An Update on Syria

An Update on Syria
If Syria wants to survive, it needs to cut ties with foreign proxies—fast

Faisal Saeed Al Mutar
9 mars 2025

The new Syrian government just failed its first real test. No one expected Iran to sit idly by—it was always going to push sectarian tensions. Those tensions have existed for decades, but the way the new leadership handled this crisis exposed its real problem: a complete lack of strategy. Instead of proving it can lead, it’s already falling into the same traps that have kept Syria weak and divided.

One of the biggest red flags is the presence of foreign fighters in the military. Reports indicate that groups from Central Asia and elsewhere are now part of Syria’s security forces. This isn’t just a minor issue—it’s a direct challenge to Syrian sovereignty. A country trying to rebuild after years of war cannot afford to outsource its security to foreign mercenaries or ideological proxies. This is how Syria turns into a battleground for regional powers instead of reclaiming control over its own future.

We’ve seen this play out before. Iraq’s De-Ba’athification in the early 2000s wiped out experienced military and political officials, creating a vacuum that led to insurgency, civil war, and, eventually, ISIS. The lesson was clear: when you purge an entire system without integrating key figures into the new order, you don’t get stability—you get chaos. Syria is repeating that mistake right now. Instead of ensuring that former military officials—especially top officers—are brought into the fold, they’re being sidelined. That’s a recipe for resentment, fragmentation, and another round of conflict.

If the new leadership wants to govern rather than just survive, it needs to act fast. First, kick out the foreign fighters. The Syrian military should be Syrian, full stop. Second, integrate former regime officials and minority leaders into real positions of power—not just as a token gesture but in ways that actually give them influence. Stability isn’t about empty slogans; it’s about ensuring that everyone with a stake in the country’s future has a seat at the table.

A lot of forces in the region want Syria to fail. The new leadership needs to wake up to that reality. This isn’t the time for self-congratulatory interviews with video bloggers. It’s time to do the hard work—building institutions, securing the country, and preventing the same cycle of disaster that has already played out across the region. If they don’t, they won’t just be another failed government. They’ll be the ones who had a chance to fix Syria and blew it.

Lire l’article sur le site de The International Correspondent.

Trump’s cost-slashing Cultural Revolution risks harming U.S.

Trump’s cost-slashing Cultural Revolution risks harming U.S.
Defense and diplomacy not spared from Elon Musk-led purge of bureaucrats

Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
25 février 2025

TOKYO — U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration is embarking on an unprecedented campaign of cost cuts in the federal government, designed to dramatically weaken the bureaucracy in the name of reform, with potentially global repercussions.
Elon Musk is heading this effort as the head of the Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, a temporary organization created by Trump’s executive order.
There is widespread shock in Washington over the restructuring. Budgets for important projects were abruptly cut, and government workers and employees of nongovernmental organizations worried that they could lose their jobs.
At Trump’s behest, Musk aims to significantly pare down the federal workforce from its current headcount of more than 2 million, and slash federal spending by over $1 trillion. The latter cuts would amount to more than half of all discretionary outlays, including spending on defense and foreign policy.
Musk is taking his task seriously. The administration sent an email to most government employees encouraging them to take « deferred resignations. » The U.S. Agency for International Development, which oversees foreign aid and employed roughly 10,000 people, was temporarily forced to shut down. The Department of Defense is set to lay off 5,400 civilian workers this week.
The Department of Veterans Affairs and the Forest Service have fired more than 1,000 and over 3,000 employees still in their probationary periods, respectively, according to Reuters. The Department of Education, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Office of Personnel Management have also issued layoff notices to probationary workers.
This has already gone beyond streamlining. The effort verges on effectively weakening the U.S. bureaucracy.
In China, between 1966 and 1976, Communist Party leader Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution in a bid to shore up his control over the party, throwing the country into chaos. He stirred up young « Red Guards » through a cult of personality to persecute intellectual elites.
Pragmatist elites such as then-President Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were forced out of power, and government institutions and schools became crippled.
Though the scales involved are very different, some aspects of that time resemble what is happening in Washington now.
Trump perceives bureaucratic elites in the federal government as a potential threat to his grip on power. Many bureaucrats are believed to lean liberal, favoring the Democratic Party. Trump is using Musk as Mao’s Red Guard to purge workers who do not show sufficient loyalty.
The president is especially hostile toward diversity, equity and inclusion efforts in the government, which broadened under previous President Joe Biden.
Many of Trump’s supporters believe members of racial or ethnic minority groups should not receive special consideration in government or corporate hiring. Musk also opposes DEI on the grounds that ability should be the top priority.
There is plenty of waste to be found in the enormous U.S. government, and its efficiency needs to be improved. Going too far with DEI can also cause harm. But drastic steps intended to destroy institutions risk weakening important functions of the government.
The impact on foreign policy is of particular concern. USAID has supported independent media and NGOs in Central and Eastern Europe and emerging countries to promote democracy. It has an annual budget of $40 billion.
Its shutdown was welcome news for China and Russia, which have opposed the agency’s work. Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, praised it as a « smart move. »
The cuts extend as far as national security. The offer of deferred resignations went out to the entire Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. media reported.
According to a former senior official who handled national security policy during the first Trump administration, the president considers U.S. intelligence agencies to be political enemies, after he was suspected of colluding with Russia to interfere with the 2016 presidential election. A public investigation into the matter ended after finding no conclusive evidence.
Trump « believes the CIA leaked such information in an attempt to bring him down, » the former official said.
All eyes are on the impact on the Department of Defense and the military. The Washington Post reported Wednesday that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered defense budget cuts of 8% annually over the next five years. He has also dismissed top military officers who had been appointed under Biden.
« The development and procurement of weapons, which involves a huge budget, is expensive, and there is much room for greater efficiency, » a security expert close to Trump said.
But a former senior DoD official warned that « rushing to cut budgets without scrutiny could lead to a decline in deterrence. »
The best-case scenario for the U.S. and its allies would be a restructuring that improves the government’s efficiency and enables it to better compete against China and Russia.
« Mao’s and Trump’s methods are similar in that they both galvanized the masses in an attempt to destroy existing power structures, » said Wu Junhua, research director at Japan Research Institute and an expert in China’s internal affairs. « But the latter aims to streamline a bloated government. If he succeeds, the U.S. is likely to be revived as a superpower. China is probably watching with trepidation. »
China’s Cultural Revolution wasted 10 valuable years. Trump should use its failures as a cautionary tale.

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Trump must avoid an ‘ugly deal’ with China

Trump must avoid an ‘ugly deal’ with China
Beijing’s bait may be tempting, but he should never trade away security

Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
February 15, 2025

TOKYO — Just a few weeks into Donald Trump’s U.S. presidency, diplomatic and economic tensions between the U.S. and China are intensifying. On Feb. 4, Trump imposed an additional 10% tariff on all imports from China, signaling that further increases may follow.
Trump’s strategy to pressure China goes beyond trade disputes. He views China’s growing influence over the Panama Canal as a strategic threat and is poised to take action to remove its involvement there.
During a joint news conference with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba on Feb. 7, Trump announced that the U.S. would strengthen its collaboration with Japan to counter China’s « economic aggression. » He pledged to deploy « the full strength of American deterrence capabilities » to defend Japan « 100% » in the years ahead.
On the surface, it appears the U.S. is quickly heading toward a direct confrontation with China. However, Trump’s actions and rhetoric suggest a deeper intention to negotiate with Beijing for a « big, beautiful deal. »
Within the diplomatic circles of the world’s leading powers, two conflicting theories about Trump’s intentions are being discussed. One view holds that Trump sees China as a formidable adversary and is intent on ramping up pressure on both trade and diplomatic fronts. This approach could lead to an even more strained relationship than during his first term in office.
The alternative theory presents a stark contrast: Trump aims to secure favorable concessions from Chinese President Xi Jinping, using his pressure on China as a negotiation tactic.
While it is clear that Trump is concerned by China’s efforts to rival the U.S. in high-tech and economic sectors, his broader approach to China seems to align more with the second theory — seeking advantageous deals rather than engaging in outright strategic confrontations.
One strong argument for this view is Trump’s clear eagerness to engage with Xi. He initially extended an invitation to the Chinese leader for his inauguration in mid-January. When that didn’t materialize, Trump quickly expressed his desire to visit China at the earliest opportunity.
Furthermore, even on the eve of imposing the additional tariffs, Trump signaled plans to engage with the Chinese side « probably within 24 hours. » These actions clearly point to someone not gearing up for a confrontation.
Trump’s desire for direct negotiations with Xi goes beyond trade issues. He is also seeking Xi’s cooperation to help achieve his diplomatic goal of brokering a cease fire in Ukraine.
In a phone call with Xi just before taking office, Trump stressed the urgency of resolving the situation in Ukraine and urged cooperation, saying, « You ought to get it settled. »
The U.S. estimates that China supplies 70% to 90% of the precision electronic components and machine tools essential for Russia’s weapons production. Trump is expected to demand that Beijing halt these supplies.
Despite his harsh criticisms of China, Trump has avoided speaking negatively about Xi, instead praising him as a « great leader. » This suggests that Trump sees Xi as crucial to securing a successful U.S.-China deal through negotiation.
Patrick Cronin, the Asia-Pacific security chair at the Hudson Institute, a conservative think tank in Washington, anticipates an upcoming meeting between Trump and Xi. Speaking at the Tokyo Global Dialogue, a symposium held in Tokyo on Jan. 29, Cronin said the debate about a possible economic deal will unfold « over the next couple of months, » adding, « It will happen as well in a face to face meeting, I believe, in the next month, even between Xi Jinping and President Trump. »
Meanwhile, China is holding a firm stance against yielding to pressure from Washington but appears determined to avoid a full-scale confrontation with the U.S. In light of its sluggish economy, Beijing is prioritizing social stability.
China aims to become a superpower on par with the U.S. by 2050. In pursuit of this goal, escalating unnecessary confrontations with the U.S. is seen as unwise. Chinese diplomatic experts suggest that these considerations shape Beijing’s approach to managing its relationship with the Trump administration.
U.S. hardliners on China, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Adviser Mike Waltz, are likely uneasy about Trump’s eagerness to strike a deal with China. They regard China as an enemy posing a security threat and are determined to counter it on all fronts.
However, Trump takes a different approach. He seems to believe that international politics are shaped not by rules or ethics, but by negotiations and deals between major powers. In this view, China can be both an adversary and an essential negotiating partner for the U.S.
Yet, Beijing might try to leverage Trump’s love of dealmaking, offering substantial trade concessions in exchange for U.S. compromises on key security issues like Taiwan and the South China Sea. If Trump takes the bait, the outcome could be remembered as an « ugly deal » that destabilizes Asia.
Looking ahead, three potential scenarios emerge. The first involves the U.S. and China reaching a trade agreement, accompanied by diplomatic compromises, possibly including issues like a cease fire in Ukraine. The second sees an initial trade agreement fall apart as compromises fail, leading to heightened conflicts over security issues. The third scenario offers a middle ground between these two outcomes.
Of these, the second scenario — marked by heightened tensions — seems the most likely, as the U.S. and China are not just addressing isolated issues but are moving toward a structural cold war. However, if Trump shows any softness toward China on security issues during this process, it could undermine stability in Asia.
Randall Schriver, a former assistant secretary of defense during Trump’s first term, comments on Trump’s reluctance to accept unfavorable deals. « Trump likes to view himself as a deal maker, however, he doesn’t take bad deals, » Schriver said. « He will be interested in what Xi Jinping has to offer, but I don’t see evidence that he would make undue sacrifices or sacrifice security. »
If Trump wants to prove his negotiating skills, he must resist the temptation to make an easy but ugly deal. Rushed compromises on security issues would only lead people to question his claimed dealmaking prowess.

Lisez l’article sur le site de Nikkei.

Never take China’s ‘smile diplomacy’ at face value

Never take China’s ‘smile diplomacy’ at face value
Apparent goodwill to nations such as Japan and India expected to fade

Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
February 2, 2025

TOKYO — When Russian President Vladimir Putin’s closest adviser visited Japan more than a decade ago, he secretly whispered this advice to Japanese policymakers.
« In Communist-ruled China, as was once the case in the Soviet Union, its [hard-line] foreign policy could shift suddenly and drastically, so stay alert. »
According to a source familiar with Japan-Russia relations, the advice came from Nikolai Patrushev, then-secretary of Russia’s Security Council.
Patrushev made the remarks in October 2012, the month after Japan nationalized the Senkaku Islands, which China claims as part of its territory. At the time, China responded vehemently to Japan’s actions, and a large fleet of Chinese vessels surged around the Senkaku area, escalating tensions.
Still, China’s policy toward Japan could change suddenly, and it would be wise not to miss that opportunity. That, clearly, was the essence of Patrushev’s advice.
Looking at the present, Beijing may be moving in the opposite direction, but this advice could still hold true. Recently, China has softened its diplomatic stance, ramping up interactions with Japan and India — both of which have territorial and maritime concerns with China — in an apparent attempt to ease tensions.
A symbolic event was the visit to China by Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya at the end of December. According to a Japanese official, Beijing went to great lengths to fill his 18-hour stay with as many meetings and activities as possible.
At a meeting with Iwaya, Chinese Premier Li Qiang said, « China-Japan relations are at an important period of improvement and development. » This was followed by a lunch with Wang Yi, a Politburo member and foreign minister, and dinner with Liu Jianchao, head of the Communist Party’s International Department. During the dinner, Iwaya and Liu discussed measures to promote personnel and economic exchanges between the two countries.
During its mid-January visit to China, a delegation from Japan’s ruling parties received a warm welcome. The group, composed of members from the Liberal Democratic Party and its junior coalition partner, Komeito, met with several high-ranking Communist Party figures, including two of the seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee and three of the top 24 Politburo members. According to the Japanese side, this was the first time in the past decade that so many senior Communist Party officials had engaged with a Japanese ruling party delegation in China.
In the meantime, Japan and China took reciprocal actions to improve ties, agreeing to ease visa restrictions. China has also started considering resuming imports of Japanese seafood, which have been halted since the summer of 2023 following the release of treated radioactive wastewater from the damaged Fukushima nuclear power plant.
China’s overtures are clearly tied to a political development in the U.S. — the return of Donald Trump to the presidency. Anticipating an increasingly bitter rivalry with the U.S., China is working to ease tensions with neighboring countries. Beijing is also seeking to boost its faltering economy by attracting more investment and trade.
China is also directing its « smile diplomacy » at India, as relations between the two have been strained in recent years. A June 2020 border clash resulted in over 20 fatalities, prompting India to restrict Chinese investments and visas. As a result, exchanges between the two Asian giants have stagnated.
The tide shifted in October when Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met for the first time in five years. The leaders agreed on the need for stability in the disputed areas and, about two months later, decided on six concrete measures to achieve this goal.
According to a former senior Indian military officer with inside knowledge of his nation’s diplomatic affairs, it was China that first proposed the border stability measures. Regarding Beijing’s intentions, he suggested that the Chinese leadership likely wants to reduce flashpoints with India before a possible confrontation with the Trump administration.
Some U.S. allies, such as Australia and several European countries, were targeted by China’s goodwill gestures before Japan and India. By the end of 2024, Beijing had lifted all punitive tariffs on Australian wine and lobster. In April of the same year, China invited German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to Beijing, and the following month, Xi made his first visit to France in five years.
The key question is how long China’s overtures will last. Historically, China has used diplomatic maneuvers to approach U.S. allies and neighbors whenever tensions with the U.S. rise. However, this posture is often short-lived, as Beijing views it as secondary to addressing issues with Washington.
A typical example is China’s relations with Japan. In 1989, Beijing faced a severe
deterioration in its ties with Western countries after its crackdown on anti-government protests in Tiananmen Square. To avoid international isolation, China turned to Japan and sought to initiate mutual visits among leaders.
However, starting in the mid-1990s, Beijing’s attitude toward Japan cooled as U.S.-China relations began to improve. The government of then-President Jiang Zemin began intensifying criticism of Japan over historical issues, causing relations between the two countries to grow increasingly acrimonious.
The same pattern was repeated in 2018, the year after the first Trump administration came to power. That year, the prime ministers of Japan and China visited each other, hinting at a diplomatic thaw, but this did not result in a substantial change in their relationship.
Sadly, it is likely that Beijing’s current smile diplomacy will eventually fade, just as it has in the past. There will also be limits to the concessions China is willing to make, as its primary motive is to strategize against the U.S.
However, other countries should take advantage of China’s conciliatory gestures while they last and work to resolve difficult issues. At the same time, they should remain vigilant about China’s underlying intentions and prepare for a shift in policy and rising tensions.
Bilahari Kausikan, former permanent secretary of Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cautions against viewing Beijing’s current diplomatic stance as a sign of real change.
« This is a tactical move as China does not want to fight on too many fronts simultaneously, particularly since it has serious economic weaknesses, » Kausikan said. « Once Beijing becomes confident that relations with Trump will not get out of hand, it will revert to its old ways.
« We should enjoy the situation while it lasts, but should not get complacent and mistake a tactical shift for a substantive policy change. »

Lisez l’article sur le site de Nikkei.

Trump’s bullying diplomacy harks back to Yalta-era world order

Trump’s bullying diplomacy harks back to Yalta-era world order

Greenland, Panama proposals show incoming leader’s focus on force over norms

Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
January 15, 2025 01:44 JST

TOKYO — With days to go before his inauguration, U.S. President-elect Donald Trump is already causing alarm with proposals to seize control of Greenland and the Panama Canal, as well as his refusal to rule out the use of military or economic force to do so.
The response from international officials can roughly be divided into two.
The first group sees the remarks merely as a bluff and a way to draw out diplomatic concessions. Even Trump would not truly think he can acquire Greenland, which is a Danish territory, or the Panama Canal, they say.
The second group believes Trump may be serious to some extent — that Trump considers international relations as a domain for major powers, where smaller countries should simply do what they are told.
It may be best to assume Trump’s worldview fits the latter. He has previously signaled his willingness to go over the heads of U.S. allies in order to settle international issues between major global powers.
In terms of the Ukraine war, the Biden administration has coordinated closely on its response with European NATO members. In contrast, Trump is looking to negotiate directly with Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the fighting. He has shown no interest so far in coordinating his position beforehand with European allies.
The same applies to North Korea. Rather than working with Japan and South Korea to contain the situation, Trump seems interested in making a breakthrough through direct talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.
Trump has said he received « beautiful » love letters from Kim while in office. The warm comments are less about any personal affinity Trump feels toward Kim, and more a sign that he sees North Korea’s autocratic leader as an important negotiation partner.
Under the United Nations Charter created in the aftermath of World War II, every nation regardless of size is expected to abide by international rules. But Trump sees the world as a jungle governed by power, not ethics or rules. This view, which stems from his career in the cutthroat real estate sector, is not expected to change.
Trump has no interest in shaping the world order. However, he could unintentionally usher in the return of great-power diplomacy like the world saw from the Yalta Conference of 1945. From the creation of the U.N. to the occupation of Germany to determining spheres of influence, events after World War II unfolded largely the way U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had agreed during the meeting.
Trump’s aggressive attitude against Denmark and Panama and his disregard for alliances makes sense when considering his interest in Yalta-like great-power dealmaking.
But it is Russian President Vladimir Putin who is most interested in the return of great-power diplomacy. He wants to decide on the future of Ukraine and the power balance in Europe through direct negotiations with Trump, putting the interest of U.S. allies on the back burner.
Concern over Trump’s diplomatic style loomed large over the World Policy Conference in the United Arab Emirates in December.
Trump’s approach « is the worst-case scenario » for Europe because it could result in « a deal between Putin and Trump that would be at the cost of Europe and Ukrainian security interests, » German lawmaker Norbert Roettgen said.
If there is a possibility that Trump will negotiate with the North Korean leader, « we hope that there will be very close consultation with South Korea, » said Hur Kyung-wook, South Korea’s former vice minister of strategy and finance.
In November, Alex Younger, former head of British intelligence service MI6, also expressed concerns over Trump in a podcast with the Financial Times.
« He’s a Yalta man through and through, » Younger said. « It’s all fundamentally inimical to Britain’s interests. »
Trump’s diplomacy could yield surprising results. But there is an even greater chance that he could create lasting problems.
While Putin and Kim essentially have no term limits, Trump has four years in office. If he rushes for a deal on the Ukraine war or North Korea, he would likely be put at a disadvantage.
U.S.-China ties are another thing to watch. Views on China within Trump’s team differ between hawks like Marco Rubio, Trumps choice for secretary of state, wealthy entrepreneurs like Elon Musk, and « America first » devotees like Vice President-elect JD Vance.
It is hard to imagine Musk, who is making big profits in China, taking a hard line against Beijing. While the America First faction is concerned about China, it is reluctant to spend heavily on defense to increase American involvement in Asia.
Trump has chosen to incorporate these varying viewpoints into his incoming administration. By leaving the door open to both hardline and conciliatory policies, he may be trying to keep China on its toes.
While a real estate deal concludes once a contract is signed, diplomacy does not end after one big deal. An impatient Trump could risk failure if he treats the two the same.

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L’Amérique de Trump

Dans une semaine, le président élu, ou plus exactement réélu après quatre années de mandat Biden, prendra ses fonctions.
Le système constitutionnel américain octroie un délai de plus de deux mois pour une transition ordonnée entre deux administrations.
Le paradoxe cette année est une de facto quasi prise de pouvoir immédiate de la nouvelle équipe pressentie et annoncée bien que non confirmée, du fait du contrôle républicain sur le Congrès, et notamment le Sénat investi d’un “rôle d’avis et de consentement” pour les postes les plus importants soit environ 1400.
De fait instruit par son expérience de 2016, Trump a annoncé à marche forcée nombre de pressentis tant au cabinet, que dans des structures autonomes (Environmental Protection Agency, Securities and Exchange Commission, etc.).
Certaines nominations ont été vivement critiquées, notamment pour des raisons éthiques (par exemple le ministre de la Justice, ou Attorney General, rapidement retiré).
D’autres rencontrent des réserves, tels le secrétaire à la défense, celui à la santé, ou le directeur de la coordination des services de renseignement.
Au delà des situations particulières, qu’ont tous ces pressentis en commun ? Tout d’abord un lien de fidélité, de loyauté avec le Président élu, souvent du fait d’une relation ancienne, personnelle ou d’affaires.
Peu ou pas de membres de la famille proche, si ce n’est par alliance (l’ambassadeur nommé pour la France et Monaco et le responsable des affaires du Moyen Orient). Beaucoup de New Yorkais, ou Floridiens, souvent les mêmes, tels le nouvel AG, le directeur de l’EPA, mon ancien Congressman NYS 1, Suffolk County, Lee Zeldin, l’ambassadrice aux Nations Unies, le secrétaire au trésor. Des milliardaires, à commencer par les co-titulaires du nouveau département dit DOGE, Department of Government Efficiency, Elon Musk et Vivek Ramaswamy. Et bon nombre d’autres personnalités.
Peu de républicains historiques, trop indépendants , à noter l’absence de Mike Pompeo et de Nikki Haley, pour lesquels Trump a pris la plume pour les remercier de leurs bons et loyaux services, mais aussi préciser que leur absence n’était pas un simple oubli.
En revanche, un certain nombre de ralliés démocrates dont quelques-uns très récemment, Robert F. Kennedy Jr, Tulsi Gabbard qui soutenait Bernie Sanders en 2016 contre Hillary Clinton, Musk, etc.
Ce qui les différencie également est le fait que sur les thèmes essentiels de la campagne, il y a des vues diamétralement opposées, et ces oppositions se sont déjà exprimées, en particulier sur un sujet aussi controversé que l’immigration.
Schématiquement, les pressentis venant de la Tech, Musk, Ramaswamy, préconisent l’octroi de visas H1B à des non-nationaux alors que le Deputy Chief of Staff , Stephen Miller, est en faveur d’une réduction des flux migratoires, y compris légaux.
The Economist de cette semaine fait sa première page sur “Donald the Deporter”, pour conclure que Trump, s’il le souhaite, a les cartes en main, pour obtenir et délivrer un projet bipartisan de régularisation des clandestins – 11 à 15 millions – qu’aucun des 5 derniers présidents n’a réalisé. A rappeler qu’Obama, pendant ses 8 années, déportait plus que Trump sur une base annelle, qui pendant la dernière campagne a promis d’octroyer des résidences permanentes – cartes vertes – aux diplômés étrangers des grandes universités américaines.
Marco Rubio, sénateur de Floride, et prochain Secrétaire d’État, fut en 2016 l’un des membres d’une commission bicamérale et bipartisane – dite gang of 8 – qui avait élaboré un tel projet de régularisation des illégaux.
Sur une autre sujet médiatisé, les droits de douane, là aussi pas de consensus, si tous les pressentis annoncés se sont exprimés en leur faveur, certains les conçoivent comme une tactique de négociation bilatérale – Trump ne comprend pas et hait le multiralisme – avec des pays tels le Canada, le Mexique et l’Union européenne – et d’autres comme un dispositif punitif à taux différenciés, ainsi que comme une source de revenus additionnels, pour les adversaires tels la Chine.
Pourtant Trump, décideur ultime, est parfaitement capable de tenter un grand “deal” avec cette dernière, affaiblie sur le plan économique et diplomatique, par son alliance avec l’axe du mal (Russie, Iran, Corée du Nord).
Sur les sujets géostratégiques et de politique étrangère, certains commentateurs avisés s’inquiètent de la supposée intention du couple infernal Musk-Trump de faire basculer l’Europe dans le camp des populismes d’extrême droite. Le Président Macron se préoccupe de la naissance d’une internationale réactionnaire. De fait, la politique étrangère sera gérée au quotidien par Rubio et Waltz, dont le sortant NSA – conseiller de Biden, Jack Sullivan -, soulignait Fareed Zakharia sur CNN la continuité sur le thème essentiel de la relation avec la Chine.

Quant à l’Ukraine, le règlement du conflit prendra plus de 24h sans aucun doute.
Et l’Iran, considérablement affaibli par les échecs successifs dans ses “proxies”, pourrait envisager un nouvel accord se substituant au JCPOA dont Trump était sorti en 2017.
Nous pourrions aborder d’autres thèmes, cette administration a une fenêtre de 2 années pour tenter de régler des dossiers chauds et potentiellement dangereux, y compris sur le plan intérieur, avec un parti démocrate affaibli et sans leadership incontesté.
En novembre 2026, Trump pourrait perdre le contrôle des deux chambres du Congrès, les sièges républicains en contestation étant le double de ceux à renouveler pour les démocrates. Ensuite il sera un “lame duck” non rééligible.
Aura-t-il la discipline et le management d’équipes requis pour son succès partiel sur quelques thèmes majeurs? Sa personnalité permet d’en douter, mais je reste dubitatif. Sa première décision, la nomination de son directeur de cabinet, une femme qui a joué un rôle essentiel dans sa campagne victorieuse , et de plus une Floridienne, est un indice important. Quant à sa relation avec l’Europe, ses menaces sur l’OTAN n’ont toujours pas conduit à une remise en cause effective de cette alliance, mais le nombre de pays consacrant 2 % du PNB à leur défense est passé de 3 à 20, et 3 % est en passe de devenir la nouvelle norme.

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