grand oral. Les pénuries n’ont pas duré.»

Mondialisation régionalisée

«On n’a pas vaincu le Covid-19, les mesures de prudence vont continuer, on n’est pas à l’abri d’un nouveau choc, les gens vont stocker davantage, prévient-il. Il va falloir modifier les stratégies de stockage, diversifier les sources d’approvisionnement, les consommateurs demandent que les filières courtes soient privilégiées.» Jean-François Lambert relève que, malgré les bas prix du transport, l’écrasante majorité des céréales cultivées en Europe sont consommées en Europe. «La mondialisation est régionalisée», estime le consultant.

Selon le «Grain Market Report», sur les 2162 millions de tonnes de céréales qui devraient être produites en 2020 dans le monde, 314 millions sont européennes. En Suisse en 2019, 39,5% des céréales importées sont venues de France et 20,9% d’Allemagne, selon les douanes, une proximité qui explique pourquoi Migros peut largement se passer du service des négociants. Loin derrière, en troisième position des pays partenaires, figure le Canada, avec 6,4% des parts.

Dans la salle de bal, on applaudit Philippe Chalmin. «C’est dangereux, me confie un trader. En janvier, on était aussi tous d’accord et on n’a rien vu venir.»

Retrouvez cet article dans Le Temps.

 

Global Challenges Europa braucht eine andere Nahost-Strategie

16.07.2020

von Volker Perthes

© MOHAMMED TALATENE/DPA

Die EU wird beim Thema Naher Osten bald gefordert sein. Ist sie vorbereitet? Über eine nötige Israel-Politik – und die falsche Fixierung auf den Iran. Ein Gastbeitrag.

Global Challenges ist eine Marke der DvH Medien. Das neue Institut möchte die Diskussion geopolitischer Themen durch Veröffentlichungen anerkannter Experten vorantreiben. Heute ein Beitrag von Prof. Dr. Volker Perthes, Direktor der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) Berlin. Weitere Autoren und Autorinnen sind Prof. Dr. Ann-Kristin Achleitner, Sigmar Gabriel, Günther H. Oettinger, Prof. Jörg Rocholl PhD, Prof. Dr. Bert Rürup und Prof. Dr. Renate Schubert.

Fluidität ist wohl das Wort, das die geopolitische Dynamik im Nahen und Mittleren Osten am besten beschreibt: Zwischen Ägypten und dem Persischen Golf gibt es keine Sicherheitsarchitektur, keine stabile Machtbalance, nicht einmal eine klare Kräftehierarchie. Die Perspektive ausländischer Mächte richtet sich auf die Abwehr von Gefahren, wirtschaftliche und politische Chancen der Region sind längst in den Hintergrund getreten.

Die Erwartung an Europa, sich stärker um regionale Entspannung zu bemühen, dürfte aber bald wachsen – zumal die USA im Nahen und Mittleren Osten kaum mehr präsent sind. Ist Europa auf diese Herausforderung vorbereitet?

Lange beherrschte der rasch internationalisierte Bürgerkrieg in Syrien die außenpolitischen Debatten, schon weil er die politischen, konfessionellen und regionalen Rivalitäten der Region wie unter einem Brennglas vergrößert zeigte. Noch heute sind russische, türkische, amerikanische, iranische und israelische Streitkräfte aktiv an militärischen Auseinandersetzungen in Syrien beteiligt. Dennoch steht der Konflikt nicht mehr im Zentrum des regionalen Geschehens.

 

Selbst arabische Staaten, die das Anti-Assad-Lager im Krieg unterstützt hatten, normalisieren ihre Beziehungen zu Damaskus. Die Türkei vertritt ihre Interessen im Norden Syriens, konzentriert sich aber mehr auf Libyen. Russland will Assads Regime, das es ohne Putins neue „Großmachtpolitik“ gar nicht mehr gäbe, stabilisieren.

Die Golfstaaten stemmen sich dagegen, Syrien iranischem, russischem und türkischem Einfluss zu überlassen. Irans Position wiederum wird durch den Ölpreisverfall, die Corona-Pandemie, US-amerikanischen Sanktionen und Luftangriffe Israels auf iranische Stellungen in Syrien geschwächt. Allerdings ist nicht zu erwarten, dass Teheran sich in absehbarer Zeit aus Syrien zurückziehen wird. Selbst Kritiker des Regimes sehen in der militärischen Präsenz in Syrien ein nützliches Element der Abschreckung gegen Israel.

Iran und Israel verhandeln nicht über Syrien, jedenfalls nicht so wie Diplomaten Verhandlungen führen. Die Antagonisten setzen auf einen „Dialog“ begrenzter Raketenschläge. Er soll verdeutlichen, wo die jeweiligen roten Linien verlaufen, was gerade noch geht oder eben nicht mehr: für Israel etwa eine existenzgefährdende, bewaffnete Präsenz Irans an den Golanhöhen. Teheran versteht das, so wie Jerusalem realistisch genug ist, nicht zu versuchen, Irans Präsenz in Syrien komplett zu beenden. Das ist nur eine plakative Forderung der USA, die vor allem den eigenen, maximalen Druck auf Iran rechtfertigen soll.

 

« Et après ? » – 3 questions à Hubert Védrine

Le point de vue de Pascal Boniface

16.07.2020

Après quatorze ans auprès de François Mitterrand à l’Élysée et cinq ans à la tête du Quai d’Orsay, Hubert Védrine se dédie aujourd’hui au voyage, à l’écriture, à l’enseignement et au conseil. Il répond aux questions de Pascal Boniface à l’occasion de la parution de son ouvrage Et après ? chez Fayard.

Les Occidentaux ont-ils été pris de court par la crise du Covid-19 ? Pourquoi ?

Ce ne sont pas les Occidentaux en particulier qui ont été pris de court, mais l’humanité tout entière. À l’exception de quelques pays peu nombreux qui avaient mieux tiré les leçons du SRAS, ou qui s’étaient mieux préparés pour différentes raisons. On y trouve des pays d’Asie du Nord-Est ou du Sud-Est comme la Corée du Sud, Taïwan, Singapour. Mais aussi des pays d’Europe comme l’Autriche, ou certains Länder allemands, ou des États qui ne sont pas des démocraties et qui ont plutôt bien réagi comme le Vietnam. Pourquoi l’humanité ne s’est-elle pas mieux préparée ? Parce que la prise en compte des avertissements et les prévisions avancées par la CIA, et repris par la plupart des Livres blancs sur la défense des pays d’Europe, auraient supposé une remise en cause profonde de la surpopulation, du mode de développement contemporain, de la déforestation, des voyages permanents, etc. L’absence de préparation, par exemple en matière de masques, s’explique par une trop grande confiance dans les ressources du marché et de l’économie à flux tendu. C’est pourquoi, quand la pandémie sera derrière nous, ce qui n’est pas encore le cas, il faudra évaluer la politique suivie par tous les gouvernements et les institutions compétentes au moment de l’apparition initiale, du confinement – sous diverses formes -, du déconfinement – avec des calendriers très différents. Cette évaluation ne devrait pas être menée dans un esprit de règlement de comptes, mais pour en tirer des leçons utiles à tous les niveaux, pour l’avenir. Il faut ajouter que, par définition, on ne peut pas à l’avance mettre au point un vaccin contre un virus qu’on ne connaît pas encore, et qui en plus mute rapidement.

Vous écrivez que la crise du Covid-19 a libéré une inquiétude croissante des Occidentaux envers la Chine.

Cela fait quelques années déjà que les spécialistes des relations internationales avaient réalisé que la Chine de Xi Jinping et son projet des Routes de la Soie n’était plus la Chine de Deng Xiao Ping, qu’elle ne mettait plus de limites à son ambition, ce que d’ailleurs les États-Unis de Trump (et peut-être l’an prochain ceux de Biden) voudraient essayer d’endiguer. Mais la pandémie, qui a eu l’effet d’un crash test, a révélé les dures rivalités du monde aux yeux de tous. La Chine a fait peur parce qu’il semble bien que le virus provienne des zones déforestées ou des marchés d’animaux sauvages, ou d’une négligence concernant les chauves-souris étudiées dans le laboratoire P3, même s’il n’y a encore aucune certitude précise sur le point de départ. Elle a inquiété par un silence trop longtemps contenu sur la propagation initiale. Elle a ensuite impressionné par son confinement massif, ce que les Occidentaux ont critiqué comme excessif et possible uniquement dans un État autoritaire, avant d’être eux-mêmes obligés de l’appliquer. Elle a énervé ensuite par sa diplomatie des masques, comme si la Chine était le seul pays à qui il soit interdit de faire de la propagande. Bref, elle a beaucoup perturbé les Occidentaux, et encore plus quand certains Chinois ont commencé à affirmer que le système chinois était supérieur au système occidental. Le monde se trouve donc confronté à un bras de fer entre les États-Unis et la Chine qui n’est pas que commercial mais aussi stratégique. Et il est malheureusement probable que dans cette nouvelle Guerre froide les tensions s’aggravent d’abord avant d’atteindre le stade éventuel d’une nouvelle détente. La priorité pour les Européens va être de ne pas avoir à choisir entre les deux, et de définir sur tous les plans, y compris technologiques si c’est possible, une position européenne. C’est l’enjeu de la « souveraineté européenne » à construire.

À quoi pourrait correspondre une « écologisation » de notre politique ?

Le terme écologie est un terme statique. Le terme « transition écologique » est trop connoté énergie, et donne trop l’impression que c’est un passage de courte durée vers un objectif bien établi. Je préconise donc plutôt le terme « écologisation » (comme on parlait d’industrialisation) pour bien montrer qu’il s’agit d’un vaste processus et d’une action dans la durée. Il ne s’agit pas d’écologiser notre politique, mais d’avoir une politique d’écologisation de tout : de l’agriculture, de l’industrie, des transports, de la construction, du numérique, etc. Je pense qu’il n’y a pas lieu de se focaliser de façon masochiste sur le CO2 émis par la France, puisque – grâce au nucléaire – la France n’est responsable que de 1% du CO2 mondial. C’est pourquoi d’ailleurs il ne faudrait plus fermer de centrale nucléaire, sauf si on parvient à démontrer que cela n’entraînera pas une augmentation de notre production de CO2. En revanche, la France pourrait donner l’exemple en modifiant en profondeur en 10 à 15 ans son agriculture. Mais l’écologisation devra être globale, progressive, rationnelle et scientifique.

Retrouvez cette interview d’Hubert Védrine par Pascal Boniface sur le site de l’IRIS. 

Didier Reynders: “We will take all necessary initiatives to have a correct implementation and also, we will analyse the necessity to introduce infringement policies”

Commission to ‘analyse necessity’ of GDPR infringement procedures

Read the article on Euractive’s website.

Former EPA Administrator Bill Reilly on the Post-Covid Renewal of American Cities

This week, Andrew and Scott talk to William Reilly, former President of the World Wildlife Fund and Environmental Protection Agency Administrator during the George H.W. Bush administration. Bill contemplates how the Covid-19-induced increase in remote work will reshape American cities facing lower demand for office space, transit, and in-person conferencing. Bill also expresses optimism about making progress toward climate goals as we quickly adapt to new technologies.

Listen to this podcast episode on CSIS website.

Download Full Transcript Here.

It’s Merkel’s Last Rodeo. Will a Pandemic Rescue Deal Seal Her Legacy?

Angela Merkel has been the German chancellor for 15 years. Forging European consensus on a bitterly disputed recovery fund could burnish an uneven record.

Chancellor Angela Merkel in Brussels last week. Over 15 years in office, she has consistently sought that sweet spot where German and European interests align. Credit…Francois Lenoir/Reuters

By Steven Erlanger

July 16, 2020

BRUSSELS — Finishing her 15th year as chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, the European Union’s longest-serving and most respected leader, now has her last, best chance to shape the future of the bloc and her own legacy.

 

With her long reign winding down, she and Germany have assumed the E.U.’s rotating presidency, which lasts through the end of the year, at a moment when the bloc is badly divided over a coronavirus recovery plan, a new seven-year budget and threats to the rule of law in eastern member states.

Ms. Merkel faces her first big test on Friday, when she and other leaders are to convene their first in-person summit meeting in Brussels since the coronavirus outbreak took hold in Europe five months ago. With a sense of urgency, they will try to hash out a consensus on how best to help European nations clobbered by the virus.

Expectations for Ms. Merkel’s leadership are high. But while this may be her last rodeo, many expect the same cautious pragmatism and reluctance to take bold, transformative steps that have characterized her time in office and her response to past European crises.

As a politician, Ms. Merkel, soon to be 66, remains, as ever, deliberately opaque, allowing many to imagine her support for their own preferred outcomes. But as much as she is committed to the European Union, she has consistently sought that sweet spot where German and European interests align, guided by German public opinion and her own careful personality.

While she has understood in the current crisis that the European economy needs a rescue, she is also keenly aware that Germany needs a strong European economy for its own continued prosperity.

That, as much as anything, led her to break new ground with France by backing pooled debt among E.U. members to stave off the economic crash of the pandemic — what she last week called “the greatest test the European Union has ever faced.”

The proposal — grants worth 500 billion euros, or about $570 billion, for regions hit hardest by the pandemic — represented a reversal of the fierce German opposition to collective European debt.

A Munich hospital in April. Ms. Merkel has been generally praised for her response to the coronavirus outbreak.Credit…Laetitia Vancon for The New York Times

Some hailed her move as a sea change, one that would seal her legacy as a Europeanist, much as Helmut Kohl is remembered for his support of the euro currency.

But others are skeptical, instead seeing a unique and typically pragmatic response to a crisis that threatened the European single market and thus the German economy.

Ms. Merkel, who tends to say what she means, has made it clear that such largess was a “one-off.”

Ms. Merkel addressing members of the European Parliament in Brussels last week.Credit…Pool photo by Yves Herman

“Germany has moved a lot,” said Daniela Schwarzer, the director of the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin. “Germans were always ready in the presidency to put a bit more on the table, but without the virus, there would have been no revolution in the budget.”

Ulrich Speck, a senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Berlin, said that Ms. Merkel remained true to herself, and that she was shifting only because Germans, deeply embedded in the European Union, want to help those ravaged by the pandemic, especially in Italy and Spain.

“For her, this does not really change the European Union, and public opinion is behind it,” Mr. Speck said. “This is not controversial; this is crisis management. What would be controversial would be a permanent change of structure.”

But others, especially European federalists in France and Italy, dare to believe Ms. Merkel harbors secret sympathy for deeper European integration and prefer to see her as breaking a taboo.

Even if that were true, with her time in office coming to an end, any more permanent shift in policy would have to come from her successor, and few believe that the current band of potential chancellors would have the political weight, let alone the desire, to repeat the exercise.

But first she must get a deal, which will not be simple, given that all 27 member countries must agree.

There is significant opposition from northern European nations like the Netherlands and Austria, which oppose grants and want loans to come with conditions about structural change in weaker economies. And there will be a fight over how the money is distributed and monitored.

Still, given the stakes, Ms. Merkel is likely to succeed at finding some agreement — if not this week then before the end of the month, when Europe goes on vacation, no matter how serious the crisis.

President Emmanuel Macron of France and Ms. Merkel in Gransee, Germany, last month. They have collectively proposed a common E.U. recovery fund.Credit…Pool photo by Maja Hitij

She has made clear that she will not run for office again, and by the end of this year, when Germany’s European presidency ends, her party will have picked a new leader, rendering her a place holder before German elections in 2021.

Within Germany, Ms. Merkel had a deep and lasting dip in popularity following her 2015 decision to open the country’s borders to thousands of migrants and refugees. As she entered this year, her political powers were waning, her party’s support was cratering and even her health seemed in question after a series of shaking episodes at public events.

In Europe more broadly, her reluctance to stand up to domestic pressure during the Greek euro crisis of the last decade cost the bloc dearly. Many, particularly in the south, have never forgiven her.

But the chancellor is riding high again in Germany, having handled the coronavirus outbreak with patience and reason, building on her experience and her training as a scientist.

And there are now lavish hopes in Brussels that she will similarly rise to the moment, finding consensus despite the current rancor.

But Ms. Merkel is still seen as a holdover of an older Europe, one that profited from friendly relations with the United States, a healthy trans-Atlantic relationship, a strong NATO and a global consensus about the virtues of multilateralism and of engagement with a rising China.

Those bedrock beliefs are now in question. As much as she is praised for her steadiness, there is a deep sense in Europe that she is yesterday’s leader, her core beliefs no longer a given in a more rivalrous, competitive world.

The pandemic has provided an opportunity for her to change the narrative. It created political space for her to push Germany in a more European direction, said Simon Tilford, of the Forum for a New Economy in Berlin.

“This is an opportunity to ensure her legacy as a chancellor who bit the bullet and convinced Germans that it’s in their interest to accept greater responsibility for the performance of the European economy as a whole,” he said.

“That’s one reason she’s so outspoken about the existential threat to the E.U.,” he added. “It makes it easier to convince skeptics at home that this is something Berlin has to do for its own interests.”

But trying is not enough, and her prospects for success are unclear — particularly without a successor in place. “It’s a pity she didn’t use her political capital earlier,” Mr. Tilford said. “Because she’ll be gone, and the jury is very much out on how much of her party is happy to move with her.”

Charles A. Kupchan, former director for Europe on the National Security Council and professor of international relations at Georgetown, said that “the pandemic has woken up Merkel and Berlin.” While President Emmanuel Macron of France was trying to articulate a vision for a more integrated Europe, he said, “the lights were out in Berlin — there was no response.”

But the pandemic raised the prospect of a collapse of the eurozone, “with ground zero being not Greece but Italy, a much larger economy, so Merkel crossed the Rubicon,” Mr. Kupchan said.

“But my best guess is that this is not a moment of conversion for Merkel. She is responding to an emergency with emergency measures,” he added. “She does not have the inclination for some dramatic change in the European architecture or the political support for it.”

The streets of Naples last month. The proposed recovery fund would most benefit countries like Italy, which were hit hard by the coronavirus pandemic.Credit…Gianni Cipriano for The New York Times

As for her legacy, others seem to care more about it than Ms. Merkel does. She is admired in Brussels, showing a competence and practical knowledge unmatched by other leaders, said Rosa Balfour, director of Carnegie Europe.

“But I’m a bit perplexed about her,” Ms. Balfour said. “She’s incredibly pragmatic, knows her dossiers and how the system works, and can wield soft power. But it’s not clear to me what her vision of her legacy in European politics is,” other than dealing with issues as they emerge. “In contrast to Macron, who goes on about this vision of Europe that no one shares, she doesn’t really have one.”

 

You can find the original article in The New York Times.

Comments on the future of Europe

By the Honorable Donald Johnston PC OC QC
Wednesday, July 1st, 2020
Extract from a panel discussion, Vienna

This panel in addressing the future of Europe is invited to answer this question:

“Is there any alternative to universal and Pan-European multilateralism?  For the purpose of my remarks I am interpreting “universal and pan – European multilateralism’ as moving forward with achieving more EU integration supported by institutions appropriate to a kind of federal structure in line with the thinking of the Spinelli Group. But it also raises the question of global free trade which I promoted as Secretary General of the OECD and continue to believe must be the word’s future in addressing poverty and opportunity, especially for the worlds developing countries. But it has to be managed in a way sensitive to the challenges of both.

In these brief comments I intend to offer my view on the answer to this fundamental question about the future of Europe.

 

To begin, I would amend the question by adding the word “good” before “alternative”.

There certainly are alternatives some of which could set Europe on a path back to a collection of independent sovereign states and undo the remarkable progress in building a secure European Union in the post WWII period.

Many years ago when looking at the extraordinary work and vision of statesmen like Jean Monnet trying to build a lasting and prosperous European Union, I came across a comment of British Historian H.A.L. Fisher in the preface to his 1936 book, A History of Europe. In part it read as follows:

“[No] question [would be] more pertinent to the future welfare of the world than how the nations of Europe… may best be combined into some stable organization for the pursuit of their common interests and the avoidance of strife.

Although we appreciate the Marshall Plan’s amazing contribution to the Europe of today, it contributed more to restoring Europe physically while providing humanitarian assistance. Of course the OEEC which evolved into the OECD in 1961 did provide an important framework and mechanism for economic and social development which continues to this day.

Fisher’s vision of a strong, unified Europe remains very much work in progress and that work really began with Jean Monnet’s initiative to create the European Coal and Steel Commission. I will comment on that in a moment. But I remain convinced that Fisher was right, and the great rebuilding of Europe and the EU after the Second World War must and will endure notwithstanding the barrage of criticisms  from euroskeptics, now emboldened by the United Kingdom’s Brexit vote of June 2016. Admittedly my conviction is based on the EU having strong, visionary leadership, which has not yet fully materialized.

Think of this. Although Greece represents less than three per cent of the Euro zone economy, euroskeptics used its financial crisis as ammunition to predict its withdrawal from the eurozone and the possible unravelling of the entire EU. The Greeks rejected that option: there was no Grexit.  Austrians also rejected right-wing populist nationalism in the 2016 Presidential election of Van der Bellen, a strong supporter of the EU.

The support for Brexit in the UK referendum was an unexpected shock for some, but it pleased others who wish to see the EU unravel and claim that the UK attitude reflects views held in other major European countries. I keep hearing and reading that the United Kingdom has rejected the EU, as if it were an overwhelming victory.  Bolstered by misrepresentations and downright lies it was a very slim referendum victory but Brexiters will argue that it was validated by Boris Johnson’s subsequent margin of  electoral victory.

There are also others, especially President Trump who appear to be hostile to the emerging global role that the European Union is likely to play as it completes its evolution to a unified international force. This has become even more important as the United States under Trump becomes increasingly isolationist and opposed to international multilateralism constructed by visionaries over the past 75 years.

In a stunning commentary in Foreign Affairs (summer 2016), Professor Jakub Grygiel of the Catholic University of America, implies that the upside to the EU crisis will be a return to independent sovereign nation-states across Europe. Indeed, that would be an upside for American isolationists. It would remove from US competition the largest unified single market in history and reinstate the possibility of future wars on the continent that this great European experiment was designed to prevent – as it has.

Some of Grygiel’s comments appear designed to create a false impression of the views of Europeans. Here is a cheerful observation to support his thesis: “a Europe of newly assertive nation-states would be preferable to the disjointed, ineffectual, and unpopular EU of today. There’s good reason to believe that European countries would do a better job of checking Russia, managing the migrant crisis, and combating terrorism on their own than they have done under the auspices of the EU.”

Really? What is that “good reason” that escaped the attention of the statesmen and nation builders like Jean Monnet in post-war Europe? Grygiel also says that the EU is ineffectual, which is true in some cases, as it is with many, if not most supranational bodies, including much of the United Nations (UN) activities. And what of the United States itself?

Sadly, the world is watching that formerly great republic floundering in the face of numerous serious challenges both social, economic, even racial, not even capable of effectively addressing the Covid-19 crisis through what is becoming a dysfunctional government under a Commander in Chief who proudly presents himself as a narcissistic ignorant bully.

And non Europeans, especially Americans, systematically ignore the EU’s successes. One good example being the collective research of 28 networked European countries that produce one-third of the world research’s output – 34 per cent more than the United States and more than China. This was documented at the time of the Brexit debate in New Scientist.  (June 2016). These are the kind of synergies that could be sacrificed should the EU dissolve, and it may already be compromised by the withdrawal of the UK which has much world first class research.

Hopefully the; United Kingdom will stay united and prosper in the post Brexit period. However, there is good reason for concern as the Financial Times Martin Wolfe wrote at the time (June 24,2016). He said:

David Cameron took a huge gamble and lost. The fear mongering and outright lies of Boris Johnson, Michael Gove, Nigel Farage, The Sun and the Daily Mail have won. The UK, Europe, the West and the world are damaged. The UK is diminished and seems likely soon to be divided. Europe has lost its second-biggest and most outward-looking power. The hinge between the EU and the English-speaking powers has been snapped. This is probably the most disastrous single event in British history since the Second World War.

Yet the UK might not be the last country to suffer such an earthquake. Similar movements of the enraged exist elsewhere – most notably in the US and France. Britain has led the way over the cliff. Others might follow.

Will others follow the United Kingdom over the cliff? Alina Polyakova and Neil Fligstein, writing in the International New York Times at the time of the Brexit vote (July 2016), relied on polls that suggest that will not happen. They say, “Britain is not, and never has been, a typical member of the European Union, and in no country but Britain do populists and other euroskeptic forces have the 51 percent of votes needed to pull their countries from the union.”

Obviously those in the UK who wanted Brexit must have believed it is good for them and presumably for the United Kingdom, even if it means losing Scotland and perhaps Northern Ireland. The City of London will also suffer, but no one can estimate what the damage will be until all the terms of exiting are known.

Jacques Delors, who has dedicated much of his life to the European dream both in public office and after retirement through his Paris-based foundation, made the following observation in an inter- view in 2012 with the Handelsblatt newspaper: “If the British cannot support the trend towards more integration in Europe, we can nevertheless remain friends, but on a different basis. I could imagine a form such as a European economic area or a free-trade agreement.

That might be the happiest outcome in the wake of Brexit. The real beneficiaries of Brexit are the remaining EU members inspired by people of the experience and quality of Jacques Delors and members of the Spinelli Group. The latter founded in 2010 as a network of thousands of politicians, individuals, writers, and think tanks looking to revive the momentum toward a federalist structure for the EU.”

In fact, the Brexit vote and Johnson’s arrival as Prime Minister may have strengthened the resolve of many EU countries and prominent Europeans to accelerate the integration process in line with federalist thinking.

Obviously those having the foresight to realize the importance of greater integration and an emerging federalist model, such as the Spinelli Group, would be blocked by a United Kingdom, were it a member, to have reforms move in the opposite direction, consistent with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s famous Bruges speech in 1988 where she said, “We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels. Certainly we want to see Europe more united and with a greater sense of common purpose. But it must be in a way which preserves the different traditions, parliamentary powers and sense of national pride in one’s own country; for these have been the source of Europe’s vitality through the centuries.”

This could hardly be seen as an endorsement of a federalist system of any kind, because decentralization, especially with the preservation of parliamentary powers, meaning full sovereignty, is incompatible with federalism. She could have added that the elements she wished to see preserved have also been the source of bloody European conflicts throughout the last millennium, including three wars between France and Germany in the 70 years between 1870 and 1939!

Consideration should be given to some steps that must be taken to realize the collective potential of the EU as a major global player, which it could never be if its members revert to sovereign nation- state status. Indeed, as other major countries grow in economic clout, it has been pointed out that not even Germany would be in a new G8. Only a united EU could have influence on the global stage.

Skeptics like Professor Grygiel, many of them American, seem blinded by the headlines and glare of current events, failing to place them in a broader historical context. Reviewing the remarkable evolution of Europe since the Second World War, I hope that the long-term success of Europe is inevitable. But as the great American judge Oliver Wendell Holmes once noted, “the mode by which the inevitable comes to pass is effort.” European leadership must now make that effort. It is critical not only for Europe, but for the world today.

A strong, unified Europe is also important for the emergence of global multilateralism and the further evolution of globalization. Since the end of the Cold War we have been living in a world dominated by just one superpower: The United States. Fortunately, that superpower has been a very open market and largely, but not entirely, militarily non-aggressive. Sometimes referred to as the “importer of last resort,” it continued to run current account deficits opposite many trading partners, especially China.

The American economy had enough strength and resilience to emerge slowly but with growing confidence from the global financial crisis of 2007–08. To become a companion economic locomotive, Europe must continue to open its markets, eliminate distorting trade subsidies, and undergo substantial structural reforms in labour, services, and manufacturing markets to stimulate European economic growth.  I hope that the results of the Europe 2020 exercise and its follow up will help in that regard.

If that does not happen, the United States might use its economic muscle to focus increasingly on bilateral agreements that are becoming a serious impediment to global free trade.

If Europe had successfully moved to a more centralized and coherent federal model of government it could have reached the objectives adopted by the EU in 2000 (often referred to as the Lisbon Agenda), which was stated in the Lisbon Declaration (24 March 2000) as follows: “The Union has today set itself a new strategic goal for the next decade: to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.”

Well, that failed. A review of progress chaired by the former Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok reported in 2004 that the strategy had fallen well short of its objectives. The diagnosis of the problems of broad structural reform was good, but implementation of reforms was seriously lacking. Kok’s review carried much credibility as he had overseen the continuation and completion of the major Dutch structural reforms originally introduced by his more conservative predecessor, Ruud Lubbers. Kok was also a regular participant in many international conferences, and during our discussions it was apparent to me that he was a talented consensus builder.

There is much to be said for such consensus builders, who enable intellectual and political opponents to better understand competing views. Strengthening such relations between European political leaders will be important in bringing cohesion and stronger integration to the EU in line with the objectives of the Spinelli Group.

The Lisbon Declaration is now replaced by the Europe 2020 strategy which   has five ambitious objectives related to employment, innovation, education, social inclusion, and climate/energy. The world would benefit greatly from Europe attaining those objectives.

Today only the EU and Japan might to come close to matching the United States in per capita GDP in the coming years.

Demographic projections show Japan’s population in serious decline, but an expanded EU which should evolve with Turkey as a major player, would have a much greater population and a much larger market than the United States.

The objectives listed above can only be realized when the peoples of Europe achieve a consensus on what kind of legal community they truly wish to be, and so far, progress to that end has been in fits and starts. The failure of the Lisbon Agenda, the rejection of the proposed constitution in both French and Dutch referenda, and now the exit of the United Kingdom underscores the difficulty of moving toward a flexible federal structure.

The use of the word federal seems to be an anathema for many Europeans. It is worth remembering that with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community inspired by Jean Monnet in 1951, the French government declared that it would “provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the Federation of Europe.”

Today there does not appear to be any coordinated and broad- based visionary leadership like that of Jean Monnet that led Europe out of the destruction and chaos of the Second World War.

Perhaps the Greek crisis, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU, and continuing economic performance under potential will awaken Europeans to the need for a truly federal-type European Union, with strong central government institutions where appropriate, accompanied by the protection of individual nations’ precious linguistic and cultural identities. The genius of federalism is that it can accommodate great diversity in many areas.

What is the way forward? Where is the higher vision to achieve what is imaginable but not yet within reach? I suggest that the answer is to reconcile the various goals of Europeans, what I call the three Ms.: minimizing frictions, maximizing synergies, and maintaining sovereignty.

Some believe they can achieve the first two without a dilution of sovereignty. That is not possible. From my Canadian experience with Quebec, however, I know that it is possible to minimize frictions and maximize synergies while maintaining cultures and national identities. In the case of Quebec, the French language, civil law, religion, and culture have been protected since the Quebec Act of 1774, which is one reason why separatist movements have never succeeded.

I see this kind of flexible federal structure, with necessary variations, in Europe’s future. Loss of Europe’s various languages and cultures would alter the character of the continent, moving it in the direction of the United States. The historical evolution and the nature of the “self-willed” peoples of Europe, as Fisher described them, make that path neither feasible nor desirable.

I finish these comments with a quote from a recent letter distributed by Thierry de Montbrial, the founder and head of the prestigious French public policy think tank Ifri.

But it stands to reason that we in Europe in particular should capitalise on building the Union in order to prove the viability of a third way between the United States, that great democracy which still claims to be a liberal one, and the People’s Republic of China, which still claims to be communist. Most of us want to remain close to American democracy, but we refuse to become its vassals, notably as part of an Atlantic Alliance retrofitted to that end. There is an urgent need to clarify NATO’s truly shared objectives. As for the European Union, despite all the whining in recent weeks, it continues to sail ahead in stormy seas, as it always has…

If there is one part of the world where multilateralism is making headway despite countless hurdles, it is the European Union. There is still a very long way to go in Europe and, even more so, on a planetary scale. But history is moving in that direction, for the alternative is collective suicide. There is no doubt that global warming, pandemics and more or less intense wars are foreseeable in the world’s near-term future. At least we can hope to limit the damage, which, after all, was the case during the Cold War. Let us be convinced of the European Union’s responsibility in that regard.”

I agree… who cannot?

Towards a productivity oriented economic discourse

Manaf Al-Hajeri at the WPC 2015 in Montreux

Kuwait Times

Wednesday, July 5, 2020

 

Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is obvious to those keeping up with economic developments in Kuwait that there is a clear dilemma in the decision-making process. This is with regard to two specific key issues, namely the growing budget deficit and the consequent concern for the sustainability of the economy, and the private sector’s position and role in this context. Regardless which of these two issues we begin with, the immediate thought that comes to mind is the state’s economic model. A model which is regarded by the majority as a rentier model that has made it difficult to integrate new ideas and concepts, since they may be construed as favoritism towards specific segments of society. This, in turn, has built up our appetite to
explore the current and prevailing economic discourse and ideologies such as the fair distribution of benefits, the right of some segments to potential governmental support as opposed to others, and more
importantly, the dire absence of key concepts to date, specifically the productivity of our economy.
In the past three months, I have realized the multitude of reports concerning the status of the economy that remain pending. Among them is a report issued by The Conference Board (TCB) on priority sectors in terms of productivity. According to the report, labor productivity declined by 2 pa on average from 2000 to 2018. In most other regions of the world, labor productivity growth has been the major source of output growth for decades. Negative productivity
means that the potential of the GCC is not realized. If productivity growth had remained flat, economic growth in the region would have been faster than the average for emerging and developing economies. A recovery to positive productivity could accelerate economic growth in the region beyond that of major emerging economies in the next decade.
A careful reading of this report and developing well-thought-out solutions can ensure a quantum leap for our rentier economy. The report underscores the urgency for GCC countries to come together and reach a consensus on which are the productivity sectors such as financial services, telecommunications services, and alternative energy,
in order to move beyond this current sustainability predicament.
Here is an important thought: what if we introduced the word “productivity” as a fundamental concept that can drive significant change for a new economy? How about swapping a rentier economy
that is laden with employment in the government sector, regardless of this sector’s productivity level, for an economy that believes in strong modern governance with its sights set on the productivity of a private sector, which operates according to the highest standards of transparency?
In short, what if we trigger a productive economic discourse, rather than the worn-out rentier one?
Today, all that we fear in the sustainability of our model has swiftly surfaced due to the COVID-19 pandemic, as it has also brought to light, now more than ever, the contrast between the strength of our financial model on one hand, and the weakness of our economic model on the other. The Kuwaiti economic model is a democratic institutional one based on the diversity and free speech, which makes it distinct, but on the other hand, it is one based on a rentier system that relies heavily on oil as the only source of national income. It also suffers from a significant weakness in its overall structure in terms of productivity, which in turn, leads to a weakness in the sustainability of the economy’s constituents. This contrast between weaknesses and strengths of models, and between what is financial and what is economic, has clearly created confusion in the economic decision-making process. For instance, when considering the measures taken by the government in
response to the pandemic, we can see that the lack of a solid decision has stalled a number of pleas from businesses of all sizes that required the provision of liquidity to avoid detrimental actions, such as reducing salaries or laying off employees in large numbers, which may create a case of recession that is difficult to overcome. All of this comes at a time
when the state is experiencing a major budget deficit in one of its most vital components; the expansion of public sector employment, and consequently, there is an urgent need for a unified decision with regards to creating more jobs in the private sector as a top economic priority.

Uncertainty

This contradiction created evident uncertainty with regards to the private sector’s positioning in all of this.
That said, is there a clear government policy put in place that considers the private sector as a strong alternative for employment for the coming years, in response to the government’s budget deficit and salaries component? And if so, will this create in turn, greater opportunities for the private sector, to grow and create jobs for a skilled workforce, while keeping up and competing with global labor markets?
Allowing for a confusing discourse to prevail and impact decision-makers is unwarranted; especially when we see that an environment of purposeless criticism has led to a state of paralysis in decision-making, whether in the government or the private sector.
On the other hand, a coherent public opinion with long-term goals to build a productive, superior, and sustainable economy, away from skepticism in the private sector, is still non-existent. In fact, the recent discourse has taken a turn, reflecting a sentiment of hostility towards expatriates, regardless of caliber and skill, which in turn, has amplified the challenge faced by the nation in attracting talent from the global
and regional labor markets. It has also become a substitute discourse that lacks any room for development or change. Unfortunately, it fails to address matters of employment in terms of deploying a more modern
approach when it comes to managing skills and talent or enhancing productivity. It has even impacted Kuwait’s relationship with other countries negatively.
As the New Kuwait 2035 vision testifies, the government’s interest in the private sector is evident, but lacks enforcement and is tainted by hesitation. This is illustrated, for example, through the current model put in place to support private-sector employees, which is based on government support through the Manpower Support Fund, i.e. private companies with semi-governmental salaries. This model specifically
defies the overall positioning of the private sector and its employees. That said, there is an urgent need for an in-depth understanding of the private sector, its strengths and weaknesses, and more importantly, a
strong belief in its capabilities to manage financial resources and other resources effectively and productively. However, when referring to the private sector, there are many generalizations and risks that can only be taken on by a conscious government that is capable of managing the wild horse that the private sector can be; the risk of procurement, governance, and ensuring full alignment of both private and public interests are examples of areas that ought to be addressed therein. This level of awareness already exists to a reasonable degree as we had witnessed when the financial sector was successfully reorganized and was further demonstrated with the formation of the Capital Markets Authority. It was proven even more successful and showed great confidence with the privatization of the stock exchange, Boursa
Kuwait.

Rentier model
The prevailing rentier model and low productivity mindset are distorted concepts of citizenship that grant rights with no commitments in return, and these constitute a dysfunctional landscape. That said, new economic discourses must be based on the capabilities of building trust, by creating a solid reform plan that is rolled out among institutions to eliminate corruption, and in turn, lead to institutional excellence. Also, it is important that creativity is empowered within a framework of social
responsibility for institutions, in order to transcend its narrow role to an active national role, and encourage the seeking of the necessary assistance from specialized authorities by focusing on the qualifications, merit, and the components of trust. Ultimately, implementing a
movement of institutional excellence and a true institutional reform to confront corruption in all its forms is the need of the hour.
To that effect, we support the complete transformation of the economic discourse, as many others do, where the first statement should focus on facing economic challenges for what’s to come post COVID-19. It must be one that puts an end to the current rentier discourse that stands for quantity rather than quality, diminishes any sense of competition and confuses decision-makers. Undoubtedly, Kuwait is in want of a discourse that urges a true economic reform with clear objectives aimed at building a sustainable and productive economy.

Note: Manaf Abdulaziz Al-Hajeri is Chief Executive
Officer at Kuwait Financial Centre (Markaz)

Access to the original article published in Kuwait Times.

The Corona Pandemic And The Middle East

WPC 2018, Rabat, October 26 - Itamar Rabinovich, President of the Israel Institute
Tuesday, June 9, 2020

 

A Middle Eastern Overview

The public health crisis and challenge of COVID-19’s impact on most of the Middle East, as on other parts of the non-Western World, has been limited. While the extent of the pandemic in Iran and Turkey has been significant, the figures cited by and for most of the Arab World have been low, certainly low when compared to the early concern that high density (in countries like Egypt and in the Gaza Strip) and weak public health systems could lead to an exponential spread of the disease. These modest figures derive from several factors and forces at work: limited exposure to international travel, a young median age of the population, limited testing, a sense of shame leading to concealment, and, in some cases, a deliberate government policy of reporting lower figures. Also, most governments in the region deserve credit for effective, and rigorous lockdown policies. The pandemic’s major impact on the Middle East has been economic. It has exacerbated economic crises in several Middle Eastern countries and created fresh problems for other parts of the region. These effects have been felt and magnified by the sharp decline in oil prices caused partly by oversupply and price wars and in part by the decline in consumption brought about by the pandemic. The decline in energy prices and consumption has directly affected oil and gas exporting countries, and indirectly countries depending on aid from these countries and on remittances from guest workers.

All told, the pandemic has not led to major changes in the patterns and trends of the region’s politics. These have been defined in recent years and on the eve of the pandemic’s outbreak by economic crises, popular unrest, the structural weakness of several states, American distancing, Russian assertiveness, Iranian and Turkish activism, and contradictory trends in Arab-Israeli relations. During the past ten weeks the following major developments and changes took place:

  • Iran has been severely affected by the pandemic and the regime has obviously failed in dealing with it. It has not responded effectively and tried unsuccessfully to conceal the full extent of the damage, thus further undermining public trust that had been shaken by earlier instances of regime dishonesty. The economic hardship caused by US sanctions has been aggravated by the sharp decline in oil revenues and yet, the regime’s aggressive regional, foreign and security policies, manifested by the nuclear program, involvement in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and the Gulf, and the confrontation with the US, Saudi Arabia and Israel, have not been significantly moderated. The two changes whose full significance has yet to be determined are the redeployment of Iranian troops in Syria to the eastern and northern parts of the country and a milder policy toward the US in Iraq.
  • Iran’s regional rival, Saudi Arabia, has handled the public health challenge well, but the ambitious domestic reforms planned by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the regional policy, primarily Riyadh’s intervention in the Yemeni civil war, and its relationship with Washington, have all been affected by economic contraction and the decline in oil prices. Saudi Arabia’s oil policy led to an unprecedented clash with President Trump who threatened to pull some US troops and weapon systems from the Kingdom unless it agreed to reduce the flow of oil into the international market.
  • Turkey has been hard hit by the pandemic and the severity of the health crisis has been a serious challenge to the leadership of President Erdogan who manages the country’s health policy. In an effort to cope with the economic crisis, Erdogan has sought to improve his relationship with Washington and distance himself from Moscow (most notably by suspending the purchase of S400 ground-to-air missiles). Turkey’s regional ambitions are now focused on Libya and the eastern Mediterranean, and it continues its massive intervention in Syria that is more defensive than expansionist in nature.
  • Syria has reported very low figures of people affected by the disease, but the regime’s credibility in this matter as in others is very low. There has been no progress in consolidating Bashar al-Assad’s hold over the country. The international economic crisis and the loss of income in the Arab Gulf states has further reduced the prospect of international aid to the country’s reconstruction. Bashar himself became embroiled in a political and business conflict with his cousin, Rami Makhlouf, “the family’s banker”.
  • Iraq and Lebanon were rattled during the month leading up to the Corona crisis by massive popular demonstrations against the enduring political crisis and its impact on daily life. In both counties, there was an anti-Iranian dimension to the popular demonstrations. In Iraq, some progress was made when a government was finally formed. In Lebanon, there are no signs of progress towards stability. Analysts and observers are taking a close look at the popular protests in Iraq and Lebanon as potential indications of a revival of popular unrest that could possibly lead to the second wave of what was known in 2010-2011 as the “Arab Spring”. The future course of the pandemic and the scale of economic damage could play an important role in such a development.
  • Both major international powers active in the Middle East, the US and Russia, are preoccupied with massive outbreaks of the pandemic. The two most prominent actions taken by the Trump Administration in the Middle East have been his confrontation with the Saudi Crown Prince and the mission of Secretary of State Pompeo to Israel to deal with the issue of annexation of parts of the West Bank to Israel (see below), Chinese investments in Israeli infrastructure and Iran’s nuclear and missile program. Russia signaled its unhappiness with Bashar al-Assad’s failure to move on with reconciliation, political reform and reconstruction with a series of critical articles in the Russian press. China has continued to invest in building its network of infrastructure projects to the point of provoking massive US pressure on Israel to reduce, if not to suspend altogether, Chinese investments in such projects as the Haifa harbor and the massive desalination program in the south of the country.
  • On the Arab-Israeli front, several positive developments could be noticed such as continued tacit cooperation with several Arab Gulf states, this time in the context of fighting the Corona crisis, the close cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in dealing with the crisis, and the mutual restraint displayed by Israel and  Hamas in Gaza. These positive trends have been overshadowed by the prospect of annexation of parts of the West Bank which threaten to affect Israel’s peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt, its tacit relationship with the Gulf states, and its direct relationship with the Palestinian Authority and the Hamas government in Gaza.

Israel and the Pandemic

In Israel, there has been one clear winner from the crisis, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Several months ago, Netanyahu, facing a criminal trial, indicted on three charges of bribery and breach of trust, and unable to win three successive parliamentary elections, was finally able to present his fifth government on May 17. His survival is due to several forces at work but it was the Covid-19 crisis that provided his challenger, Benny Gantz, with both the motivation and the pretext on March 26 to announce that he was joining Netanyahu in an emergency national unity government in order to deal with the crisis ramifications for Israel and its economy.

The formation of this new government ended a lengthy political crisis that began in December 2018 when the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, was dissolved in order to hold a new election. A new party, Blue and White, was formed in order to challenge Netanyahu in the April 2019 parliamentary elections. The party was formed by three former chiefs of staff of the IDF and one professional politician. The new party, Blue and White, was essentially a centrist entity which also included a right-wing component. Its leader, retired General Gantz, was able for the first time in many years to present a serious challenge to Netanyahu and within a matter of weeks was able to win 35 out of 120 seats in the Israeli parliament. However, this was not enough. The parliament was essentially divided between a right-wing and a center-left bloc, and neither was able to reach the magic figure of 61 in order to form a government. The result was two additional rounds of elections in September 2019 and in March 2020, at the end of which the paralysis could not be resolved.

One of the most significant aspects of these rounds of elections was the new role of Israel’s Arab minority of some 20%. In earlier election campaigns a low voting percentage and the fractiousness of its representatives denied this minority a proper representation in the political system. The formation of a unified list, a higher percentage of voting and a shift of orientation from Arab Palestinian nationalism to a quest for participation in Israeli life gave the Arab minority a larger number of Knesset members (up to 15) and created a situation in which the centrist parties were willing to collaborate with the Arab Joint List. The term cooperate should be qualified – three members of the coalition put together by Blue and White were not willing to vote for a government supported by the Arab Joint List, thus denying Gantz the possibility of forming a government after the March 2020 elections.

The three election campaigns of 2019/2020 were to a large extent conducted over the question of whether Netanyahu, as a man about to face a criminal trial, should and could be Israel’s prime minister. According to Israeli law, a cabinet minister under indictment has to resign his / her post, while the prime minister is exempt from this stipulation, since his / her resignation would mean a resignation of the whole cabinet. Since December 2016, when the open investigation of Netanyahu of suspected bribery and breach of faith issues was initiated by the Israeli Police under the supervision of the Attorney General, Israel’s political system has been fully preoccupied with these issues. Netanyahu has been able to build a right-wing bloc, composed of his own Likud party, the Orthodox parties and the party representing the West Bank settlers, that has kept him in power and given him “a base” that led him safely through three elections. This phenomenon has to do with Netanyahu’s own charisma, but also with several underlying forces at work, first and foremost the fusion of the dream of Greater Israel, ultra-Orthodox championship of religion’s role in Israeli life and politics, and Sephardi resentment of the traditional elites into a right-wing hegemony in Israeli politics.

Benny Gantz’s still inexplicable decision on March 26 to join forces with Netanyahu, thus splitting his own party, resulted in a peculiar political arrangement. Israel now has a national unity government based on parity between Netanyahu and his allies on the one hand, and Blue and White and its partners on the other, even though Blue and White has been reduced to 17 members of Knesset. Rotation means that at this point Netanyahu is the Prime Minister and Benny Gantz is the Defense Minister, and they are to change places 18 months from now. The unusually large government will have to deal with several major challenges, including the economic ramifications of the pandemic and the issue of annexation. This issue became a prominent item on the agenda as a result of the publication in January 2020 of President Trump’s plan to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This essentially pro-Israeli plan does call for a two-state solution, but it also envisages Israel’s annexation of the Jordan Valley and the areas of Israeli settlements in return for territorial compensation to the Palestinian in the south of Israel. This led to pressure by the settlers and the populist right wing of Netanyahu’s own party to proceed with annexation even without a full implementation of the plan. As mentioned above, such a step is likely to produce sharp reactions among the Palestinians and in the Arab world as well as in Europe. It is not at all clear what the Trump Administration’s own view of the matter is.

Read the article on the Hoover Institution website.

Consequences and Lessons of a Virus

Thierry_de_Montbrial_wpc2019

As Europeans get ready for their summer holidays, the Covid-19 pandemic seems to be winding down, despite hotspots cropping up here and there. However, we are not safe from the next wave. After so many careless speeches, nobody dares to make any more precise forecasts. In any case, any confirmed lull fosters broader reflections both on the disaster’s consequences and the dysfunctions that allowed it to happen.

Most commentators agree that the crisis has catalysed, if not revealed, pre-existing trends in every area. For example, some already troubled companies, such as in the retail sector, will go bankrupt faster. Everywhere, production chains will be both shorter and more diversified in order to mitigate political or other risks of disrupting supplies. Many activities will be brought back onshore. Likewise, there will be less just-in-time trade. In addition to health precautions, a slowdown in international or even national air traffic can also be expected due to the rise of videoconferencing, which countless companies mastered during the lockdown. In another vein, it can be expected that the international economy will become more politicised. In other words, the three-way correlation between geopolitics, geo-strategy and geo-economics will grow stronger. Increasingly, States will overtly protect companies they consider “strategic”, or at least parts of their activities they deem critical. The right to competition will be unsettled. I am thinking, for example, of the likely subsidy race between Boeing and Airbus, with the rise of a Chinese aircraft manufacturer in the background. Direct investments and population movements will be increasingly controlled.

These few remarks obviously do not claim to be exhaustive. They merely illustrate a partial return to the international economy’s pre-modern form, in which essentially goods are traded while the factors of production (capital and labour in the classic model) are not very mobile. Thus, the WTO is the World Trade Organization, and not for economic exchanges in general. In many countries, all these changes will lead to a swifter rise in transitional unemployment than had been expected before the pandemic.

Admittedly, the unprecedented opening of the floodgates of money worldwide has prevented the worst, i.e. a chain of bankruptcies of structurally viable businesses and ultimately the nightmare of the entire world economy collapsing like a house of cards—a bit like what happened to Russia in the 1990s, but on a global scale. One shudders to think what would have come next. Once again, the central banking community rose to the occasion. But even the best actions have a downside: in this case, the explosion of public debt. What is truly unprecedented is the fact that the phenomenon took place simultaneously worldwide, but also, and perhaps especially, that it occurred after an exceptionally long period of price stability. To me it looks as though this stability is due to increased competitive pressure, especially on wages in developed countries owing to the opening up of the huge labour pool in emerging ones. With even partial de-globalisation, real inflation or stagflation, whose dire consequences Europeans, at least in the Western part of the continent, have forgotten, could return to Western countries. At the same time, in the rest of the world, partly deprived of an outlet for its goods, social difficulties could also increase. Nothing is easier than building mathematical models on paper that create the illusion of perpetual debt sustainability, and my macroeconomist friends do not deprive themselves of doing just that. Still, one must not be naive enough to believe in them. The conclusion is that we need more innovative international economic cooperation.

This remark leads me back to the issue of global governance. It was already in tatters before the pandemic due to a widespread erosion of trust made worse by the reckless behaviour of many political leaders, starting with the head of the world’s most powerful nation, who would normally be expected to set an example. The systematic recourse to insults or the blaming of scapegoats is undoubtedly part of the arsenal of populist leaders. It is also true that the rise of social media has normalised invective, fake news and the return to the law of the jungle, where Rousseau’s noble savage would feel quite out of place. But if international relations became an all-out brawl where emotion crushed reason, when objectively international cooperation would seem more necessary than ever, the risk of a sort of third world war would become serious.

Instead of prompting the planet’s main States to face up to their joint responsibilities, the pandemic has indirectly hastened the degradation of Sino-American relations and the weakening of multilateralism. The emergence of a phenomenon with the potential to spark a pandemic is a perfect illustration of the butterfly effect, when a tiny cause has huge consequences. Detecting such a phenomenon early, gathering and interpreting relevant data, providing access to and sharing such data, nationally and internationally planning the prevention of these types of risks (health risks in this case, but also financial and other risks), allocating the resulting responsibilities and determining who funds what and who has the right to control what are some of the inevitable issues facing an increasingly interdependent and complex world where butterfly effects are bound to proliferate. It is easy to accuse China, and there is indeed good reason to question that country’s behaviour, or to rebuke the WHO, which has the drawbacks of many international organizations and whose language turns stiff and bureaucratic when it strays into uncharted waters. WHO has a normative function but no direct power over its member States (in particular, no right of direct access to their data) and no preventive structure enabling it to act in emergencies. Its Director-General has no more troops than the UN Secretary-General. Organizations are crucial for coherent international cooperation. However, their missions must be unambiguously defined and they must have the appropriate delegation of authority to carry them out. The most exemplary institution in this respect is the IMF. But it must be said that the planet’s main powers currently have the narrowest conception of sovereignty. This does not bode well as risks multiply on the horizon.

Nevertheless, I would like to end on an upbeat note. Having been immersed in international life for a long time, I am less struck by the scale of the dramas of history than by their limitation. Since current events bring medical metaphors to mind, I will say that despite appearances, the immune system of international society is not working too badly. Overall, in the last three months, after a worrying start, the quality of Europe’s response has, in my view, exceeded all expectations. As for the face-off between the United States and China, I am willing to bet that reason will prevail over impulsiveness. The hardest thing for those two powers to do will be to admit the absolute necessity, in the coming decades, of a minimum sharing of sovereignty, without which multilateralism will increasingly be a dead letter. It is then that great wars would once again become possible.

It remains for me to wish you the best possible summer. See you at the end of August for my next letter.

Thierry de Montbrial

Founder and Chairman of the WPC
Founder and Executive Chairman of Ifri

June 30, 2020

GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: BEYOND EMPTY WORDS

As I write these lines, the COVID-19 pandemic seems to be following the pathway forecast by those epidemiologists and virologists, who have been telling us for weeks that the wave is past its peak. If it is, this does not mean that we are safe from a second wave some time later, but only that the first surge is over. There is no doubt that we must relentlessly continue the search for therapeutic solutions and, if possible, vaccines for this virus like no other. But a possible lull should allow those who think about, design or implement public health policies to clarify what is meant by expressions such as “a vaccine is a global public good”.

It is not my intention here to comment on the concept of the common good (the concept of public good is much more precise), but to draw attention to the fact that any categorical imperative relating to this idea, even the most ethically convincing, rings hollow in the absence of an international organisation with precise, universally accepted rules, and capable of defining strategies and ensuring their implementation. This remark goes far beyond drugs and vaccines. It applies both to preventing pandemics and to curbing their impact when they do occur.

And even that seems too restrictive. Who could disagree with Philippe Descola, a renowned anthropologist and disciple of Claude Lévi-Strauss, when he calls for a “politics of the Earth” imagined as a “common house” (for all living beings)?  For an international relations specialist, the “common house” reference brings to mind Mikhail Gorbachev, who, as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR, unsuccessfully tried to convince Western Europeans to live under the same roof with the Soviets. It also recalls a warning from Eduard Bard, a climatologist with an international reputation, who said, “The COVID-19 pandemic foreshadows and accelerates global warming”.  Bard deplores the chaotic individual and collective behaviour during the current “crash test”. Of course COVID-19 is not climate-induced, but there is strong reason to believe that global warming will cause new kinds of pandemics. In their own way, these two eminent scientists, like many others around the world, underscore the international system’s total unpreparedness for the types of disasters whose occurrence is a foregone conclusion.

For those who believe in order through law, this unpreparedness is shocking, since the establishment of the United Nations Organisation in the aftermath of the Second World War was precisely intended to organise international relations for the common good. In the circumstances of the post-war period, the common good was identified with peace. “Multilateralism” is the name given to a method of strengthening the chances of peace based on a shared search for solutions to situations that might jeopardise it. This method comes with rules (international law) and a whole system of enabling institutions, such as the World Health Organisation (WHO), which has been in the hot seat since the coronavirus outbreak. Whatever its shortcomings, the United Nations could not do better than it did during the Cold War, with an extremely heterogeneous international system where none of the main players were willing to give up their sovereignty and ambitions. Nevertheless, international law has acted as a shock absorber in many crises, and that is already a lot. The United Nations has also served as a sounding board for propaganda. Awareness of planet Earth’s finiteness began to rise in the last third of the 20th century due to the population explosion and the pressure put by economic growth on natural resources and the environment, with few operational consequences to date. That UN multilateralism has failed, at least in terms of achieving utopia, seems obvious to me. I do not infer from this that the UN is useless. The framework is there. The problem is the lack of political will. It can be hoped that dramas such as wars, natural disasters or pandemics lead to higher awareness and, therefore, positive action—as long as the deniers and conspiracy theorists lurking in the shadows during all these great ordeals do not gain the upper hand. COVID-19 is no exception.

Only the deepening of multilateralism will allow the common good to be increasingly taken into account. When jurists speak of multilateralism, they mean “international law”. In the field of international relations, many political scientists think primarily in terms of balance of power, giving the word “power” its most broadly accepted meaning. In terms of relations between sovereign states, in my view the best approximation in practice of the idea of multilateralism, including institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), was found within the network of alliances revolving around the United States during the Cold War, which required American leadership to meet the challenge posed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the erosion of multilateralism began, slowly at first, both in its global, UN form and its Western form (or “trilateral”, with Japan or South Korea). Washington’s allies turned a blind eye to this reality. It was in the interests of the rising power, China, to treat the West with kid gloves with the aim of catching up with and eventually overtaking it, like Japan after 1868 (the Meiji revolution). Meanwhile, the Chinese were spreading their tentacles around the world and skilfully trying to tilt the balance of power in international organisations in their favour.

This brings us back to the coronavirus. Has it changed the international system? Obviously not. The crisis has only accelerated trends already largely at work under George W. Bush and Barack Obama. The storm was brewing. The demiurge Trump unleashed it, and with him the Sino-American rivalry took on a global dimension. Just before the outbreak, it was still possible to believe in a lull, at least in the trade clash. But with the pandemic came thunder and lightning. The last two episodes focus on the WHO and Hong Kong. The rivalry between the US and China could only get worse. But before Trump became president, it was unimaginable that the erosion of multilateralism might so quickly approach the point of its destruction at both UN and Western levels. It is not dead yet, but the danger is real, at a time when unthought-of, if not unthinkable, global challenges require a huge effort to develop collective action.

I will refrain from speculating on multilateralism’s immediate odds. But it stands to reason that we in Europe in particular should capitalise on building the Union in order to prove the viability of a third way between the United States, that great democracy which still claims to be a liberal one, and the People’s Republic of China, which still claims to be communist. Most of us want to remain close to American democracy, but we refuse to become its vassals, notably as part of an Atlantic Alliance retrofitted to that end. There is an urgent need to clarify NATO’s truly shared objectives. As for the European Union, despite all the whining in recent weeks, it continues to sail ahead in stormy seas, as it always has. The most spectacular breakthroughs in May were Franco-German, as usual. The Karlsruhe Court ruling earlier this month stunned those who were unfamiliar with the German Basic Law and had never noticed its critical role at every stage of European construction, particularly with regard to the Central Bank (ECB). After the ruling, the Commission’s (German) President threatened to sue Berlin, while the Chancellor shrewdly dodged the issue by committing herself at great length with the French President to a form of mutualisation of the recovery, and Christine Lagarde, at the helm of the ECB, imperturbably stayed on course.

If there is one part of the world where multilateralism is making headway despite countless hurdles, it is the European Union. There is still a very long way to go in Europe and, even more so, on a planetary scale. But history is moving in that direction, for the alternative is collective suicide. There is no doubt that global warming, pandemics and more or less intense wars are foreseeable in the world’s near-term future. At least we can hope to limit the damage, which, after all, was the case during the Cold War. Let us be convinced of the European Union’s responsibility in that regard.

Thierry de Montbrial

Founder and Chairman of the WPC
Founder and Executive Chairman of Ifri

June 3, 2020

We Have No Role But to Bear Witness

WPC 2018, Rabat, October 26 - Itamar Rabinovich, President of the Israel Institute
Tel Aviv Notes
In this latest edition of Tel Aviv Notes, Itamar Rabinovich examines the role of Syria’s cultural and artistic community in the ongoing Syrian crisis.
Date

Adonis, Nizar Qabbani and Sadiq Jalal al-Azm
From left to right: Adonis, from Wikimedia Commons [CC BY-SA 3.0 ]; Nizar Qabbani, from Wikimedia Commons [public domain]; Sadiq Jalal al-Azm, from Wikimedia Commons [public domain].

Bashar al-Asad has survived the Syrian civil war, but he is unable to consolidate his rule and apply it to the whole of Syria. Prominent among the challenges to his regime is the recent “Caesar Act” (Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act), the sanctions imposed by the U.S. on Asad and his supporters. The effort to protect Syria’s civilian population from the regime’s atrocities is important and laudable. But in the long term if Syria is to be put back together again as a state, a restoration of its civil society will be necessary. In this context, it is important to examine the role of culture and specifically literature in the unfolding Syrian crisis.

In the five decades that preceded the outbreak of the Syrian uprising in 2011, the Ba‘th regime had a formula for maintaining a functioning relationship with the cultural and artistic community in Syria. This formula was not fundamentally different from the methods employed by dictatorial regimes in other countries. The regimes of the father, Hafiz al-Asad, and his son, Bashar al-Asad, demonstrated a limited willingness to withstand criticism and did not hesitate to suppress and imprison their critics, but at the same time, their Baʿthist regimes placed great emphasis on Syria’s status as an important hub of Arab culture. The regime was able to appreciate the prestige and legitimacy that was provided by Syrian theater, cinema, television, poetry, and literature. It also recognized that a limited dose of criticism provided a safety valve with which to release public criticism of the regime.

The Baʿthists were willing to accept criticism as long as it was not aimed at the legitimacy of the regime and its leaders. Criticism of corruption, inefficiency, the bureaucracy, and the ills of Arab society and politics as a whole was acceptable. For its part, the regime was able to establish a symbiotic relationship with a large part of the artistic and cultural community, whose people studied and taught in state institutions and produced state-funded films, plays, and television programs.

Works that went beyond the regime-imposed red lines were banned and their authors were sometimes jailed. An interesting example of this pendulum’s movement is the story of great Syrian playwright Saadallah Wannous. Wannous was critical of the regime, which banned the production of his plays, but in 2007, when UNESCO chose Syria to serve as the 2008 “Arab Capital of Culture,” the regime allowed the production of one of his plays, in light of the fact that he was considered one of the most prominent playwrights, if not the most prominent, in the Arab world.

Syria’s three most prominent intellectuals tried but failed to find a modus vivendi  with the regime. The poet Nizar Qabbani served as a diplomat in the Syrian foreign ministry but resigned in 1966 without criticizing the regime while choosing to live in Europe until his death in 1998. The poet Adonis (ʿAli Ahmad Saʿid Esber), a native of the Alawi Mountain, preferred to live in Lebanon and Paris. He returned to Damascus for a few years and wrote a regular column in al-Thawra newspaper until the regime fired the editor and stopped publishing the column. Adonis returned to Paris and lives there to this day. Philosopher and intellectual Sadiq Jalal al-ʿAzm lived most of his years in Lebanon, Europe, and the United States. In 1995, he returned to Syria as head of the department of philosophy at the University of Damascus. This episode ended in failure in 1999, when al-Azm was granted permission to leave Syria so as not to return.

As the Syrian uprising turned into civil war, a cultural war developed between the regime and the opposition, with both sides trying to enlist the support of the Syrian literary and arts community. Most of them supported the rebellion, but the regime succeeded in recruiting the most prominent comedian in Syria, Duraid al-Laham. Laham’s Shiʿi origins may have been an important factor in his siding with the regime.

Despite a large number of cultural figures opposing the regime, the Asad government still managed to sign about 100 artists, most of them second-tier, to a pamphlet of support. Much more ominous was the violence perpetrated against some regime critics at the height of the civil war. Thugs from one of the pro-regime militias broke the arms and fingers of cartoonist ʿAli Farzat, and singer Ibrahim Qashoush, who became famous for his protest anthem “Yalla Erhal Ya Bashar (Come on Bashar, Leave)” was found dead with his throat and vocal cords cut. Given this reality, it was not surprising that a large number of anti-regime artists preferred to leave Syria for other Arab countries or Europe and the United States. It is no wonder then, that much of the cultural-artistic protests against the regime were made on social media. Particularly popular was a group that operated a puppet theater in short videos broadcast over the Internet.

Against this backdrop, writer Khaled Khalifa is of special interest. Khalifa was born in 1964 in Aleppo, and after graduating from university, became a successful author and screenwriter. His first book was published in 1993 and the second, published in 2000, was confiscated by the Arab Writers Union in Damascus (a radical Pan-Arab organization that also criticized the peace talks with Israel). He acquired his reputation in 2006 with the publication of In Praise of Hatred, which tells the story of a merchant family from Aleppo, and through it, the story of the Muslim Brotherhood’s struggle against the Baʿth regime between 1979 and 1982. Aleppo was one of the main battlegrounds between the regime and the Muslim rebels. The uprising culminated in the city of Hama, where the regime killed over 20,000 residents. Khalifa found a safe middle ground between a graphic depiction of the brutal revolt and repression and the degree of caution required by an author in Syria. The words “Asad,” “Baʿth”, and “Alawis” do not appear in the book. Khalifa made use of the words “the president,” “the party,” and “the other community” instead. The book was banned in Syria shortly after its publication, but was republished in Beirut and enjoyed success. Khalifa was not arrested by the regime and continued his work, a clear example of his ability to navigate the unstated red lines during those years.

Khalifa’s most important and successful book was published in 2016 under the title, Death is Hard Work. The book describes the journey of a Syrian family taking the body of its deceased patriarch from Damascus to his native village near Aleppo. On the journey, the family encounters all the horrors of the civil war. Khalifa explained in interviews that the idea for writing the book came to him after he had a heart attack and was hospitalized in Damascus, and when he recovered, he asked himself what would be the fate of his body in the event of his death.

Why did Khalifa decide to stay in Syria and not emigrate like many of his friends? As he explains: “In general, those of us who could have stayed in Syria stayed, and those who left Syria did so because they had to. For those of us who stayed, I feel we preserved this place despite the fact that life here is dangerous and difficult. The decision to stay here is not easy at all. Some have left without being forced, but war is not the time to ask anyone why they want to leave a dangerous place. As for my role and the role of other artists, in simple terms, we have no role but to be witnesses… We are paralyzed in what we can do. I am fortunate to be an author … I can write by myself. You cannot go outside with a camera and take pictures on the street today. It is impossible. I feel that if I leave Syria I will lose this place for good. I am quite a coward. I cannot start my life anew elsewhere … But it is not a matter of courage … There is a price for staying but there is also a price for leaving. I have decided to pay the price of staying.”[1]

Khalifa was also able to survive in Syria because he declared that he does not have political positions, he merely describes reality. He also criticizes the opposition, and his criticism of the regime is restrained. But perhaps more important is the fact that his book was published after the regime had actually won the civil war, with the help of Russia and Iran, and could afford to withstand some criticism, which during the height of the war seemed dangerous. The fact that Khalifa is recognized in the Arab and Western worlds also serves as a kind of shield.

With the conquest of Aleppo in December 2016, the critical phase of the civil war ended in the regime’s victory. Since then, the regime has tried to reestablish its control and legitimacy and reassert its authority, with limited success. Today’s Syria is very different from Syria of 2010. Six million Syrians, mostly Sunnis, have left and several million others are internally displaced refugees in their own country. A significant part of the state is not under the regime’s control and the desire to stabilize the regime and begin economic rehabilitation today seems hopeless. Equally serious is that most of the cultural and artistic community has left Syria, leaving a depleted state in which even Khaled Khalifa would find it difficult rehabilitate its status as an important hub of Arab cultural production and creativity.


Professor Emeritus Itamar Rabinovich was the first director of the Moshe Dayan Center (MDC) for Middle Eastern and African StudiesTel Aviv University . He is also a former president of Tel Aviv University, and a former Ambassador of Israel to the United States. He is President Emeritus and Counsel of the Israel Institute.  

*This article is a revised and edited version of an article that was originally published in Haaretz on June 9, 2020.

Hubert Védrine : «L’Europe est devenue une sorte de petit paradis pour Bisounours»

Siège de la Commission européenne, Bruxelles

23.06.2020

Concernant les leçons tirées par l’Europe de la crise du Covid-19, Hubert Védrine, ex-ministre français des Affaires étrangères, confie au Point qu’il est temps de se défaire de la «naïveté» de «la vision idéalisée de la mondialisation» que les pays européens ont adoptée après la Seconde Guerre mondiale.

«Jamais le monde entier n’avait eu peur de la même menace en même temps!». C’est avec ces mots que l’ancien chef de la diplomatie française Hubert Védrine décrit la crise du Covid-19. Selon lui, elle entraînera «des conséquences anthropologiques profondes», mais ouvrira «une fenêtre d’opportunité pour agir».

Dans un entretien accordé au Point, le diplomate estime notamment que les Européens ont besoin d’une «révolution mentale», car «contrairement à une croyance répandue, plus d’intégration européenne ne veut pas dire plus de puissance».

«Il faut montrer que l’Europe est forte de la force de chaque nation, et qu’en réglementant à outrance, avec des normes ubuesques, on a perdu l’enracinement. Certains paniquent dès qu’on parle de frontières, mais une frontière, ce n’est pas un mur!», souligne-t-il.

Jurassic Park

Pour analyser l’état actuel de l’Europe, M.Védrine remonte aux années d’après-guerre, quand les fondements de l’Union européenne ont été posés:

«Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, presque tous les Européens ont refusé l’idée même de puissance, dont on pensait qu’elle avait conduit au désastre. Ils ont demandé aux États-Unis de les protéger et, à l’abri de l’Alliance atlantique, ils ont fabriqué le marché commun, puis le marché unique (avec ses normes!). L’Europe est ainsi devenue une sorte de petit paradis pour Bisounours. Mais le monde, c’est Jurassic Park! C’est ce qui se passe quand on jette Machiavel à la poubelle. Nous avons cru […] que tout irait bien puisque les pays en développement allaient devenir, en se développant et en commerçant, plus modernes, plus démocratiques, et qu’ainsi nos valeurs allaient se répandre dans l’Univers».

Se défaire de la naïveté

Pour Hubert Védrine, le temps est venu «de se défaire de cette naïveté», car la révélation de «la dépendance presque complète» de l’Europe dans certains secteurs montre que «la vision idéalisée de la mondialisation» a tourné, en partie à son détriment.

«La pandémie nous l’a montré: pour avoir des masques, les gens se sont tournés vers les gouvernements nationaux, la région ou leur ville, pas vers l’Europe».

Ainsi, poursuit-il, au lieu de dire aux Européens «qu’on va s’en remettre à l’Europe», il faut leur dire qu’«on va rendre l’Europe plus forte par la combinaison des ambitions réveillées des États membres».

«[Il faut] les rassurer en expliquant qu’ils resteront des Français, des Allemands, des Danois, des Portugais, etc., et qu’il ne s’agit pas de leur piquer ce qui leur reste de leur souveraineté», conclut l’ancien ministre français des Affaires étrangères.

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