L’invasion russe de l’Ukraine constitue la plus grande césure de l’histoire de l’après-Guerre froide. Elle dépasse de loin le choc des attentats du 11 septembre. L’agression russe modifiera en profondeur l’architecture de sécurité européenne et aura un très lourd impact sur les politiques de défense et de sécurité de pays membres de l’OTAN. Elle changera également l’équilibre entre l’Allemagne, de la France et de la Pologne. Cette dernière se verra pleinement confirmée dans son attitude de méfiance vis-à-vis de Moscou qu’elle observe depuis la fin de l’URSS et qu’elle partage avec ses voisins baltes. La France ne pourra que constater l’échec de sa politique d’ouverture envers la Russie et les résistances auxquelles se heurte son engagement dans le Sahel pourraient se traduire par un redéploiement partiel de ses forces militaires en Europe centrale, une tendance qui se traduit déjà par un engagement renforcé en Roumanie. L’Allemagne enfin voit tous les principes de sa politique étrangère post-Guerre froide remis en question. L’ordre européen qu’elle voulait contribuer à bâtir sur les principes du libre-échange, du multilatéralisme et de l’interdépendance entre l’UE et la Russie a vécu. Pendant longtemps entourée de pays qu’elle croyait sûrs, elle s’est permis des réviser à la baisse ses dépenses militaires pendant trois décennies. Elle doit désormais revoir en profondeur les postulats de sa politique de défense et revoir à la hausse ses dépenses militaires. Dans un contexte d’enchérissement conséquent de ses approvisionnements énergétiques (Berlin a suspendu la mise en route de Nord Stream 2).
Un héritage en demi-teinte
Sur cette base et face à un président russe qui estime que les frontières de la Russie éternelle doivent être identiques à celles de la défunte URSS, la renaissance du « Triangle de Weimar » semble s’imposer. Rappelons que ce dernier a été créé il y a trente ans par l’Allemagne, la France et la Pologne avec l’ambition de contribuer à surmonter la division de l’Europe et de rapprocher les États d’Europe centrale et orientale à la fois de l’UE et de l’OTAN. Cet objectif a été atteint en plusieurs étapes, pour l’essentiel entre 1999 et 2009. Ce qui n’a pas manqué ensuite de poser la question de la raison d’être du « Triangle de Weimar ». Ce dernier a toutefois souffert des rapports asymétriques entre les trois pays, la Pologne ne pouvant évidemment pas se mesurer à la France et à l’Allemagne quant au niveau de vie ou du PIB, sans parler de son rayonnement extérieur. Les relations entre les trois pays souffrent encore de bien d’autres facteurs. La relation franco-polonaise est handicapée par le peu d’investissement (et d’intérêt) politique et économique de la France dans la région. S’y ajoutent le scepticisme que la France a maintes fois manifesté face au bien-fondé de l’élargissement à l’Est de l’UE et face au transatlantisme des Polonais, jugé excessif par Paris. Sans oublier la primauté que la France a accordée aux enjeux de sécurité du Sud par rapport à ceux de l’Est. La relation germano-polonaise est quant à elle pour l’essentiel marquée par l’asymétrie de la puissance économique entre les deux pays, mais aussi, voire surtout, par le souvenir de Seconde Guerre mondiale. Pendant les six années de la terreur allemande, entre 1939 et 1945, la Pologne a perdu près de six millions de citoyens, dont la moitié furent des citoyens juifs. Les Nazis avaient détruit l’élite polonaise et destiné le pays et son peuple à l’esclavage et à une extermination progressive. Plus de 700 villages polonais ont été victimes de massacres collectifs allemands. Aujourd’hui encore, cette mémoire est profondément enracinée dans la conscience collective polonaise. Jaroslaw Kaczynski a grandi à Varsovie, dans les ruines de la capitale polonaise, qui a été presque entièrement rasée en 1944. La Wehrmacht et les SS ont à ce moment assassiné des centaines de milliers de personnes. Du point de vue intérieur polonais, le nationalisme militant du gouvernement PiS est une conséquence de cette expérience collective de mort imminente.
Le caractère autoritaire de son système politique, sa tendance à placer le pouvoir au-dessus de la liberté, découle de la conviction que seul un État dirigé de manière stricte et rigoureuse peut s’affirmer dans un monde plein de dangers existentiels. Le partage des pouvoirs n’y a pas sa place. D’où les dérives du gouvernement polonais qui, vu de l’extérieur, apparaissent comme l’expression d’un nationalisme d’un autre âge. Ce qui place l’Allemagne et la France, sinon toute l’UE, devant un vrai dilemme. D’une part, un pays dont le gouvernement sape l’autorité de la loi et le principe de la séparation des pouvoirs, remet en question la primauté du droit européen et s’empare du contrôle des médias publics ne devrait pas pouvoir rester membre de l’UE. D’autre part, l’idée que la Pologne puisse à nouveau se retrouver dans une zone grise, dépourvue de la protection d’alliances fiables, entre l’Allemagne, la Biélorussie de Lukaschenko et l’État russe en quête d’expansion, est une perspective cauchemardesque. La crise migratoire à la frontière polono-biélorusse a amplement démontré ce dilemme, puisque l’UE, obligée qu’elle fut de se montrer solidaire de Varsovie, n’a pas pu dénoncer, ni empêcher la mise à l’écart de Frontex, ni surtout les actions illégales de push-back de réfugiés menées par les forces douanières polonaises.
Un avenir commun dicté par l’urgence
Si, pour toutes ces raisons, le « Triangle de Weimar » ne s’est jamais affirmé en tant que force politique sur la scène européenne, il semble aujourd’hui renaître de ses cendres. Le 8 février à Berlin, lors d’une conférence de presse venant conclure deux jours d’intenses débats avec les présidents russe et ukrainien, le chancelier allemand et les présidents français et polonais « ont souligné leur unité » face à la Russie, qui subirait des « conséquences de grande envergure » si elle attaquait l’Ukraine. L’unité franco-germano-polonaise face à la Russie est suffisamment rare pour être soulignée. Mais surtout, elle va loin cette fois-ci. Berlin, Paris et Varsovie sont tombés d’accord pour estimer qu’en cas d’invasion russe de l’Ukraine, l’Acte fondateur de Russie – OTAN de 1997 ne s’appliquerait plus. S’ils n’ont pas rendu public leur accord, Scholz souligne qu’une agression n’aurait pas seulement des conséquences économiques, mais « certainement aussi géostratégiques ». Cet accord est confirmé à l’OTAN, où on considère qu’une invasion russe en Ukraine ébranlerait si fondamentalement l’architecture de sécurité européenne que l’Acte fondateur ne serait plus applicable. Cela fait partie des « messages forts » transmis à Moscou ces derniers jours. Un abandon de l’Acte fondateur – qui avait stipulé que l’OTAN n’a « ni l’intention, ni le projet, ni la raison d’établir des dépôts d’armes nucléaires sur le territoire de ces États membres » – aurait des répercussions sur la doctrine nucléaire de l’OTAN. Des armements nucléaires américains pourraient dorénavant être installés à l’Est, perspective esquissée par Jens Stoltenberg en novembre 2021 déjà. Rappelons aussi que l’Acte fondateur avait pour but d’amortir l’élargissement à l’Est, l’Alliance s’étant engagée à ne pas déployer sur une base permanente des forces de combat substantielles à l’Est. L’OTAN s’est sentie liée par cette règle, même après l’annexion de la Crimée, ce qui a notamment été une préoccupation de l’Allemagne et de la France, tandis que la Pologne a insisté pour qu’elle soit modifiée. C’est la raison pour laquelle seules des forces au nombre inférieur à une brigade ont été déployées jusqu’à présent dans les trois Etats baltes et en Pologne. Et sur une base rotative. Tout ceci appartient désormais au passé. Et les trois pays partenaires du « Triangle de Weimar », en dépit de tout ce qui les sépare, semblent s’accorder sur cette révision lourde de conséquences. Cette unité de vue est aussi la traduction de l’unité occidentale face à Moscou. Reste toutefois à savoir si Paris et Berlin peuvent et doivent faire confiance à la Pologne de Kaczynski dans un domaine aussi sensible que la sécurité en Europe et alors que les relations entre Bruxelles et Varsovie ne cessent de se dégrader.
La hausse brutale des prix de l’énergie, qui risque de s’accélérer avec la guerre déclenchée par la Russie contre l’Ukraine, est au centre des préoccupation des électeurs. Comment éviter que les enjeux de long terme de la transition climatique ne soient marginalisés par les revendications sur le pouvoir d’achat et négligés par les responsables politiques ?
Par Jean Pisani-Ferry
Publié le
Dans un sondage récent, 52 % des Français citaient le pouvoir d’achat comme leur préoccupation principale. 29 % seulement mentionnaient l’environnement, reléguant ce thème à peu près au niveau du système de santé (30%) et de l’immigration (28 %). Dans ce contexte, il n’est guère surprenant que la transition vers une économie neutre en carbone n’ait pas été mise en avant dans la première phase de la campagne présidentielle.
Avec le déclenchement de la guerre en Ukraine, les questions de politique internationale et de Défense vont, pour une fois, s’imposer dans le débat national. Parallèlement, la hausse du prix du gaz va certainement accroître l’inquiétude relative au pouvoir d’achat. Ces préoccupations ont toute chance de reléguer la politique climatique aux marges du débat politique.
Pourtant, la France, tout comme le reste de l’Union européenne, s’est engagée à baisser environ de moitié ses émissions de gaz à effet de serre d’ici 2030 – soit une diminution trois fois plus rapide qu’au cours de la décennie passée. La capacité du pays à atteindre cet objectif extraordinairement exigeant dépendra des décisions qui seront prises pendant le prochain quinquennat. Approcher seulement la cible demandera d’accélérer une transformation qui va toucher tous les secteurs et tous les aspects de la vie économique et sociale.
Dans ces conditions, le bon fonctionnement de la démocratie voudrait que les décisions d’urgence en matière d’action climatique soient la priorité des programmes électoraux. Mais les candidats qui, à Gauche, mettent l’accent sur cette thématique sont largement distanciés, tandis que ceux de Droite préfèrent éviter le sujet, ou même plaident pour interrompre l’installation d’éoliennes en raison de leurs conséquences pour les paysages. Le seul débat significatif concerne les parts relatives du nucléaire et des renouvelables dans le mix électrique en 2050 : un choix important sans aucun doute, mais qui ne déterminera pas la capacité de la France à remplir ses objectifs pour 2030.
Tous les pays européens ne manifestent pas la même indifférence. L’action climatique, par exemple, a figuré en bonne place dans la campagne électorale pour les législatives de septembre 2021 en Allemagne, puis dans l’accord de coalition qui y consacre 40 pages.
Mais dans la plupart des pays, la hausse brutale des prix de l’énergie depuis l’automne et la reprise de l’inflation ont suscité de vives protestations et ont détourné l’attention des responsables politiques des enjeux de long terme. Partout, les gouvernements se sont précipités pour introduire diverses formes de compensations, dans l’espoir de modérer la hausse des prix. D’après une enquête publiée par le think tank Bruegel, beaucoup de pays ont abaissé les taxes sur l’énergie, réduisant de fait le prix du carbone dans une période où il faudrait au contraire l’augmenter.
Une telle situation suscite trois interrogations. Premièrement, comment expliquer une telle myopie sur les enjeux climatiques ? Deuxièmement, comment les gouvernements devraient-ils réagir ? Troisièmement, existe-t-il une méthode pour faire en sorte que le débat démocratique se centre sur les choix déterminants pour l’avenir ?
Dans un contexte où la meilleure protection contre des prix élevés de l’énergie serait de réduire notre dépendance aux combustibles fossiles, il est tentant d’attribuer la myopie actuelle à la domination grandissante des réseaux sociaux sur le débat public et à l’érosion des institutions politiques établies, à commencer par les partis eux-mêmes.
Mais il y a également des raisons économiques. Depuis la crise financière globale de 2008, de nombreux ménages européens ont subi des difficultés en série. Si leurs revenus ont été dans l’ensemble protégés contre les effets de l’épidémie de COVID-19, leur niveau de vie n’a que peu progressé depuis les débuts de la crise financière. Avec l’augmentation des prix de l’énergie, celles et ceux qui ont du mal à boucler leurs fins de mois ont subi une nouvelle érosion de leur pouvoir d’achat. Et les ménages plus aisés dont les économies sont placées sur des comptes d’épargne ont vu diminuer la rémunération de leurs avoirs en raison des faibles taux d’intérêt. Avec le retour brutal de l’inflation, ils craignent désormais une érosion de la valeur réelle de leur actif.
L’instabilité des prix de l’énergie est probablement appelée à durer – voire à s’aggraver. Indépendamment même des soubresauts géopolitiques, la transition d’une économie brune à une économie verte ne se fera pas sans difficultés. La réallocation des capitaux des énergies fossiles aux renouvelables sera un processus chaotique qui comportera des phases de pénurie énergétique aussi bien que des périodes d’offre excessive.
C’est pourquoi les gouvernements doivent se préparer à ces scénarios. Plus précisément, ils doivent expliciter leurs objectifs climatiques, assumer et annoncer une progression graduelle du prix (explicite ou implicite) du carbone, et procurer un soutien substantiel aux ménages qui ne peuvent pas assumer le coût de l’isolation de leur maison ou de l’achat d’une voiture moins polluante. Personne ne doit être protégé des changements imposés par le prix de l’énergie, mais personne ne doit être privé de la possibilité de s’y adapter.
C’est aussi le rôle des gouvernements de protéger les ménages les plus fragiles contre les augmentations du coût de l’énergie. Ils doivent le faire par des programmes qui visent de façon ciblée le bas de la distribution des revenus, sans procurer des avantages à l’ensemble des consommateurs. De telles mesures ne doivent pas affaiblir les incitations à investir dans la rénovation thermique des logements ou de nouveaux équipements. Parce que le soutien budgétaire et les protections contre les fluctuations tarifaires doivent aider les ménages à se repérer dans un brouillard d’instabilité, les responsables politiques doivent clairement expliquer les deux objectifs et s’assurer que chaque instrument est consacré à chacun des objectifs.
La troisième question est la plus difficile. La capacité d’une société à identifier les défis de long terme et à concentrer ses efforts pour y faire face dépend d’une série de conditions. L’honnêteté (au sujet des défis et de leur coût), la clarté (sur les choix politiques), la transparence (sur les conséquences des décisions politiques) et l’équité (dans la répartition de l’effort) sont indispensables. Mais ils ne sont pas suffisants.
L’action en faveur du climat ne mobilisera et ne motivera les électeurs que si la peur laisse place à l’espoir. Les électeurs, en Europe du moins, n’ont plus besoin qu’on leur explique la menace climatique mais ils ont besoin d’entendre qu’on pourra y arriver, d’être galvanisés par un Yes, we can. Ils ne doivent plus se voir comme les victimes potentielles du changement climatique ou des politiques mises en place pour y répondre mais comme des acteurs de la transformation en cours, et trouver un rôle positif dans la construction d’un avenir désirable.
C’est une ambition de taille dans des sociétés de « post-vérité » au sein desquelles la confiance dans les institutions est à son étiage. Mais quiconque réussira à créer cette dynamique en tirera un bénéfice politique à la hauteur de ses efforts.
Lire l’article original sur le site de Terra Nova.
ENTRETIEN. Le diplomate singapourien Kishore Mahbubani déplore que l’Occident ait perdu toute vision stratégique et l’appelle à lâcher du lest envers Moscou.
Attachée au respect de l’intégrité et de la souveraineté territoriale de tous les États, la Chine appelle à la retenue dans la guerre d’agression déclenchée par la Russie contre l’Ukraine. Elle affiche une attitude de neutralité entre les belligérants et se prononce pour une reprise des négociations. Mais beaucoup d’experts occidentaux la soupçonnent de soutenir en sous-main Vladimir Poutine qui s’est rendu à Pékin le 4 février, où il a été reçu par le président Xi Jinping à l’occasion de l’ouverture des Jeux olympiques d’hiver.
As the war between Russia and Ukraine continues, our panel of IAI contributors offer their analysis of the situation. Lawrence Freedman, Hew Strachan, Domitilla Sagramoso and Joseph Nye on what to expect in the short and long run, the role of nuclear weapons, and how to make sense of Putin.
Lawrence Freedman
Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King’s College London. He was a member of the Iraq Inquiry and was the official historian of the Falklands War.
For those of us who have long wondered why Putin would embark on an aggressive war, the core puzzle has been what he could hope to achieve politically. A limited campaign in Eastern Ukraine made some sense as it would carve out an area that could be sustained and defended over time. The current scale of operations makes less sense because it essentially requires regime change in Kyiv. In Iraq and Afghanistan the US and the UK learned through bitter experience how difficult this can be.
The point about wars (and I have studied many) is that they rarely go according to plan. Chance events or poorly executed operations can require sudden shifts in strategy. The unintended consequences can be as important as the intended. These are the pitfalls surrounding all wars and why they should only be embarked upon with good reason (of which the most compelling is an act of self-defence).
The decision to embark on this war rests on the shoulders of one man. As we saw last week, Putin has become obsessed with Ukraine, and prone to outrageous theories which appear as pretexts for war but which may also reflect his views. So many lives have already been lost because of the peculiar circumstances and character of this solitary individual, fearful of Covid and a Ukraine of his imagination. At times in democracies we lament the flabbiness, incoherence, short-sightedness and inertia of our decision-making, compared with autocrats who can outsmart us by thinking long-term and then taking bold steps without any need to convince a sceptical public, listen to critics, or be held back by such awkward constraints as the rule of law. Putin reminds us that that autocracy can lead to great errors, and while democracy by no means precludes us making our own mistakes, it at least allows us opportunities to move swiftly to new leaders and new policies when that happens. Would that this now happens to Russia.
This is an edited excerpt from Lawrence Freedman’s Substack, published here with the author’s permission.
Hew Strachan
Professor of International Relations at St. Andrews, and world-renowned expert on war, military strategy and the British Army.
The campaign plan which the Russians are putting into effect points to a rapid encirclement of Kyiv and the installation of a puppet Ukrainian government. A short war ending in a clear-cut victory may produce a decisive political outcome. Putin has the initiative for now, but this, like so many other wars that have promised quick results, looks destined to be long. The longer it is the less certain its possible outcomes.
As the war lengthens, both sides will have to accommodate the major economic consequences of sanctions. For Russia, they could inflame the domestic dissent that is already evident. Putin’s Russia is more open than the Soviet Union and his decision to go to war seems to have left him isolated, even among senior elites. His political future now depends on the war’s outcome. The presidents of both the United States and Ukraine have spoken over his head to the people of Russia. But dead Russian soldiers could also rally the Russian people to support the war and so to Putin.
The challenge for the international community is how to contain the war and strengthen the multilateral order, not just in Europe but also globally, while supporting Ukraine short of a direct military commitment. These aims may have been clarified by Russia’s invasion but they are no easier to put into effect than they were before the fighting began.
Putin has threatened those who rush to support Ukraine with nuclear attack. Moreover, intervention could also foment civil war within Ukraine. Playing it long is sensible but will be difficult, as domestic public opinion demands quick responses to Russian outrages but then turns inward to focus on shortages of key commodities and soaring energy prices. The need for clear statesmanship is paramount: Putin has gambled on it being in short supply.
Domitilla Sagramoso
Senior lecturer in Security and Development at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, and a noted expert on Russian foreign and security policy.
The fact that Russia has nuclear weapons lies at the heart as to why the West cannot fully intervene militarily. There is danger and risk involved in escalating the conflict to a nuclear level. Putin has already sent an unveiled threat that he would escalate to a nuclear level if NATO intervened.
This invasion should finally lay to rest the argument that Putin is a rational actor who measures his actions carefully. If we look at Russia’s actions in the North Caucasus in the early 2000s, it was clear that he had a complete disregard for civilian casualties. Russia’s military operation was very brutal; it included mass abuses of human rights, attacks of civilians fleeing from conflict zones, disappearances of people, and indiscriminate bombing. The same applies to Russia’s intervention in Syria, with the carpet bombing of Aleppo. Putin is acting emotionally in Ukraine; he has a strong attachment to the USSR and to the former Russian Empire, of which Ukraine were important parts.
As to the theory that NATO is to blame for making Russia feel threatened by expanding into regions formerly controlled by the USSR, it might have made sense in the past (in the 1990s or in 2008 when talks of Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO were ongoing) but no longer. Furthermore, the presence of NATO forces in the eastern flank, near Russia, was extremely slim, almost symbolic, compared to the forces Russia had amassed on the border, although NATO is significantly reinforcing its presence on the eastern flank now. This war, in fact, shows how wrong Russia was to feel threatened by NATO’s supposed interest to expand into Ukraine, because NATO had no presence in Ukraine and European countries are only now starting to provide military equipment to Kyiv. So, this argument that Russia was being encircled by NATO and had to react is no longer valid.
Putin, it seems to me, has lost touch with reality. Before this operation started, he was obsessing with the idea that Ukraine was going to attack Russian minorities in the Donbas region, and that the USA was manipulating the Ukrainian leadership into such an operation. His whole worldview is so removed from the West’s understanding of the events in Eastern Europe that we can’t exclude the risk of escalation.
Joseph Nye
Chairman of the National Intelligence Council under Clinton, and former Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, Nye coined the term ‘neoliberalism’.
What’s ahead? Distinguish between the short and medium term. In the short term, it seems that the Russian army will overpower the Ukrainian army. But long term is likely to be more difficult for the Russian invaders. The US military was able to overcome Saddam Hussein’s military quite quickly, but “mission accomplished” proved to be misleading regarding Iraq over the long term. Ruling a mobilized nationalistic population is much more difficult than defeating an army.
Russia’s possession of nuclear weapons has deterred the US and NATO sending troops into Ukraine, but that still leaves the problem described above. Nuclear weapons do not change that at all. And in the meantime, Russia’s actions seem to have strengthened NATO.
La crise en Ukraine aura eu pour mérite de faire sortir l’Allemagne du sommeil stratégique dans lequel elle était plongée depuis la chute de l’Union soviétique.
Nicolas Barré (Dessin Kim Roselier pour « Les Echos »)
Publié le 28 févr. 2022 à 17:10 | Mis à jour le 28 févr. 2022 à 19:38
Enfin, l’Allemagne s’éveille au XXIe siècle. Vladimir Poutine aura réussi l’exploit de la sortir du grand sommeil stratégique dans lequel elle était douillettement plongée depuis Gerhard Schröder, devenu chancelier en 1998, puis Angela Merkel. « Nous avons failli face à l’histoire » : cet aveu terrible de l’ancienne ministre de la Défense de la chancelière, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, dit tout.
Engourdie comme d’autres Etats européens dans le mythe des « dividendes de la paix », l’Allemagne d’Angela Merkel n’a pas perçu la montée des périls. Ironie de l’histoire, il revient désormais à son successeur, Olaf Scholz, imprégné de culture pacifiste mais aiguillonné par les événements et sentant le souffle de l’histoire , de réussir ce réveil stratégique.
Un rôle pour l’histoire
C’est le moment d’endosser des rôles plus grands que soi. Dans Kiev assiégé, l’ex-acteur comique Volodymyr Zelensky le prouve chaque jour , usant avec talent des réseaux sociaux – face à l’envahisseur, toutes les armes sont bonnes à prendre. Devant le Bundestag en fin de semaine dernière, Scholz fut à la hauteur du changement d’ère que l’on attendait de Berlin.
Depuis la fin de la guerre froide, jamais l’Allemagne n’a porté ses dépenses militaires à 2 % du PIB. Elle s’engage désormais à aller au-delà et reconnaît de facto l’échec de sa stratégie de sécurité vis-à-vis de la Russie qui, depuis la chute de l’Union soviétique, avait consisté à miser sur une coopération économique renforcée.
Naïveté
Solder ces années de naïveté va coûter cher. Il y a quelques jours encore, la ministre des Affaires étrangères Annalena Baerbock justifiait son refus d’exclure les banques russes du système Swift par la nécessité de continuer à importer du charbon et du gaz. Pour la ministre écologiste, brûler du charbon russe était donc plus important que de sanctionner l’écrasement de la démocratie ukrainienne !
De même, Berlin s’accrochait à sa doctrine officielle de ne pas livrer d’armes à des régions en guerre, doctrine qui n’a toutefois pas empêché son industrie de défense de livrer l’Arabie saoudite face au Yémen…
Servitude volontaire
Solder ces années de naïveté, c’est aussi admettre que la stratégie de sortie à marche forcée du nucléaire, sans aucune concertation avec ses partenaires européens, a plongé l’Allemagne, et avec elle tout notre continent, dans un état de dépendance préoccupant à l’égard de Moscou. Et si l’on élargit la focale, en finir avec la naïveté, c’est également reconnaître qu’au nom de la défense de son industrie, notamment automobile, l’Allemagne n’a pas poussé l’Europe à exiger de la Chine une vraie réciprocité dans l’accès à son marché.
Que ce soit vis-à-vis de la Russie, de la Chine ou des autres grandes puissances, l’Europe n’a pas pour destin de s’accommoder d’un état de servitude volontaire. Il était temps que cela soit admis dans toutes les capitales du continent.
OPINION. En ordonnant une invasion, Poutine affiche un mépris éhonté à l’encontre des traités internationaux et du droit international. Il n’y a pas eu d’événement comparable en Europe depuis Hitler, écrit Joschka Fischer, ancien ministre allemand des Affaires étrangères et vice-chancelier de 1998 à 2005
Le président russe Vladimir Poutine a fait son choix. Il a amené la guerre en Ukraine. C’est un moment décisif pour l’Europe. Pour la première fois depuis les guerres des Balkans des années 1990, qui se sont limitées à la région de la Yougoslavie à l’heure de sa désintégration, le continent est une fois de plus confronté à des bombardements de villes et à des divisions de chars en mouvement. Sauf que cette fois-ci, c’est une superpuissance nucléaire qui a ouvert les hostilités.
What Putin is doing is a violation of the basic principles of human coexistence. This is the moment to stand up and to speak out.
Josep Borrell, EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy. Photograph: Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
At this dark hour, when we see Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine and massive disinformation campaigns and information manipulation, it is essential to separate lies – invented to justify what cannot be justified – from facts.
The facts are that Russia, a major nuclear power, has attacked and invaded a peaceful and democratic neighbouring country, which posed no threat to it, nor provoked it. Moreover, president Putin is threatening reprisals on any other state that may come to the rescue of the people of Ukraine. Such use of force and coercion has no place in the 21st century.
What Putin is doing is not only a grave violation of international law, it is a violation of the basic principles of human coexistence. With his choice to bring war back to Europe, we see the return of the “law of the jungle” where might makes right. The target is not only Ukraine, but the security of Europe and the whole international rules-based order, based on the UN system and international law.
His aggression is taking innocent lives, crushing people’s wish to live in peace. Civilian targets are being struck, clearly violating international humanitarian law, forcing people to flee. We see a humanitarian catastrophe developing. For months, we pursued unparalleled efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution. But Putin lied to the faces of all who met him, pretending to be interested in a peaceful solution. Instead, he opted for a full-scale invasion, a fully fledged war.
Russia must cease its military operations immediately, and unconditionally withdraw from the entire territory of Ukraine. The same goes for Belarus, which has to immediately stop its involvement in this aggression and respect its international obligations. The European Union is united in offering its strong support to Ukraine and its people. This is a matter of life and death. I am preparing an emergency package to support the Ukrainian armed forces in their fight.
The international community will now in response opt for a full-scale isolation of Russia, to hold Putin accountable for this aggression. We are sanctioning those who finance the war, crippling the Russian banking system and its access to international reserves.
The EU and its partners have already imposed massive sanctions on Russia that target its leaders and elites and strategic sectors of the Kremlin-run economy. The aim is not to harm the Russian people, but to weaken the Kremlin’s ability to finance this unjust war. In doing this, we are closely aligned with our partners and allies – the US, Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea and Australia. We also see many countries from around the world rallying to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, including the United Kingdom. We stand together on the right side of history in the face of Russia’s horrifying attack on a free and sovereign country.
To justify its crimes, the Kremlin and its supporters have engaged in a massive disinformation campaign, which started already weeks ago. We have seen Russian state media and their ecosystem peddling untruths in social media networks with the aim of deceiving and manipulating.
The Kremlin propagandists call the invasion “a special operation”, but this cynical euphemism cannot hide the fact that we witness a fully fledged invasion of Ukraine, with the aim to crush its freedom, legitimate government and democratic structures. Calling the Kyiv government “neo-Nazi” and “Russophobic” is nonsense: all manifestations of nazism are banned in Ukraine. In modern Ukraine, extreme rightwing candidates are a fringe phenomenon with minimal support, without passing the barrier to enter the parliament. The Ukrainian government did not cut the Donbas off and it has not prohibited the use of Russian language and culture. Donetsk and Luhansk are no republics, they are Ukrainian regions controlled by Russia-backed and armed separatist groupings.
We know this – and many Russians know this. There have been courageous protests in cities across Russia since the invasion started, demanding the end of the aggression against a peaceful neighbouring nation. We hear their voices and recognise their courage in speaking out, and we also see many prominent public figures in Russia protesting this senseless invasion.
I continue to work with our partners around the world to ensure the joint action of the international community against the Kremlin’s behaviour. On 25 February, only Russia vetoed a UN security council Resolution on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, with China, India and the United Arab Emirates abstaining. From all over the world, countries condemn Russia’s attacks, and at the General Assembly the entire international community needs to join forces and help to end Russia’s military aggression by adopting the related UN resolution.
With this war on Ukraine, the world will never be the same again. It is now, more than ever, the time for societies and alliances to come together to build our future on trust, justice and freedom. It is the moment to stand up and to speak out. Might does not make right. Never did. Never will.
Read the original article on the site of The Guardian.
Le banquier Jean-Claude Meyer appelle, dans une tribune au « Monde », à un allègement massif de la dette des pays africains, dont la stabilité économique, déjà mise à mal par la pandémie, va subir le choc de l’inflation et de la hausse des taux d’intérêt
Publié le 18 février 2022 à 10h00 | Lecture 4 min.
Tribune. Le fossé entre les pays développés et les pays en voie de développement et émergents s’est creusé avec la pandémie. Il va certainement s’amplifier, à cause de nos deux « virus » que nous allons exporter chez eux : l’inflation et la hausse des taux d’intérêt. Notre inflation va naturellement réduire le pouvoir d’achat des pays les plus pauvres (en particulier à cause de la hausse des denrées alimentaires) et l’épargne des classes moyennes.
L’inflation est un accélérateur de pauvreté, et l’on sait que, contrairement à ce que les banquiers centraux ont dit pour nous « endormir » ou par manque de lucidité, elle ne sera pas transitoire, mais durable. En même temps, la hausse des taux, déjà amorcée sur les bons du Trésor à 10 ans, va durement frapper ces pays, grevés pour la plupart par leurs déficits budgétaires et le risque de surendettement.
Même si les taux d’intérêt réels resteront faibles, cette hausse, annoncée en mars par la Réserve fédérale américaine et sans doute bientôt par la Banque centrale européenne, rendra plus difficile et plus onéreux leur appel aux marchés internationaux pour se refinancer, boucler leur budget, et financer leurs projets de développement.
L’importance de l’inflation
Elle accroîtra la volatilité et l’incertitude de leurs flux de capitaux ; le dollar se renforçant, leurs monnaies vont être dévaluées, entraînant de sorties massives de capitaux : déjà 50 milliards de dollars viennent de sortir du Chili, 15 milliards de dollars du Pérou.
« En 2022, les pays les plus pauvres devront payer 80 milliards de dollars au titre du service de leur dette. Compte tenu de cette charge, les pays vulnérables auront plus de mal à affecter des ressources à la santé, à l’éducation, à la protection sociale et au climat », s’est inquiété David Malpass, président de la Banque mondiale, dans son dernier rapport (janvier 2022).
En outre, le « gap d’infrastructures » est estimé à 100 milliards de dollars par an en Afrique ; en Côted’Ivoire, le plan national de développement 2021-2025 requiert près de 90 milliards d’eurosd’investissement, dont deux tiers sont attendus du secteur privé. Depuis mars 2020, le Fonds monétaire international (FMI) a approuvé une aide totale de 170 milliards de dollars à 90 pays, outre des droits de tirage spéciaux (DTS) de 21 milliards.
L’initiative de suspension de la dette (ISSD) lancée par le G20 et le Club de Paris a permis à 48 pays les plus fragiles de suspendre le remboursement de 13 milliards de dollars, mais il a pris fin en décembre 2020. Le Sri Lanka, le Ghana, le Salvador et la Tunisie sont au bord du défaut de paiement ;l’Argentine vient de restructurer avec le FMI sa dette de 44,5 milliards de dollars ; le Tchad, l’Ethiopie et la Zambie sont engagés dans une restructuration de leur dette au sein du cadre commun mis en place par le G20.
Un risque de déflagration
En plus de ces endettements inquiétants, les trajectoires de croissance se sont inversées entre les pays développés et pays en voie de développement et émergents. D’ici 2024, les premiers auront accru leur produit national brut de 0,9 %, tandis que les seconds l’auront vu chuter de 5,5 %. Depuis 2020, au moins 70 millions de personnes sont tombées sous le seuil de pauvreté, vient de révéler Gita Gopinath, directrice générale adjointe du FMI.
Véritable scandale, seulement 4 % de la population des pays pauvres est vaccinée. La pandémie a fait des ravages en Amérique latine et en Afrique subsaharienne, particulièrement chez les jeunes, dont l’éducation a pâti des fermetures d’école. Dans les pays pauvres, l’inflation importée et la hausse des taux vont s’ajouter à la hausse de l’endettement et la chute de la croissance.
Prenons garde : une crise financière de ces pays pourrait propager une déflagration sur nos marchés financiers florissants. Il est d’une urgence vitale que le FMI, la Banque mondiale, le G20, le Club de Paris, la Chine et les créanciers privés prolongent la suspension du remboursement de la dette des pays les plus pauvres, notamment en Afrique, apportent de nouvelles sources de financement bonifiées avec la réallocation des DTS des économies développées, et accélèrent le rééchelonnement de leurs dettes.
Une question de survie
Surtout au moment où, dans certains Etats d’Afrique de l’Ouest, le djihadisme s’abreuve de la faiblesse des structures étatiques et de la pauvreté ; et où la pression démographique accrue par la récession et les incertitudes politiques risque d’entraîner d’importantes vagues migratoires. Le plan d’investissement public et privé de 150 milliards d’euros annoncé jeudi 10 février par la Commission européenne dans le cadre du volet Afrique-Europe de l’initiative « global gateway », répond en grande partie à notre cri d’alarme.
Espérons que le sommet Europe-Afrique qui se termine à Bruxelles vendredi 18 février confirmera ce plan et contribuera ainsi à apporter, pour l’Afrique en tout cas, des solutions solidaires et concrètes. Ily va de la survie de ces pays. Il y va aussi de notre intérêt.
Jean-Claude Meyer (Vice-président International de Rothschild et Cie)
Lors du sommet Europe-Afrique de Bruxelles, jeudi et vendredi, les dirigeants des deux continents devront se mettre d’accord sur la prise en charge des investissements énergétiques
Par Pascal Airault
17 février 2022 à 6h00
Le site gazier de Krechba, au sud d’In Salah en Algérie. Sipa Press
Les faits – Les dirigeants de l’Union européenne et de l’Union africaine se réunissent à Bruxelles les 17 et 18 février 2022 à l’occasion du sixième sommet UE‑UA afin de jeter les bases d’un nouveau partenariat. Pour contrecarrer le projet chinois des Routes de la Soie, l’Europe prévoit d’investir 150 milliards d’euros sur le continent africain d’ici à 2027, dont une partie dans la transition énergétique. Mais les Africains souhaitent le maintien des financements pour les énergies fossiles…
L’Europe sera-t-elle au rendez-vous du gaz africain ? C’est l’un des enjeux du sommet des dirigeants européens et africains de jeudi et vendredi à Bruxelles. « Il existe un fossé entre la façon dont les Africains considèrent la question du climat et de l’énergie et celle dont nos amis Européens les considèrent », estime Mo Ibrahim, co-créateur de la Fondation Afrique-Europe et président de la Fondation Mo Ibrahim.
Selon lui, l’Europe ne peut continuer à produire et à se fournir en énergies fossiles (gaz, charbon) sur le continent africain alors qu’elle refuse de financer ses projets gaziers. Il estime que c’est « moralement indéfendable ».
La conférence des Nations unies sur le changement climatique (COP 26), en novembre dernier à Glasgow, a laissé un goût amer aux responsables africains. Les bailleurs de fonds ne sont pas au rendez-vous des promesses, alors qu’ils s’étaient engagés à lever 100 milliards de dollars de financement climatique. La question est sensible. Environ 600 millions d’Africains n’ont pas accès à l’électricité dont la demande croît d’environ 6 % par an sur le continent.
« Injustice climatique ». Le 10 février, l’Union européenne a annoncé un plan de 150milliards d’euros dans le cadre de sa nouvelle stratégie d’investissement baptisée « GlobalGateway ». Une partie est destinée à la transition verte à travers une aide au développement desénergies renouvelables. Mais Bruxelles rechigne toujours à financer les énergies fossiles. Président en exercice de l’Union africaine, le Sénégalais Macky Sall a récemment demandé aux Européens de revoir leur copie. « Les économies africaines sont celles qui polluent le moins, mais c’est la partie du monde qui subit le plus les conséquences du changement climatique, justifie-t-il. Il ne faudrait pas rajouter une injustice climatique à l’Afrique en décidant de ne plus financer les énergies fossiles. » Futur producteur de gaz, le Sénégal est particulièrement concerné.
« L’UE considère le gaz comme un pont vers la neutralité climatique, mais seulement s’il remplace le charbon et si les investissements sont prêts pour l’hydrogène »
Du côté de la Commission européenne, Frans Timmermans, vice-président exécutif pour le Green Deal, semble aujourd’hui faire un pas vers les dirigeants du continent, même s’il assure que la transition verte restera au cœur des programmes de coopération pour les dix prochaines années. « L’UE considère le gaz comme un pont vers la neutralité climatique, mais seulement s’il remplace le charbon et si les investissements sont prêts pour l’hydrogène », explique-t-il.
Bruxelles compte sur les pays du Sud afin de sortir de sa trop grande dépendance au gaz en provenance de Russie. Premier fournisseur de l’UE, ce pays exporte annuellement 160 milliards de mètres cubes de gaz vers le Vieux continent, soit 40 % des importations européennes et 55 %des besoins de l’Allemagne. Une des alternatives est la fourniture d’hydrogène à prix compétitifs, selon Frans Timmermans. L’Allemagne prospecte les capacités du Nigeria et de l’Angola en la matière. Le Mali a aussi des gisements.
Contingences politiques. Africains et Européens devraient aborder ces questions lors de la table ronde consacrée au sujet lors du sommet UE-UA. « On étudiera les questions un peu plus subtiles sur la manière dont se fait la transition énergétique des pays qui ont remplacé le charbon et le fioul par du gaz en tant qu’énergie de transition », confie une source élyséenne.
Les fournitures de gaz africain à l’Europe ont été soumises aux contingences politiques ces dernières années. Le gazoduc Greenstream, qui relie la Libye et l’Italie, a rouvert en octobre dernier après des mois de fermeture. Il permettait d’exporter neuf milliards de mètres cubes de
gaz par an en Italie, soit 12 % des besoins du pays, avant le début du conflit.
L’Algérie continue à fournir l’UE via ses gazoducs reliés à la Sicile et à l’Espagne mais a suspendu, en novembre dernier, les approvisionnements via la bretelle connectée au Maroc puis à l’Espagne en raisonde la crise politique avec Rabat.
Alger, qui exporte plus de 40 milliards de mètres cubes de gaz par an, prévoit d’augmenter ses capacités d’acheminement vers l’Europe. L’Algérie et le Nigeria ont discuté, début février, de la construction d’un gazoduc reliant leurs deux pays, en passant par le Niger. Sa réalisation permettrait d’augmenter sensiblement les livraisons au continent européen. Et le Nigeria et le Mozambique devraient enfin augmenter leurs exportations de GNL dans le futur grâce à la construction de complexes de liquéfaction. Les réserves prouvées de gaz naturel de l’Afrique sont de 14,9 milliards de mètres cubes, soit plus de 33 fois celles de l’UE.
Governments’ irresponsible fiscal policies and the monetary measures of central banks, in clear breach of statutory law, have long been paving the way for inflation. Such dangerous practices have been taking place in democratic and authoritarian regimes all over the world. They are the result of populist tactics from politicians seeking approval from their clientele.
Dangerous gift
The appalling consequence of all this is that political systems have bought voters with their own money. This form of corruption takes place through redistribution. A classic example of this is: take money from Peter (the alleged rich) and give it to Paul. Paul (the majority) is grateful and votes for those who give him money. However, Peter is the one who invests in the economy, either by working harder or thanks to savings, and therefore in such situations, capital is taken out of the economy and economic activity is adversely affected because of wrong incentives.
Governments and administrations, whose function should be to provide services to citizens, have rather taken on the role of an authority figure that watches and controls the population, all under the guise of benevolence. But most often this “benevolence” amounts to buying votes in democracies or boosting regime approval in autocracies.
Politicians have so far preferred to ignore or minimize the problem, since the austerity measures needed to solve the issue would take away the tool to appease voters with money.
Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once said the problem with socialism is that “you eventually run out of other people’s money.” And here we are now. Over the last 20 years, both conservative and liberal parties have joined the social democrats in resorting to populism and started implementing socialist policies. And then, more recently, short-term politics began dictating central banks’ actions. This started with measures like zero-to-negative interest rates and quantitative easing to release an unlimited flood of money. In parallel, some economists began promoting Modern Monetary Theory, stating that governments can incur unlimited debt without adverse consequences. These claims defy all empirical economic science and sheer common sense – they are no more than fraud.
Inflation was the unsurprising result. Asset inflation has long been rocketing, but the trend went unnoticed because the focus is on consumer price indexes (CPI). But suddenly, with supply chain problems CPIs started to rise rapidly in the United States and Europe.
Complete corruption
Inflation is a hidden tax. It affects every layer of society. It leads to misery and unrest.
This is an issue that has to be addressed. Politicians have so far preferred to ignore or minimize the problem, since the austerity measures needed to solve the issue would take away the tool to appease voters with money. But this money is not a gift from a “benevolent government,” it is capital that is being misappropriated from others.
In the U.S., the Federal Reserve has at least acknowledged the issue and is starting to tighten the money supply. Six months ago, the European Central Bank (ECB) declared that inflation would be kept in the desired two percent range. Now CPI inflation in the eurozone exceeds 5 percent. Christine Lagarde, ECB President, and main guardian of the stability of the euro, is trying to lull the public by declaring this is a momentary phenomenon, caused by short-term supply chain problems. She claims this will not trigger the wages-price spiral that normally drives inflation. But she hypocritically omits to mention the other underlying reasons for inflation, like huge public deficits and irresponsible overspending. And wages will have to increase.
The situation requires honesty and common sense. But they are in short supply.
Europe is clinging to its illusions and the public is being misled by governments and the Central Bank. Green economy, global warming and Covid relief have provided perfect excuses to continue this madness. It is possible that Ms. Lagarde does not realize what she is doing – her past experience is in politics, not in central banking. She may be insufficiently familiar with the principles of monetary and fiscal policy, or overly concerned with preserving the current political power setup, at least in the short term. After all, her own appointment was political. Let us assume this is what lies at the heart of the problem – rather than a coordinated attempt to establish a centralized technocratic system that will harm market efficiency, and limit prosperity and individual freedom. But the end result remains the same. European democracies are on the path to complete political corruption. And the ECB is leading the way.
Pour Thierry de Montbrial, président de l’Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri), les pays de l’Union européenne n’ont d’autre choix que de serrer les rangs au sein de l’Alliance atlantique
Thierry de Montbrial, président de l’Ifri. (AFP)
Voici sa tribune. Au moment où Vladimir Poutine, seul décideur en Russie de la guerre et de la paix, vient de choisir la guerre, l’heure n’est pas à se disputer sur les erreurs commises par les Occidentaux dans leur approche de la sécurité européenne depuis la fin de la guerre froide. L’exercice devra être mené le moment venu, dans un esprit constructif. Dans l’immédiat, les pays de l’Union européenne n’ont d’autre choix que de serrer les rangs au sein de l’Alliance atlantique, et de prendre des sanctions économiques dont ils auront à subir eux-mêmes les lourdes conséquences à court et moyen termes, notamment dans le domaine énergétique. Le but est que les Russes paient effectivement un prix très élevé pour leur agression. En attendant, une chose est certaine : l’Ukraine est la grande victime de ce monumental échec du système de la sécurité européenne.
La France – elle n’est pas la seule – avait depuis longtemps oublié que, sous le vernis de la diplomatie du spectacle à des fins de politique intérieure autant qu’extérieure, les relations internationales reposent sur les rapports de force face aux situations géopolitiques telles qu’elles se présentent dans le temps. Il ne sert à rien de polémiquer sur les tentatives d’Emmanuel Macron à Moscou, mais aussi à Beyrouth ou ailleurs. On n’a jamais tort d’essayer de bonne foi d’éviter le pire, même quand on a peu de cartes dans sa main. Encore faut-il regarder la réalité en face. En tendance, le poids de la France n’a cessé de diminuer depuis la fin de la guerre froide, notamment sur les flancs de l’Europe, à l’Est ou au Sud. Nous ne sommes plus un acteur majeur au Moyen-Orient et les opinions publiques nous sont de plus en plus défavorables en Afrique francophone, alors même que la « Françafrique » n’existe plus et que nous avons fait du bon travail contre les djihadistes au Mali. La Russie n’a plus pour la France la considération que lui manifestait l’Union soviétique. Un demi-siècle après la fameuse question de Kissinger sur le numéro de téléphone de l’Europe, Poutine lui répond en substance que c’est celui de la Maison-Blanche. Et trop souvent en effet au cours des dernières décennies, les Européens ont dû subir sans broncher les conséquences de décisions contraires à leurs intérêts, prises par Washington.
Le poids de la France n’a cessé de diminuer depuis la fin de la guerre froide
Quoi qu’il en soit, après le coup de force de Poutine, il est indispensable que l’UE mette au premier rang de ses préoccupations une réflexion autonome sur l’avenir de la sécurité du continent. D’autant plus que le retour de Trump ou d’un trumpiste à la Maison-Blanche est possible. À ce niveau, il s’agit de savoir de façon précise ce que nous voulons nous préparer à défendre, avec qui et avec quels moyens. En bref, nous devons identifier clairement nos intérêts, sans hésiter à employer ce terme. Mais en disant nous, qui sommes-nous ? La France doit reconnaître qu’aucune grande politique, en particulier en Afrique du Nord et de l’Ouest ou au Moyen-Orient, ne sera plus possible sans coopération étroite avec au moins certains de ses partenaires de l’UE. Ces coopérations devront être pensées à long terme et assorties d’institutions dotées de moyens proportionnés aux enjeux. On gagnerait à aborder les problèmes de sécurité en s’inspirant de la méthode de Jean Monnet, comme pour la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier (CECA). Point ne serait besoin, pour cette refondation, de subordonner toutes les initiatives à l’accord unanime des pays membres. Chacune d’elles devrait être portée par un noyau de volontaires, au sein duquel figureraient idéalement les six pays fondateurs.
Pareille approche à long terme ne serait pas aux dépens de l’Alliance atlantique, que Vladimir Poutine a réussi à remettre en selle. Mais, face aux nuages qui s’accumulent, les plus influents de ses membres européens devront désormais, le plus possible en amont des crises concevables, être au clair sur la compatibilité entre les intérêts européens et américains. En agressant l’Ukraine, la Russie a aussi fait le choix de se rapprocher encore davantage de la Chine, et nul ne sait quel parallèle Poutine et Xi Jinping ont pu mener entre l’Ukraine et Taïwan. Une bonne partie du monde, en particulier en Asie, veut éviter d’avoir à choisir entre les États-Unis et la Chine. Sur ce point majeur également, l’Union européenne doit clarifier lucidement ses intérêts, sans nécessairement rechercher l’unanimité de ses membres.
Je suis convaincu que, dans une perspective longue, la refondation de la politique étrangère de la France, dont les lignes principales ont été fixées sous la IVe République, devra passer par un retour à la source de la construction européenne, avec le remarquable mélange d’ambitions et de modestie qui la caractérisa.
As the poet Shelley once hopefully wrote, ‘if winter comes, can spring be far behind?’ When it comes to China–US relations now, it seems that spring is quite far behind.
At the beginning of 2021, there were modest hopes. The good news was that Joe Biden had won the US presidential election. Trump’s trade war had sent the relationship into a deep dive. His manipulation of the China question for domestic political gain contributed to its further deterioration. His handling of the Taiwan issue towards the end of his term increased the risk of accidental conflict across the Taiwan Strait.
Biden is the polar opposite of Trump. He belongs to the US policy mainstream, characterised as professional, decent and cool-headed. Some believed this was a positive sign for China–US relations and held prospect a more pragmatic approach toward China. The Chinese government shared this view and signalled its willingness to work with the new administration.
After the Biden administration officially took office, Yang Jiechi, in charge of China’s foreign relations, said ‘it is a task for both China and the United States to restore the relationship to a predictable and constructive track of development and build a model of interaction between the two major countries that focuses on peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation’.
But many in Washington interpreted Yang’s message as an effort to blame the United States for the problems between the two countries instead of an expression of goodwill. On assuming office, Secretary of State Antony Blinken defined the new administration’s approach towards China as a mixture of competition, confrontation and cooperation.
It soon became clear that competition would continue to dominate US policy towards China. Washington blasted China’s behaviour on a range of issues, including Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Taiwan, the South China Sea and human rights. Blinken labelled China’s policies in Xinjiang as a ‘genocide’. The Biden administration also stepped up efforts to rally its allies to ‘push back’ on China.
Washington’s uncompromising posture drew frustration and anger from Beijing. Many in China concluded that the Biden administration’s China policy was worse than the Trump administration’s since it sought to create an international anti-China front. A tit-for-tat exchange between Beijing and Washington followed. At the two countries’ first high-level face-to-face meeting in Alaska on 13 November 2021, there was a heated exchange.
Despite some cooperation on particular issues, like climate change, the conflict between the two sides has increased. The issue that drew the most attention turned out to be Taiwan. Taiwan authorities’ efforts to push for independence coupled with increasing US endorsement and support elicited a tougher stance from China, which included sending military aircraft to patrol the vicinity of Taiwan. The vicious cycle of interactions between Beijing, Taipei and Washington increased the likelihood of a military showdown.
Against this background, the virtual summit meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Biden on 16 November was more about how to set guard rails for the relationship than exploring the possibility of substantive cooperation. Despite the summit, the relationship between Beijing and Washington continues to slide. The most recent bickering includes a US official boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics, sanctions over Xinjiang and Chinese retaliation.
Why has the relationship evolved in this way?
The rise of China has elevated security concerns among US realists about China’s strategic intentions, especially in the light of China’s military moves to defend its proclaimed territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Political developments in China have also disappointed US liberals who had banked on the hope of encouraging political reform in China through engagement.
Trump’s race-to-the-bottom anti-China rhetoric provided a vent for frustration with China for both US realists and liberals alike and contributed to a political atmosphere in the United States in which being tough is the right and only posture when it comes to China.
Given the anti-China consensus in the US Congress and the slim majority the governing Democrats enjoy, Biden has had to remain tough on China to get anything done at home. This includes the appointment of cabinet officials, passing bills to contain COVID-19 and rebuilding infrastructure.
How the two countries interacted with each other, which was characterised by megaphone diplomacy for domestic consumption, undermined any goodwill that remained for stabilisation and improvement of the relationship.
In the short run, these factors are unlikely to change. The 2022 mid-term elections bode ill for China–US relations because the Republicans who stand on an even tougher policy toward China appear likely to win.
Under these circumstances, the Biden administration is unlikely to be able to advance a pragmatic approach toward China. Ahead of the 20th Party Congress, China is also unlikely to compromise.
The stabilisation and improvement of China–US relations is likely to remain a distant prospect for some time yet.
Dr. Volker Perthes, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Sudan, discusses the role of UN diplomacy, as well as the impact of the Oct. 25, 2021 coup and the Ethiopian civilian war on Sudan’s transition.
We talk to the former Norwegian politician who wants to make sure that energy doesn’t get wasted
by Peter Judge
Ingvil Smines Tybring-Gjedde is a puzzle. She’s proud of her environmental credentials – but she’s had a career in the petroleum industry, and even represented it in the Norwegian government.
She’s entered the data center world as the CEO of Earth Wind & Power, a company that says it can help with the climate crisis. But EW&P offers fossil-powered data centers running on natural gas burnt at oil wells.
– Earth Wind & Power
All that takes some explaining, but she says it all comes down to efficiency, getting off your high horse, and “looking at the facts.”
A climber
“I started out hating the [petroleum] industry,” she tells us over Zoom. “I was a professional climber, and I loved the outdoor life. I didn’t want people to have any footprint. I was really eager to stop the oil and gas industry. I was on the outside, and I only saw the negative part of it.”
Climbing was how she started, and it’s clearly still in her bones. Each step of her career she’s found the next handhold, and tested it before transferring her weight.
As a climbing instructor, she taught soldiers “how to survive, how not to be taken out in avalanches, and how to rescue your colleagues.”
From there she got involved in rope access: “I was doing maintenance on bridges. Instead of using scaffolding, we said we can do it with ropes – and we can do it in like 10 minutes instead of building this scaffolding.”
“I started a company, called in Norwegian Ut-veg, It’s directly translated as ‘a way out’, but a way out is also a way into something new, out of the house and into nature.”
At this point, her attention turned to oil – and she began working within the Norwegian oil industry, not against it.
Climbing onto oil rigs
Around 1990, Smines Tybring-Gjedde noticed something. Across the North Sea, oil rigs in the British oil fields were using climbers.
“There were actually British climbers on the British [continental] shelf,” she says, “and we thought, if they can do it on the British shelf, we should do it on the Norwegian shelf instead of scaffolding.”
She pioneered rope access on Norway’s oil rigs, starting with a job request to change some bolts on an onshore oil rig.
“I said yes, I can do it,” she tells us, but before she could take the job, she had to get approval. Statoil could not give her a permit for rope access on their oil rigs, “so I traveled to Scotland and got two certificates there.”
Back in Norway, she became a rope access entrepreneur: “I got a job painting the legs of a platform offshore. It was a test. So I climbed down to do the sandblasting and painting, and they used a scaffolding company on the other legs.
“And you know, my team was finished with the whole work before the scaffoldings were built. It was quite a nice job, we got a lot of money, and I still liked being a climber.”
After that, she alternated climbing mountains round the world, with earning money on oil rigs to fund the expeditions. Gradually her opinion of the industry changed.:
“I saw that the oil and gas industry was very eager to reduce its footprint in the environment. So, from not liking it at all, I had a huge transition. I saw that the people working there and the industry as a whole did have some very good morals or ethics – or the needs of doing a good job.”
Fueling global warming
In the big picture, there is plenty to dislike about Norwegian oil. The country has a large, nationalized petroleum industry, which is undeniably fuelling global warming. It supplies roughly two percent of the oil burnt worldwide.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s recent report, and subsequent studies have found that the only way to hit our climate change target of 1.5C global warming is to stop using fossil fuel. We must leave 60 percent of the world’s oil reserves in the ground (and 90 percent of the coal).
But the Norwegian government won’t be doing that, funded as it is from oil fields run by government-run Statoil.
The sector is expected to make the government 277 billion Krone ($30 billion) in 2020. For comparison, that’s roughly one-tenth of Norway’s GDP or $6,000 for each of the country’s five million population.
At home, Norway is very virtuous, with all its electricity coming from renewable sources. It’s making fast progress at electrifying its transport fleet too. But it’s the fourteenth largest oil exporter in the world (and the third largest gas exporter), with a climate change policy that was rated insufficient by Climate Action Tracker.
And far from calling a halt or slowing down, the new center-left government, which replaced the previous Conservative/Progress alliance, is actually planning to grow Norway’s oil industry.
Smines Tybring Gjedde sees a good side to the oil industry. It may be burning the planet, but Norway’s oil companies are concerned for marine life conservation, an area where it’s actually been “at the forefront,” she claims.
“When oil was found on the Norwegian shelf,” she says, “it was immediately put into laws and regulations that this new industry shouldn’t destroy what the other industries were living off – and that was fisheries and shipping.
“It was completely new, but they said that we need to take care of the fisheries, the industries and the environment of the ocean, at the same time as developing the oil and gas industry in such a way that it is it will not destroy the living of the sea, and at the same time also develop the shipping industry to be contributors to the oil and gas industry.”
Norway was lucky to strike oil, she says, but it handled it well: “We are lucky to have oil, but it was not luck that made us put the oil to our pension fund. That was that was just good management and clever people.
“They were really looking years ahead,” she says. “I am having goosebumps now just talking about it. The oil and gas belong to the Norwegian people.”
Climbing into politics
In 2005, she began a traverse into politics. “I didn’t have any wishes to become a politician,” she told us, but she got involved in a campaign for fathers’ access to their children: “I was writing articles in the newspapers, because I was really into how fathers were treated when they divorced. In an equal country like Norway, dads and mums should have equal rights to see their children after they divorced.”
This was around the time she got re-acquainted with her childhood sweetheart, the far-right politician Christian Tybring-Gjedde. The two both have children from previous marriages, and married in 2009.
She also got in touch with Norway’s right-wing, anti-immigration Progress Party. Her husband Christian Tybring-Gjedde is on the extreme end of the party, never a Minister though he was its first (and, for a time its only) MP. He denies the existence of man-made climate change, and twice nominated Donald Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize.
We don’t mention her husband.
At the 2013 election, the Progress Party won more seats, becoming the third-largest party in the Norwegian Parliament, and formed a coalition government with the Conservative Party.
It was then that she got a phone call: “The prime minister called me and asked if I would consider to join them as a deputy minister in the ministry of petroleum and energy. Having been working there for 25 years, I thought, well, a politician with a background for what you should do in the ministry would be nice. So of course I accepted.”
Although not an elected member of parliament, she was appointed state secretary in the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy in 2015.
In 2019 she was appointed Minister of Public Security in the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, serving till the coalition disintegrated in 2020.
How to use flare gas
When her political career ended, she joined some former oil company executives to set up Earth Wind & Power, an energy company with the goal of using energy that would otherwise be wasted.
The company’s first target is oil rigs, at sea and on land, which “flare” natural gas, burning it off because it is considered unprofitable to transport and use. The practice has been banned in Norway from the start of its oil business in 1972, except in emergencies, so Norway pipes its gas to shore.
“It’s like spaghetti on the ground underneath the water,” she says. “The Norwegian continental shelf is quite small, and we have a lot of activity all over it. So the gas pipes are all over. So either they put their gas into the gas pipes and sell it, or they pump it back down into the earth to increase oil recovery.”
Environmentalists would reject any idea of getting more oil out of the ground, but she thinks it’s good use of resources: “Just taking out a little bit of what the reservoir contains is poor resource management. You’ve done all the investments, so it’s really important to get as much as you possibly can out of the reservoirs.”
As an oil minister, she found that other countries aren’t so scrupulous about using flare gas. Flying into oil-producing countries, she looked down and was shocked: “It looks like a birthday cake, you know, with all the flares, and I thought what a waste!”
Oil producers flare off their gas because they can’t find anything better to do with it, but the International Energy Agency wants this to change: “It’s estimated by the IEA, that 30 percent of total global energy production was lost or wasted in 2021. And the World Bank has estimated that up to 150 billion cubic meters of gas is flared every year.”
That much gas, she says, “could power the continent of Africa, or the entire fleet of cars in Europe, and it’s about 150 percent of what Norway exports every year. It’s poor management, and it’s really, really devastating for the environment.”
As well as this it’s a misuse of resources: “It’s horrible, when we know that 60 percent of people across the African continent are without any access to electricity, and we are flaring all this gas. It’s horrible.”
Earth Wind & Power wanted to fix this: “We tried to find solutions of how we can stop the flaring. How could you make it into a product that somebody needed?”
One idea was to bottle the flare gas, and distribute it in energy-poor areas. “One of the founders, his family has been trying to help African women create jobs. We thought that we could take the flare gas, put it into containers, give micro loans to the women and have them sell containers instead of burning coal and wood.”
Firewood is often collected by children, who can’t go to school, she said: “So we could reduce flaring, give the women a job, and improve the health of women who die of cancer from making food at wooden ovens – and help their children go to school, and then come back to the villages and make industry and business for themselves.”
That idea failed: “We couldn’t find a way to do it economically. That’s why nobody does it.”
A foothold in data
Next, the fledgling business picked up on the “megatrend” of digitization: “We know that in 2016, about one percent of the total electricity in the world was used by the data center industry – and there’s an assumption that by 2025 or 2030, 20 percent of the total electricity utilization will go to the data center industry” [according to estimates by Huawei researcher Anders Andrae].
“This is happening when the world needs more and more energy. How can we do it? We need more energy in general, we need to have reduced emissions from the energy, and we need more and more energy for the digitalization of the world. And we also know that 150 billion cubic meters of gas is flared each year.”
If transporting the gas was a problem, she said, “maybe instead we could move the mountain to Mohammed, and put the data centers where the energy is produced.”
EW&P’s idea is to “take the flare gas, make electricity by it, have a cable and put it into the data centers we have made in forty-foot containers.”
The data centers themselves communicate over fiber if it’s available but “very often, if there’s no infrastructure in the rural areas where they are flaring, we can communicate or sell it or transport it by satellites. It’s like a Kinder egg, with a lot of layers.”
– Earth Wind & Power
Make no mistake, these data centers are run on fossil electricity. But they are reducing emissions compared with flaring the gas, she says: “We’re not just transferring the emissions from the flare gas to another industry, because by burning it as we do, we reduce the methane by approximately 100 percent and the NOx and VOCs [volatile organic compounds] by 98 percent.
“We’re not reducing the CO2 – not yet,” she says. “But we are looking into that as well. We might have a solution. We don’t know yet, but we are really putting a lot of emphasis in finding a solution for that also.” It’s a nice aside – in 2016, as junior energy minister, she launched one of the world’s first full-scale carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects.
Even without CCS, she believes a data center run on flare gas can satisfy the definitions of environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG). because of the reduction in other GHGs and pollutants: “So we are also making an ESG data center service.”
Off-grid data centers also potentially reduce the need for generation capacity, she says. “When everything in society is to be electrified, you need more electricity at some times of the day, like eight o’clock in the morning and four o’clock in the evening. You have to make the grid bigger to take the peaks, and then you have to pay for all the grid capacity that you don’t use during the rest of the day. Being outside the grid, using energy that is stranded, is a double positive effort on the environment.”
Why not leave it in the ground?
Making oil wells greener might sound like a good idea, but environmentalists would disagree. The science is clear: the world needs to stop oil producers in their tracks, and wean our infrastructure off fossil energy.
Using flare gas may make some oil wells more profitable, actually prolonging the use of oil. So it’s not surprising that oil companies seem to be welcoming the idea.
Surprisingly, there is a Net-Zero Producers Forum of oil-producing nations, which includes Norway, Canada, the USA, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. A truly net-zero oil industry would be an oxymoron, however. So the group is diverting attention to smaller issues like flaring.
“They have to stop the flaring. And Earth Wind & Power is the only solution. So they’re really eager to talk to us, both to stop flaring, and to use the excess energy as much as we can.”
She has a few arguments for continuing with fossil fuels, starting with global equity. The idea of an easy, hard stop to fossil fuel exploitation is an easy illusion for the privileged world, she says: “I believe that it’s really important for us in the Western world to look at the situation in for example, Africa, where 60 percent don’t have energy at all.
Sadly, that’s a line big oil companies often take, but GHGs emitted by poor people are just as deadly as those from the developed world. The real answer is to fund the development of sustainable energy in those countries – an issue the rich world failed to address at the recent COP26 climate conference.
She also deploys the “bridge” argument – that natural gas is less polluting than coal.
Africans burn a lot of coal, and export gas, she says: “If you change that coal and use gas instead, you reduce the emissions a lot, and it’s much better energy efficiency to burn gas than coal. So that’s a huge step.”
“Who are we to say that these people should not reduce their energy emissions by using gas instead of coal? I think it’s really difficult to sit on my high horse here in Norway, warm, and with 98 percent renewables in my electricity system. I think it’s really important to look at the facts and help.
“To have the energy transition to more renewables, you need something that can be a bridge,” she says. “And gas is really, really good at doing that. Especially in the African continent, I think we should applaud them for using gas instead of coal.”
Climbing into renewables
Norway already uses resources efficiently, so EW&P is looking abroad to find stranded resources to exploit: “Where they flare the most is in Africa, and Asia and the Middle East.”
And it’s also already operating in renewables as well: “We saw after a little while that there’s excess energy in all kinds of energy production. It’s in solar, it’s in wind, it’s on geothermal. And what’s really good is that because we don’t need a grid, we can be the birth giver to new renewable energy production.”
Providing a ready customer for power can help get renewable projects started in countries with less reliable grids, she says: “Say you’re going to build a geothermal station. As long as you have a hole and power coming out of it, we can put our container on top of that. We can buy your energy so you can invest in building infrastructure which is really, really expensive. Developing a new renewable energy plant will be better economically with EW&P than without, because we can be off-takers of the energy immediately.”
“The cheapest way to develop more energy is in Africa is extra solar,” she says. “They have a huge possibility because it’s cheap. But you need to make it economically viable. We can help them do that. They can install the solar panels, and start the solar firm, and we can help with the takeoff of that power, while they are building the grid or the mini-grid.
“Solar and wind are on track to become the cheapest form of energy in the coming years. And the IEA has estimated that 70 percent of the total investment in this space needs to occur in developing countries.”
The company will start with gas flares, and its first projects are coming in 2022, the CEO tells us: “We have started with some small projects in Africa, just to show that it’s possible. We will have our first container in operation in March.”
EW&P is using a container developed by German efficient hardware company Cloud&Heat: “It’s highly energy efficient, with 30 percent better energy efficiency than the average – and we can also operate in temperatures from -30C to up to 50C.”
That reliability is important. Among other things, a liquid cooled container is easier to seal, to keep out salt sea water or desert sand: “When you place a container offshore, you don’t want any breakage. You really need to double check everything. Cloud&Heat looks a very good solution.
“We’ve done feasibility studies with oil and gas offshore sites – and they concluded very successfully. And we are working with a world leader in wind and solar to provide integrated solutions for offshore renewables.”
Being a swing arm
EW&P is entering a contract for more than ten flare sites in Oman, and has done a pilot project to be part of a solar mini-grid in Uganda, she told us: “It was a very, very small unit, just to see that it’s actually possible. In Africa, with 60 million people not having access to any form of energy, it is really, really important to have mini-grids that can contribute what the local society needs. But the possibility to pay for it is also very low, so you need to find solutions for that as well.”
Solar and wind farms sometimes make extra energy, and an EW&P micro data center can act as a “swing arm” to use that excess, or enable investment to put in more turbines or solar panels: “We can buy that energy, and in that way help the economy go around for renewable investment.”
But is a data center the best use of that electricity, we ask her. Given that the world needs more electricity to decarbonize society, wouldn’t it be better to store the energy for use elsewhere, instead of consuming it in data centers?
EW&P has looked into this but most solutions are too complex, says Smines Tybring-Gjedde. For instance, electrolysis could generate hydrogen, but this just installs a lot more hardware and leaves the energy company with the same problem: storage and transport of a different gas.
“The reason they are burning 150 billion cubic meters of gas is because nobody has found a solution. We have found the solution that we think is the best as per now. Because this is easy. And it’s movable. And it’s stackable. We don’t leave any footprint – because when there’s no gas left, or when they need more of the energy that we have been helping them have an off-take for, we can put our containers on the truck and go to the next station.“
But is this processing worth doing?
There’s another important question: the flare gas energy may be turned into processing, but what if the processing is itself wasted?
The Cloud&Heat container which EW&P is using was co-designed by BitFury, a leading light in Bitcoin and cryptocurrency mining hardware – a global industry which consumes more electricity than a sizable country, for no environmental benefit.
EW&P’s site includes a “Fact Center” with some bullish predictions, including a suggestion that blockchain may be running 20 percent of the global economic infrastructure by 2030 – even though most technology commentators acknowledge that the structure of blockchain makes it massively energy-hungry and unlikely to scale in this way.
But Smines Tybring-Gjedde says blockchain is just one of many options for using EW&P’s output.
“It depends on the site. What kind of interconnections are there? Are they high bandwidth, with a consistent power supply? Is it low bandwidth with a consistent power supply? Or is it low bandwidth with an inconsistent power supply?” she says. “It’s the circumstances that determine what’s possible.”
It’s not possible to say how much EW&P capacity will go to crypto mining, as it’s in an early stage: “It’s feasibility studies, and it [depends on] the bandwidth, the power supply, and the circumstances. Some countries may ban Bitcoin. And some don’t. So it’s really impossible to say. We are a data center service company. And we will look at each site and offer what can be done on that site.”
In Africa, locally-powered data centers could be used for local clouds to enable digital sovereignty: “Cybersecurity is really, really important. And having your own cloud is highly interesting for several of our potential customers. Instead of buying an American cloud, you can produce your own, with your own energy produced in your own country. That is one of the services that we can provide.”
Where there’s no consistent connection, then different work would be done: “It could be blockchain, it could be long term storage, which doesn’t require continuity of service. It could be general HPC for commercial industries, or CFD modeling or AI training.”
She goes on: “I think it’s really important to use excess, ‘stranded’ energy. When there’s low bandwidth and an inconsistent power supply, then you do operations that don’t need anything more than that. In that way, you don’t interfere in the grid or use fiber that you don’t need.”
In most cases, even remote sites have enough connectivity to be useful: “You can transport the data center services by satellites. We have 5G all over the world now.”
It’s been a long climb for Ingvil Smines Tybring-Gjedde. And given the contradiction between reducing emissions and enabling oil exploitation, her latest course looks like a tricky, overhanging rockface.
The EW&P project may be more efficient, it may reduce greenhouse gas, and it could give compute power to developing countries. But it’s still burning fossil fuel in a world that desperately needs to stop burning.
Balakrishna (Bali) D.R., Executive VP, Head of AI and Automation Services, Infosys, explores the drivers of change in AI and Cloud and how it is impacting enterprise strategic development in an interview with Dr. Sally Eaves, a highly experienced chief technology officer, professor in advanced technologies, and a Global Strategic Advisor on digital transformation.
The Role and Adoption of AI has Changed
As many of us pause to reflect on the trends set to dominate 2022, it is clear that we have entered an Age of Convergence across technologies notably AI, Cloud, 5G, and IoT, and similarly, an Age of Experience too, where increasingly personalized expectations from consumer to employee have never been higher.
The pandemic clearly catalyzed acute disruption across sectors and across the world, accelerating digital transformation and adoption levels by up to a staggering seven years (McKinsey). The results of digitalization have largely shown the significant payoffs from that investment, further accelerating enterprise interest and influencing many businesses’ long-term digital strategies, especially around Artificial Intelligence. Infosys exemplifies this sustained commitment, having embedded AI into every area of the company and most notably training, legal, finance, and cybersecurity, whilst also continuing to evolve its offerings to customers to align with their changing behaviors, needs, and expectations. Speaking with Bali, seven drivers of change came to the fore:
Innovation in cloud-based services and computing power to better leverage AI and Data Science
The realization of powerful use cases enabled by integrative technologies with AI at the core
The pivotal role of AI and other technologies to manage the pandemic like contract tracing and creation of vaccination
Enhanced accessibility and democratization including ‘AI As-A-Service models’, advances in AI training, and rise in Open AI/APIs
Regulation starting to catch up with AI development including guideline collaborations
Increasing resonance of AI being a force for societal good has helped to ‘change the narrative’
AI and Cloud – Reimagining Experiences
Multi-channel and omnichannel are not the same thing! People expect seamlessness of experience across web, mobile and social apps alike and increasingly expect the same personalization of experience obtainable in their personal and consumer lives to be available in their working ones too, notably in productivity tools. Putting this into context, AI and appropriate technology integrations can now permeate and enhance every aspect of the consumer journey, from personalized demand generation, providing a curated set of products that fits the customer profile to enabling a frictionless purchasing process. AI can help engage with the customer in the right channels, at the right time, in the right way – from Virtual Agents to AR – and all the way through to affording the services for additional product supply post-sale. And for employees, there is a similar re-imagining occurring across the journey of hiring, onboarding, training, team integration, and organizational engagement. A great example of this change is undertaken within Infosys itself in relation to its talent management lifecycle, improving efficiency across its recruitment process.
‘We use AI to predict the demand, what kind of skills will be in demand, and the quantity of demand …. and to screen, process and review more than 2 million resumes a year and even to understand the speaking skills, tone, articulation of the perspective employee [interview process for contact centers] and then in terms of internal training we use something which we call ‘Infosys Digital Brain’ to find skills demand matches… AI also helps us figure out which employees are getting disengaged to predict churn …and what should we do in terms of interventions’ – Balakrishna (Bali) D.R. Executive VP, Head of AI and Automation Services
Broadening AI Uses and Democratization of Access
It is critical to make AI (and automation more broadly) available to a greater number of users within organizations and beyond traditional heavy technology-facing roles. As discussed with Bali, this starts with education, communication, and values, and I especially love his stated Infosys commitment to ‘invest in each of you’. This changes the narrative around AI potentially taking away jobs to enabling higher-order work activities and indeed opening up new role opportunities too.
As an example, Infosys uses AI within its digital learning platform Lex, an implementation of Wingspan, a next-generation learning solution accessible anytime, anywhere, and on any device to customize programs for both individuals and teams. And the results of increasing AI and automation across the organization have attracted a myriad of collective benefits including efficiency, cost reduction, experience improvement across the entire customer lifecycle, mean time to issue resolution, and even employee morale. This is the value that has been passed onto customers, including setting up specific projects to democratize AI usage into the line of business functions without the need for detailed technical knowledge and experience. The benefits of Infosys’ living labs and information network are also clear, being able to test and iterate with customers to lead into a Proof of Concept and supporting engagements with bleeding-edge start-ups too.
Strategic and Scalable Evolution – Cloud and AI
The trajectory of AI and cloud strategy is interwoven. With cloud the foundational layer for digital transformation from infrastructure, to the services available to clients to transform quickly, AI helps to reduce the complexity of migration processes notably technology refreshes. This may range from the database itself, through to legacy languages, with developers leveraging AI to translate them into modern code thereby expediting the end-to-end development process, improving productivity, and freeing up time for value-added activity such as creative problem-solving. And once migrated, AI helps support the management of operations to optimize ‘Return on Cloud’ by affording visibility and clarity on metrics such as spend and consumption, for example identifying seasonal patterns on load and helping move beyond reactive to a more proactive and always-on active intelligence.
‘We have a platform called Leap – through that we are able to analyze issues before they actually happen, whether it is infrastructure, application-level issues, we are able to respond’ – Balakrishna (Bali) D.R. Executive VP, Head of AI and Automation Services
And in tandem with this, the cloud significantly supports the adoption of AI and API services, especially those available from the hyperscalers, enabling both easier consumption and the capacity to scale AI workloads up and down at speed. Indeed, scalability is a critical part of cloud enablement with many organizations starting to adopt AI in a few use cases or Proofs of Concept but not scaling across their entire entity. A cloud platform-based approach supports this critical ‘moving beyond’ with all the benefits of standardization, curated services, pre-trained models, and lifecycle management too. Clearly AI and cloud feed off each other and where they amplify well they do so both reciprocally and significantly – creating an interlinked strategic focus imperative. This is especially critical when we consider the fact that AI-demand is outpacing supply, fueled by accelerated demands from the pandemic and other resource challenges, and leading to supply chain delays and chip shortages.
Enterprises must therefore optimize their extant resources, which can be supported by the cloud service providers who can pull resources and automate infrastructure to ease AI adoption and enable data centers to be utilized at almost 100% capacity. Infosys Applied AI is an integrative flexible offering that allows businesses to access, deploy, and contextualize cloud services and harnesses the power of convergence across cloud, AI, and analytics to enable new business solutions, manage risks and efficiently scale AI investment enterprise-wide. And as the democratization of AI continues, such an embedded approach to future-proofing technology investment is fast becoming business-critical.
AI for Good and Ecosystem Collaboration
And finally, when we reflect on the future of AI and cloud, one further aspect comes to the fore and that is the shared value benefits their evolution and convergence can bring, further supported by the power of education, research, and partnership. The new Infosys AI Innovation Centre exemplifies this approach, attracting universities, startups, and large enterprises alike with its ready-to-use applications for various industries supported by the combination of Infosys Applied AI, Infosys Cobalt and a depth and breadth ecosystem of digital technologies.
An additional example is the collaboration between Infosys and BP known as ‘Energy As A Service’ and originally announced here. It aims to collect data from multiple energy assets and apply AI to systemically optimize supply and demand for cooling, heating, power, and EV charging. This can help companies maximize their entire energy consumption and utilize more sustainable energy sources. The specifics will vary by industry sector and as highlighted by Bali, the advance of 5G makes an interesting case in point, with AI the key enabler to make connected and efficient choices.
‘We can actually optimize the entire energy consumption [asking ourselves] – When is the peak? When do you need to scale up and scale down the energy requirement in the tower – to know how much coverage you need and how much bandwidth that you have to do based on being able to predict when the load is right. You can look at the whole area around the tower and you can look at how you can use solar panels, wind turbines, etc to be able to generate power to actually run the tower, you can use battery storage to be able to consume the power during the night. And then actually, during peak hours you actually consume from the battery. And that way you reduce the load on the grid’ – Balakrishna (Bali) D.R. Executive VP, Head of AI and Automation Services
This brings to the fore that not only can AI, cloud, and tech convergence more broadly deliver enhanced experiences and new product and service innovations for customers and employees alike, but this integration can also deliver on vital Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) outcomes. With consumers and ecosystem stakeholders increasingly conscious and ensuring enterprise transparency, commitment, and accountability for social impact outcomes now a key organizational differentiator, its importance cannot be overstated. Underpinning this, the vision of Global IT Services Leader Infosys in this space is key – aiding enterprise partners to adopt a comprehensive and holistic roadmap approach to scaling AI and ensuring ‘Return on Cloud’, whilst supporting the critical balance of advancing innovation while protecting existing investments at the same time.
MOSCOW (AP) — With Russia carrying out a massive military buildup near Ukraine and the West roundly rejecting Moscow’s security demands, a window for diplomacy in the crisis appears to be closing.
But even as Moscow continues to bolster its forces and holds sweeping war games, President Vladimir Putin is keeping the window open for more negotiations in a calculated game of brinkmanship intended to persuade Washington and its allies to accept Russia’s demands.
The West fears that a Russian invasion of Ukraine may be imminent, while Russia maintains it has no plans to do so but wants its security concerns addressed.
Here is a look at the Kremlin’s strategy in the standoff:
DEMANDS AND RESPONSES
Russia wants the U.S. and its allies to keep Ukraine and other former Soviet nations from joining NATO, refrain from putting any weapons near Russia, and roll back alliance forces from Eastern Europe.
Washington and NATO reject those demands as “nonstarters,” but they also are offering to discuss possible limits on missile deployments, a greater transparency of military drills and other confidence-building measures.
Putin has yet to deliver Moscow’s formal response to the Western proposals, but he has already described them as secondary and warned that he wouldn’t take “no” for an answer on his main demands. He countered the Western argument about NATO having an open-door policy by arguing that it threatens Russia and violates the principle of the “indivisibility of security” enshrined in international agreements.
MILITARY MUSCLE-FLEXING
With the West rejecting its key demands, the Kremlin has raised the stakes by massing over 100,000 troops near Ukraine and carrying out a series of military maneuvers from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea.
As part of the show of force, Moscow has moved trainloads of troops, tanks and weapons from the Far East and Siberia to Belarus for joint war games, drawing Western concerns that Russia could use them as a cover for an invasion.
Washington and its allies are raising the prospect of unprecedented sanctions in the event of an invasion, including a possible ban on dollar transactions, draconian restrictions on key technology imports like microchips, and the shutdown of a newly built Russian gas pipeline to Germany.
President Joe Biden’s administration also has deployed additional U.S. troops to Poland, Romania and Germany in a show of Washington’s commitment to protect NATO’s eastern flank. The U.S. and its allies have delivered planeloads of weapons and munitions to Ukraine.
CALCULATED ESCALATION
By concentrating troops that could attack Ukraine from many directions, Putin has demonstrated a readiness to escalate the crisis to achieve his goals.
“Putin appears overconfident and is exhibiting a high level of risk-tolerance,” said Ben Hodges, who served as commanding general of the U.S. Army Europe and now works at the Center for European Policy Analysis. “He seems intent on applying maximum pressure on the West in this self-manufactured crisis, in hopes that Ukraine or NATO will eventually make concessions.”
Some observers expect Putin to further ratchet up tensions by expanding the scope and area of the military drills.
Fyodor Lukyanov, head of the Moscow-based Council for Foreign and Defense Policies who closely follows the Kremlin’s thinking, predicted a Western refusal to discuss Russia’s main demands would trigger a new round of escalation.
“Logically, Russia will need to raise the level of tensions,” Lukyanov said. “If the goals set are not being achieved, then you need to increase pressure — first of all through a demonstration of force.”
Lukyanov said that while invading Ukraine is not what Putin wants, he may challenge the West by other means.
“The whole idea as envisaged by Putin … was not to solve the Ukrainian crisis by means of war, but to bring the West to the negotiations table about principles of European security arrangements,” Lukyanov noted. “The moment Russia starts a war against Ukraine, the whole previous game will be over and the new game will happen at an absolutely different level of risk. And all we know about Mr. Putin is that he is not a gambler. He is a calculated player.”
POTENTIAL PATHS FOR COMPROMISE
While Putin and his officials have insisted they expect the U.S. and NATO to bow to Russia’s demands — a prospect that looks all but impossible — some Kremlin-watchers expect Moscow to eventually accept a compromise that would help avoid hostilities and allow all sides to save face.
Even though Western allies won’t renounce NATO’s open-door policy, they have no intention to embrace Ukraine or any other ex-Soviet nation anytime soon. Some analysts floated an idea of a potential moratorium on expanding the alliance.
Gwendolyn Sasse, a Carnegie Europe fellow who heads the Centre for East European and International Studies in Berlin, voiced skepticism, saying that “the worst would be to signal that there are divisions in NATO,” noting that Putin might not be satisfied with it either.
Another possibility is the “Finlandization” of Ukraine, meaning that the country would acquire a neutral status, the way Finland did after World War II. The policy helped it maintain friendly ties with the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War.
Such a move would represent a sharp revision of Kyiv’s course toward NATO membership and likely fuel strong domestic criticism, but the Ukrainian public could eventually welcome the policy twist as a lesser evil, compared with a Russian invasion.
Asked about the “Finlandization” idea, French President Emmanuel Macron told reporters Monday that “this is one of the models on the table,” but he backtracked the next day when he visited Kyiv.
Another potential compromise would likely include steps to defuse tensions in eastern Ukraine, which has been controlled by Russia-backed separatists since a rebellion flared up there in 2014 shortly after Moscow’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula.
Russia has urged the West to press Ukraine to fulfill its obligations under a 2015 peace deal that was brokered by France and Germany and required Kyiv to offer self-rule to the rebel-held territories. The deal has been seen by Ukrainians as a betrayal of the country’s national interests and its implementation has stalled.
Macron this week described the agreement as “the only path allowing to build peace … and find a sustainable political solution.”
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Associated Press writers Lorne Cook in Brussels and Sylvie Corbet in Paris contributed.
There’s been a “quantum shift” in the relationship between the world’s two largest authoritarian powers, said former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd.
The shift is represented by the 5,300-word joint statement by China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin outlining their intended collaboration to redistribute global power. Former US National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley—who joined Rudd at an Atlantic Council Front Page event co-hosted by the Asia Society and the Council’s Global China Hub—called the statement a “manifesto for their global leadership,” warning that Russia and China are making the case for taking charge of the international system—assuming a role they believe the United States has abdicated.
But as the crisis in Eastern Europe continues, just how far is China willing to go to help Russia? Are there parallels between Ukraine and Taiwan? And what should the United States do about this? Hadley and Rudd dove into those challenging questions at Thursday’s event, moderated by Susan Glasser of the New Yorker. Here are more highlights from the discussion:
Depends on your definition of ‘democracy’
Three aspects of the joint statement jumped out to Rudd: First, by coming out against NATO expansion it is “the first time” that China has issued “direct commentary” on the topic. Second, it amounts to an “explicit” China-Russia position opposing the AUKUS defense pact that will send nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. Third, it includes China’s endorsement for Russia’s proposed “long-term, legally binding security guarantees” in Europe. Taken together, the repositioning represents “China becoming a global security actor in a way which I personally have not seen them do before,” said Rudd.
Hadley noted that, contrary to public perception, the countries claim they are supporters of the international order as defined by the United Nations and even claim that they are democratic. “It shows the power of the democratic principle, that even Russia and China have to say that they embrace it,” he explained, arguing that while they certainly have “a different definition of democracy” than the West, they don’t plug authoritarianism as the new or better global model.
While the partnership has “good running room,” according to Hadley, China and Russia are going to “bump up against ultimately some constraints” over the Arctic, Central Asia, and nuclear capability, where their interests conflict. Rudd agreed but warned that it would be wrong to “assume that this will not get bigger and broader in scope over time,” and that it “behooves” the West to “see this as being enduring and consequential” for foreign policy.
Reading the Ukraine tea leaves
Hadley believes that if Russia were to invade Ukraine, “China will not formally endorse it” because it recognizes the Ukrainian government and largely opposes foreign interventions. But Hadley predicted that in such a scenario China would “blame the United States and blame the West for provoking it and for failing to take into account Russia’s legitimate security interests.”
And if the United States and Europe slap on sanctions, Hadley said that China will likely help Russia “circumvent or avoid or overcome” them. Rudd agreed, saying that Putin’s “principal concern with China” is to build financial support and access to financial markets if it is removed from the SWIFT international banking transaction system.
Hadley gave the Biden administration credit for “being very public about what Putin is doing” and for “the way [it] rallied the allies.” But he wished the United States “had left more ambiguity” about the possibility of a military response for Ukraine. He also said he thought the United States “should have moved heavier equipment [into Eastern Europe] earlier.”
Is a Russian invasion even likely? “Putin is not a bluffer,” Hadley said. “He may gradually pull back, but he’s pretty far out on this one.” Hadley added that the sheer magnitude of Russia’s troop movements makes it “very difficult for [Putin] to back down.”
Tracking Taiwan
Rudd noted that China is “not looking to Ukraine for… a template” of what it can achieve in Taiwan. “We shouldn’t overread the significance of [US] actions or non-actions vis-à-vis the Ukraine scenarios,” in Xi’s calculations on Taiwan.
China will wait until “they nationally believe they are militarily ready,” Rudd said, which would require the People’s Liberation Army to certify to Xi that its forces will defeat the US and Taiwanese militaries in a Taiwan crisis in which Washington intervenes. “Probable is not a word that Xi Jinping wants to hear,” Rudd said. “He wants to hear ‘definitely win.’” According to Rudd, that isn’t likely in the next year or even decade: It “lies in the 2030s.” Until then, China will be watching global crises like the one over Ukraine to update their analysis about American power, and Rudd added that he was concerned about “the aggregation of any perception of American lack of strategic resolve long-term.”
Friends and foes
Hadley explained that when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, the view in the George W. Bush administration was: “tomorrow will be Ukraine, and the day after it will be the Baltic States.” So “we threw US-Russia relations in the toilet,” he added. Now, Russia and China “have a better relationship with each other than either of them has with the United States. And that is our problem.”
But that isn’t attributable to anything the United States did, Hadley argued. “What really brings them together is a common threat not by what America did, but in some sense what America is. Their narrative is [that] the United States does not accept the legitimacy of either regime… and that they need to resist America and its democratic proselytization.”
While addressing these strategically aligned partners, the United States will have to be wary of “the real challenge,” as Hadley put it: Overstretching. “If we have to be engaged in a substantial way” in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, “the only way we’re going to manage is to do it with friends and allies,” he said.
Putin’s mostly manufactured crisis risks leaving Russia worse off.
Article by Richard Haass
February 2, 2022
Russian President Vladimir Putin trains with members of the Russian national judo team in Sochi on February 14, 2019. Photo by MIKHAIL KLIMENTYEV/SPUTNIK/AFP via Getty Image
Russian President Vladimir Putin regularly showcases his skills in judo and other martial arts. Success in these sports often depends on what the Japanese call kuzushi –unbalancing one’s opponent by employing techniques designed to disrupt their physical and mental equilibrium.
Putin has sought to throw the United States and its NATO allies off balance by mobilizing more than 100,000 Russian troops on Ukraine’s border. Having made no secret of his view that Russia and Ukraine are organically tied, Putin may well see re-establishing such a relationship as a way to cement his legacy by removing the perceived ignominy suffered by Russia in the decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Putin may have believed that threatening Ukraine might destabilize the country and provide an opportunity to replace the current, pro-Western government with one much more deferential to the Kremlin. Even more likely, Putin judged that his troop mobilization would intimidate the US and its relatively new president, Joe Biden, into accepting Ukraine’s return to Russia’s sphere of influence.
After all, the US had just carried out a chaotic and near-unconditional withdrawal from Afghanistan. Putin had largely gotten away with annexing Crimea in 2014. And Chinese President Xi Jinping had paid little if any price for rolling back democracy in Hong Kong. From afar, therefore, the US appeared weak, divided, and inward-looking.
Add to that Putin’s lack of respect for America’s European allies. Germany, having unwisely decided to phase out nuclear power, had allowed itself to become more dependent on Russian gas and, as was often true of West Germany during the Cold War, is uncomfortable confronting the Kremlin. Moreover, Putin began his military buildup as winter was approaching, when low temperatures and high fuel prices would give the Kremlin added leverage. The French were focused on their upcoming presidential election, while the United Kingdom was preoccupied with COVID-19, Brexit, and Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s behavior.
In addition, Putin took steps to reduce Russia’s own vulnerabilities, especially to economic sanctions. The country’s foreign-exchange reserves reached a record $630 billion in December 2021, while high oil prices have generated significant government revenue. And China, already providing diplomatic backing, could offer financial help if the Kremlin were to need it.
But while Putin manufactured the Ukraine crisis believing he held a clear advantage vis-à-vis the West, he committed an error that can prove dangerous even for a skilled martial-arts practitioner: he underestimated his opponent.
While Biden and NATO have said they will not intervene directly on behalf of Ukraine, this is not the same as accepting Russian dominance. In fact, the US has organized a comprehensive response. It has sent arms to Ukraine to increase the costs to Russia of any invasion and occupation. There are plans to fortify NATO member countries closest to Russia. Substantial economic sanctions are being prepared. And rerouting gas to Europe would partly offset the possible loss of Russian supplies.
All of which is to say that Putin’s initial thrust failed to score a decisive blow. Those who say that Russia’s president has the West where he wants it have things backwards. Putin has placed himself in an unenviable position: he must either escalate or find a face-saving way to back down.
The US has wisely provided Putin with a diplomatic off-ramp. This could entail a new structure to help underpin European security, as well as arms-control arrangements that would limit the scale and location of a range of systems. A revitalized and revised Minsk process would seek a political settlement in eastern Ukraine that would allow for considerable autonomy for the region’s inhabitants (many of whom are ethnic Russians) and the replacement of Russian soldiers by international peacekeepers. The US has also signaled that Ukraine will not enter NATO any time soon, and then some.
Whether such an outcome will be enough for Putin is uncertain. He is not going to hear what he wants – that Ukraine will never be able to join NATO, or that NATO forces will pull back to where they were more than two decades ago, before the Alliance expanded into Central and Eastern Europe. But Putin will probably have a few weeks to ponder his next steps. He will soon travel to Beijing for the opening of the Winter Olympics – and Xi has likely made it clear that he would not appreciate a war in Ukraine overshadowing the opportunity to showcase China ahead of the Communist Party congress this fall, where he will seek a third term.
Putin does have another option. He could increase Russia’s military presence in the Western Hemisphere, claiming to be doing to the US what it and NATO had done to Russia. But this would be risky, and would do nothing to deal with his concerns in Europe.
It is impossible to predict what Putin will do, and it may be that he has yet to decide. He may well opt for a so-called “minor incursion,” or limited intervention, possibly to increase Russia’s military presence in eastern Ukraine.
Such a course of action would give Putin something to show for his aggressive diplomacy without incurring major penalties, as NATO’s 30 members would be unlikely to reach a consensus on how to respond. It would also be consistent with the martial-arts approach of looking for tactical openings to unbalance one’s opponent.
But such a scenario highlights the limits of martial arts, which are more about tactics than strategy. This largely manufactured crisis in Ukraine risks leaving Russia worse off: controlling slightly more territory, but facing new sanctions, a stronger NATO, and a neighbor whose people have developed a more separate, anti-Russian identity.
When he returns to his dacha, therefore, Putin might be well advised to take up another game closely associated with Russia: chess, where the best players think several moves ahead and respect their opponent.
A l’occasion de la réunion de la BCE ce jeudi, Jean-Claude Trichet, ancien Président de la Banque Centrale Européenne, était l’invité de l’émission Ecorama du 3 février 2022, présenté par David Jacquot sur Boursorama.com.
Lebanon’s former prime minister Saad Hariri arrives for a press conference in the capital Beirut, Jan. 24, 2022. (AFP)
The Lebanese media last week reported the story of five young men from the north of the country who died while fighting for Daesh. Much emphasis and hype was placed on the citizens being from Tripoli.
Why this effort to demonize Tripoli, the capital of the north, as a hub of Sunni extremism? Actually, it is convenient for Hezbollah to do this, as Sunni extremism has been its greatest ally. The Sunni fundamentalist narrative is also convenient for Saad Hariri, the former prime minister, as he and his movement are supposed to represent “moderation.”
Far from being a hotbed of extremism, Tripoli has been at the forefront of combating terrorism. In 2007, its residents were the first to fight Shaker Al-Absi and his Fatah Al-Islam group in the Bared River battle. Young men from the towns of Bebnine and Al-Abda, close to the Nahr Al-Bared refugee camp, contained the terrorist group until the Lebanese Army arrived.
Tripoli has been home to some of the richest people in Lebanon, including the billionaire and current Prime Minister Najib Mikati. However, its people have been suffering from poverty and deprivation for decades. Tripoli used to be a center for culture and trade on the Mediterranean, but now it is one of the region’s poorest spots. Nevertheless, if you visit the city, you will meet kind, generous and welcoming people and you will realize that all negative propaganda has been created for political purposes.
To examine how Hezbollah uses Sunni terrorism, we need to go back to the beginning of the Syrian war. Initially, when Bashar Assad was losing and soldiers and officers were starting to defect, the dictator needed a helping hand to suppress his people. Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah could not send young men to defend a dictator whose family had made Lebanon suffer for 30 years. The conflict in Syria also had nothing to do with the group’s original mandate, which was fighting Israel. So Nasrallah invented the excuse that Hezbollah had to protect the tomb of Zeinab from the march of the Umayyads — even though the last of the Umayyads perished during the Reconquista in Spain 600 years ago. The excuse was not convincing. Nasrallah showed confusion and gave contradictory explanations for the group’s intervention. Then Daesh emerged, which was a gift for Hezbollah. The terrorist group represented an existential threat to the Shiites. The Takfiris who consider Shiites and other sects to be apostates and want to annihilate them gave Hezbollah an excellent excuse to rally people around it.
Today, the group is facing scrutiny from its own constituency. Hezbollah has paralyzed the government and is holding the country hostage, just for Iran to have stronger bargaining power at the nuclear deal talks in Vienna. More and more people from the Shiite community are realizing that and asking themselves what has become of the “resistance” project. Ultimately, beyond the slogans, people’s main aim is to live with dignity. So now is the time for Hezbollah to highlight the perceived existential threat once again.
The Sunni fundamentalist narrative is needed to rally the Shiites and part of the Christian population. It allows Hezbollah to portray itself to the international community as the lesser of two evils. After all, didn’t the international community allow the creation of the Popular Mobilization Units in Iraq for the purpose of fighting Daesh? The world saw in the pro-Iran militias a lesser evil than Daesh. In fact, it created a monster that is every bit as bad.
As for Hariri, he is known to live a lavish lifestyle. In 2019, he transferred $16 million to a 20-year-old South African swimwear model at a time when he had not been paying his employees. Because of this and his spineless attitude toward Hezbollah, his popularity has faltered. This is visible in his support base on the street. When he said last month that he would not run in the elections in May, the number of his supporters who took to the streets was nothing compared with those who protested in February 2011, when his government fell following the resignation of 11 ministers. Saudi Arabia also stopped supporting him after he failed in terms of governance, as well as in containing Hezbollah.
The Sunni fundamentalist narrative is needed to rally the Shiites and part of the Christian population.
Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib
The narrative of fundamentalism is convenient to Hariri as he can present himself to the Saudis and the wider international community as the lesser evil; incompetence is better tolerated than fundamentalism. However, the entire narrative of fundamentalism is not true. Tripoli is not a breeding ground for terrorism and the void created by Hariri’s departure will not be filled by fundamentalists. The city has a vibrant civil society and many patriotic activists who care about the well-being of the people. The international community should lend a helping hand and fund development projects in the city to alleviate its poverty. Most importantly, they should not be fooled by the cliche of Sunni fundamentalism.
With Russian troops at the Ukrainian border, NATO appears to have regrouped, but several challenges lie ahead before a solution can be found. Most importantly, Kyiv should be an active player in further negotiations.
In November 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron declared NATO “brain-dead.” At the time, his observation seemed accurate – even though one might question the wisdom of such a comment coming from the head of an important member state.
However, with the Ukraine crisis, NATO appears to have awoken from its coma. The alliance and most of its member states have declared their support for Ukraine and want to keep its borders intact. They have delivered materiel, trained personnel and pledged to retaliate with harsh sanctions (including from the EU) should Moscow take its troops over the border. However, these threats are made somewhat weaker by declarations that there will be no military response from NATO.
Give Ukraine a voice
After Russia put some 100,000 troops on the Ukrainian border in late 2021, a flurry of military and diplomatic activity ensued. So far both Russia and the Western alliance have had some successes.
First and foremost, the Kremlin managed to get the United States to the negotiating table, as well as NATO. There were high-level meetings between presidents and the German Minister of Foreign Affairs traveled to Moscow. All this boosted the standing of the Russian president. Another potentially unintended victory for the Kremlin was to neutralize Germany within the alliance.
A bizarre aspect of the situation is that there is little talk of Ukraine itself.
The West, meanwhile, has managed to reinvigorate NATO. Europe has been reminded that not only the U.S. but also the United Kingdom and Turkey, play an important role in security matters.
Still, nervousness runs extremely high in the West. Any Russian action near the border leads to rumors of an imminent attack. This plays into Russia’s hands, as it creates insecurity and fear among the population in Ukraine and Central Europe.
A bizarre aspect of the situation is that there is little talk of Ukraine itself and Kyiv’s interests, which are in fact at the heart of the matter. The Ukrainian army is on high alert and also informal (guerilla) activities appear to be underway. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has asked his own people, and especially Western strategists and politicians, not to panic.
It cannot be in Russia’s interest to invade Ukraine and engage in a long war, in the style of Iraq or Afghanistan, in its own neighborhood. Some inhabitants of eastern Ukraine may harbor sympathies for the Russians, but most Ukrainians do not. A guerrilla war is the last thing any country wants. Hopefully, the government in Kyiv will stay coolheaded, even though it wants and needs Western support.
Moscow was angling for negotiations, and it is likely that it also hoped for the official recognition of Crimea as part of Russia (tacitly this is already the case). It also wants to keep Ukraine out of NATO. So far, the Kremlin has not received any such guarantees.
President Putin is not known to take excessive risks. If the West presents a united front, it could help create a fair discussion between Kyiv and Moscow. But Ukraine would need to have a voice of its own in these negotiations, and not be discussed in the third person – as is too frequently the case.
En 2021, pour la première fois dans l’histoire, une crise énergétique a été provoquée par le gaz et non par le pétrole
Par Irène Inchauspé
Philippe Chalmin. Sipa Press
Les faits –
La demande européenne de gaz devrait diminuer cette année, son prix toujours élevé rendant le charbon plus compétitif pour la production d’électricité, a déclaré lundi l’Agence internationale de l’énergie (AIE).
Historien et économiste, Philippe Chalmin est un spécialiste des marchés des matières premières.
Comment s’est comporté le gaz en 2021 ?
On peut dire que 2021 a vraiment été l’année du gaz, car nous avons connu une crise énergétique qui, pour la première fois dans l’histoire, n’a pas été due au pétrole mais au gaz. Que ce soit en Europe ou en Asie, les prix du gaz ont quadruplé en moyenne, la hausse étant encore plus spectaculaire par rapport aux minima enregistrés en mai 2020 — de 1,50 dollar le mbtu [million de British thermal units], au plus bas, à 40 dollars au plus haut, soit des augmentations spectaculaires sur l’année (+397 % en Europe et +280 % en Asie pour le GNL [gaz naturel liquéfié]). Une évolution que personne n’avait prévue. Alors que le pétrole lui, est
seulement passé de 40 dollars le baril à 70 dollars le baril. Ceci montre bien que si traditionnellement le prix de gaz suivait le pétrole, ce n’est plus le cas aujourd’hui. D’ailleurs, le premier est deux fois plus cher que le second. Il faut noter également qu’entre 2015 et 2020, le
marché s’est modifié. La part des contrats à terme, indexés sur le pétrole, a fortement diminué par rapport au contrat spot. L’essentiel des transactions en Europe se fait au prix spot, et Vladimir Poutine a beau jeu de dire : « Vous vous plaignez, mais c’est vous qui vous êtes mis
dans cette situation. »
C’est le résultat d’une combinaison de facteurs climatiques, économiques et géopolitiques. Climatiques d’abord avec la sécheresse qui a touché la Chine affectant sa production hydroélectrique et provoquant un recours accru au charbon et la réouverture de mines. Mais aussi une hausse des importations de GNL qui ont fait monter les prix. Ensuite, il y a eu une panne de vent en Allemagne et en Europe du Nord. On s’est vraiment rendu compte alors que nos énergies renouvelables sont méchamment intermittentes ! Pas de vent, donc pas ou peu de production éolienne en Europe du Nord, nécessitant une consommation en forte hausse de GNL en été, ce qui est vraiment inhabituel. Le facteur économique est lié aux grandes compagnies gazières européennes qui sont en retard dans la reconstitution de leurs stocks, qui sont à des niveaux historiquement bas. Enfin, dans le domaine de la géopolitique, avant même la question de l’Ukraine, les tensions existaient déjà entre l’Europe et la Russie autour du gazoduc Nord Stream 2. Elles ont aussi contribué à la hausse des prix du gaz.
« Dans l’hypothèse où la situation politique ne se détériore pas, nous devrions assister à une détente des prix du gaz au printemps. Il ne retrouvera pas toutefois ses niveaux de 2020, en raison de la tension sur les stocks »
L’explosion des prix du gaz a entraîné dans son sillage un recours accru au charbon avec pour la Chine la recherche de nouveaux fournisseurs à la suite d’un embargo sur le charbon australien. L’Europe, elle, a augmenté de 12 % sa consommation de charbon en 2021. Les prix de
l’électricité en Europe ont aussi été impactés, puisqu’ils sont déterminés par les coûts de la dernière centrale appelée pour assurer l’équilibre entre l’offre et la demande, qui est une centrale au gaz. Les matières premières « électriques » comme le lithium et le cobalt ont également connu de fortes hausses des prix, tout comme on a connu flambée de ceux des engrais. Enfin, en raison de la hausse du coût de l’énergie, nous avons constaté une baisse de la production d’aluminium et de zinc.
Le conflit en Ukraine menace-t-il nos importations de gaz ?
Aujourd’hui, l’Europe occidentale dépend à 40 % pour ses approvisionnements de la Russie. Les autres grands fournisseurs sont la Norvège, l’Algérie, et des importations de gaz naturel liquéfié qui peuvent venir du Qatar, d’Australie et des Etats-Unis. Pour la France, le principal fournisseur de gaz est la Norvège (36 %), devant la Russie (17 %), l’Algérie (8 %), les Pays-Bas (8 %), le Nigeria (7 %) et le Qatar (2 %). Nous sommes moins dépendants de la Russie que le reste de l’Europe, en particulier l’Allemagne. Nous avons aussi l’avantage du nucléaire. Vladimir Poutine, quant à lui, utilise déjà l’arme du gaz vis-à-vis des « maillons faibles ». Par exemple, en Moldavie qui s’est dotée d’un gouvernement plutôt pro-européen, alors que la société gazière du
pays est une filiale de Gazprom ! Il a exercé des pressions identiques en Bulgarie et en Hongrie. Si nous avons un vrai conflit, qui nous amène à dire que l’on n’achète plus de gaz aux Russes ou que ceux-ci ne veulent plus nous le vendre, nous aurons un vrai problème d’approvisionnement
puisque les stocks de gaz naturel que nous détenons sont historiquement bas. Il faudrait alors trouver d’autres approvisionnements. La Russie devrait elle aussi trouver d’autres façons
d’écouler son stock, mais elle peut tenir un moment car elle a des débouchés en Chine.
Risque-t-on de faire face à une pénurie de gaz en Europe ?
Du gaz, on pourra toujours en trouver, on pourra toujours en acheter. On a des capacités aujourd’hui d’importations de gaz naturel liquéfié. Le seul problème qu’il faut rappeler, c’est se détériore pas, nous devrions assister à une détente des tarifs du gaz au printemps. Il ne retrouvera pas toutefois ses niveaux de 2020, en raison de la tension sur les stocks.
Retrouver l’article original sur le site de L’Opinion.
A health worker collects a swab sample from a traveler at a train station to test for COVID-19 before allowing her to enter the city, in Mumbai, India
India Inc has demonstrated resilience in the third wave of Covid-19, despite disruptions and challenges, and business should rebound by February-March, say CEOs and business leaders.
Larger markets such as Mumbai and Delhi have been able to deal with the third wave, without putting too much pressure on the healthcare infrastructure, and smaller cities too are expected to ride it out better than the previous ones, corporate leaders say. While employees having to take time off to recover from Covid infections did delay assignments and plans, relative mildness of Omicron, lower mortality levels compared with the second wave and large-scale vaccinations resulted in the absence of fear and stress among organisations.
Infosys founder NR Narayana Murthy said Indian industry has done a pretty good job at drdriving growth despite Covid.
Absence of Lockdowns Helped
He added that Indian businesses will remain resilient with appropriate Covid protocols, vaccinations and greater planning.
« The government has also done a great job on the vaccinations front. That has led to a drop in mortality and fear, and more confidence in running businesses and life, » Murthy said. « We have to learn to live with the virus with more planning and less panic. I think the Indian economy is fairly resilient today and will be on a strong wicket. »
Corporate chieftains say businesses have attempted to mitigate the risks arising from Covid over the last two years in terms of planning, sourcing and strategy. Investment in robust and diversified supply chains, automation of processes, and accelerated digitalisation on the customer-experience side, have helped companies manage the aftermath of Covid better. Also, the absence of lockdowns has ensured less disruption and less panic.
« Fear is absent and we are in a better place to deal with Covid in terms of medicines and health infrastructure. There have been blips in demand, but we see lesser anxiety, leading to more business confidence. Fortunately, there were no lockdowns and we are hopeful that the Omnicron wave ends by March this year, » said RPG Group chairman Harsh Goenka. The chairman of a top Indian conglomerate said that in the first wave there was tremendous business uncertainty, and in the second wave, the high levels of mortality caused a dent in business and consumer confidence. This time round, business is better prepared and illness caused by Omicron is temporary, without being life threatening in most cases. « Vaccines, improved line of treatment, and availability of better drugs will help cope with the pandemic. Businesses have to work around Covid, » he said.
CONSUMER SENTIMENT
Business leaders were of the view that consumer sentiment remained positive.
» Consumer sentiment is far better after vaccinations and boosters. Business rebound is expected to be faster than before, » said Indian Hotels Company Ltd managing director Puneet Chatwal. Businesses took six to nine months to bounce back after the first wave in 2020, three months to recover after the second wave, and six weeks in the third, he said.
Shoppers Stop MD Venu Nair said consumer sentiment continues to be positive. « We are already seeing a positive trend in sales, and we expect a faster rebound this time, » said Nair.
Asian Paints CEO Amit Syngle said while consumer sentiment has been subdued in the third wave, prior experience shows that a Covid wave is followed by the release of pent-up demand. « Covid leads to temporary suspension in demand owing to deferment of plans, but buoyancy will return fast, » he said. Companies selling discretionary products said compared to the first two waves, business remained largely on track in the third wave. Beauty unicorn Good Glamm group founder Darpan Sanghvi said during the second wave, there was a drop in consumer sentiment. « Consequently, we saw online click-through rates (CTRs) drop by 15- 20% and offline was badly impacted by over 40- 50%. During the Omicron wave, we have not seen consumer sentiment get hit. We see CTRs staying strong and online sales staying healthy, » he said. « Agility of supply chains, distributed manufacturing footprint together, omni-channel presence as well as accelerated digitalisation have enabled us to ensure continued and uninterrupted supply of our range of FMCG products, » said an ITC spokesperson.
Metro Cash & Carry MD Arvind Mediratta, too, said the impact of the third wave on business was much less severe compared to the earlier waves. « There has been a slowdown in sales over the last one month (around 10-15%) with the hospitality sector down by 25-30%. But we expect this to get over by mid-February as by then the third wave would have receded in all the big cities, » he said.
Read the original article on the site of the Economic Times
ByCarl Bildt, Aleksander Kwasniewski, Victor Pinchuk, Anders Fogh Rasmussen
Ukraine faces a grave threat on its border. Another Russian invasion seems quite possible. Given the size of the Russian forces currently concentrated close to the frontier and the determination of Ukrainians to defend their freedom, the result would be tragic.
United and resolute engagement by the West is essential if we are to avoid catastrophe. A recent survey has identified strong backing among the Western public for an assertive policy in support of Ukraine. We believe this is an important and timely message for Western leaders.
Today, Western leaders are trying to balance firmness with efforts to avoid escalation. Are they prepared to back up diplomacy not only with sanctions but also with military support in a worst-case scenario?
We felt it was important to systematically survey Western public opinion in order to gain a sense of how the public views the current crisis. What policies towards Ukraine do people in Western countries want to see? Will citizens support their leaders in a coherent and firm policy to defend Ukraine?
The six-country study commissioned by the Yalta European Strategy and the Victor Pinchuk Foundation included 600 interviews per country with representative samples of the general population in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Poland.
Across all countries surveyed, though of course with national variations on all issues, the study found that Western populations not only endorse strong diplomatic and economic measures, but also back military engagement to deter Russian aggression and protect Ukraine’s borders. If deterrence fails and Russia invades Ukraine again, Western populations are even more emphatic in their backing for military support from NATO member states.
Western citizens want to stand with Ukraine and believe that an assertive set of policies can successfully deter Russia. At the same time, they expect Ukraine and its leadership to commit fully to reforms and the elimination of corruption.
Here are some key results of the survey:
Western public support is based on broadly positive attitudes towards Ukraine, and to the idea of the country joining the EU and NATO.
Clear majorities or nearly half of all respondents believe that Ukraine and the West share the same values, including 61% in Poland, 57% in the UK, 56% in Canada, 54% in the US, 48% in Germany, and 47% in France. When asked the same question about Russia, the answer is a clear “no.”
On the question “If the EU/NATO would accept candidates in the next five to ten years, which country should be admitted?” Ukraine ranks top among eleven listed candidate countries. Across the West, majorities consider it important for their home country to support Ukraine, its freedom, and efforts to defend itself. Majorities also see support for Ukraine as important for European security.
Western populations oppose the idea of “sacrificing” Ukraine in order to improve relations with Russia. Only around 15% of respondents feel it is more important to improve relations with Russia than defend Ukraine, with the highest figure being 18% in Germany.
In terms of the present military crisis, majorities or nearly one-half in all six surveyed countries favor NATO allies making a commitment to defend Ukraine from Russian aggression including 66% in Poland, 61% in the US, 61% in Canada, 57% in France, 49% in Germany, and 47% in the UK.
Through unity and resolve, the West can help defend both Ukraine’s territorial integrity and democratic values. We believe the West has a moral obligation to do so. Western nations have always supported and encouraged Ukraine on its European and Euro-Atlantic path. The West now has a responsibility to stand with Ukraine during this moment of truth.
The recent survey shows that Western citizens will support their leaders if they do the right thing. At the same time, the Western public want their leaders to be tough not only in defending Ukraine, but also in demanding reforms from Ukraine.
There is a consistent belief held by 70% in the UK, 67% in Poland, 63% in the US, 60% in Germany, 55% in Canada, and 53% in France that Ukraine must first get its act together before more substantial long-term support can be given. Western populations sees Ukrainian civil society as the main partners in the pursuit of reforms.
In a moment of grave threat, Western populations are ready to support Ukraine’s right to defend itself and the country’s choice of a democratic future. As Western leaders face up to a great crisis, they have reason to feel their voters will back them up and not hold them back if they adopt principled positions in support of Ukraine.
Carl Bildt is a Member of the Board of Yalta European Strategy. Aleksander Kwasniewski is Head of the Board of Yalta European Strategy. Victor Pinchuk is the Founder and a Member of the Board of Yalta European Strategy. Anders Fogh Rasmussen is a Member of the Board of Yalta European Strategy.
Survey Methodology Statement: Schoen Cooperman Research completed 600 interviews per country in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Poland with representative samples of general population adults, as well as an additional 185 interviews with professionals with higher educations and middle-to-upper incomes in each country, on behalf of Yalta European Strategy and the Victor Pinchuk Foundation.
Respondents in the secondary sample are defined as professionals working in industries such as technology, business services/consulting, finance, healthcare, law, academia, government, or media & entertainment with post-secondary education or the equivalent in their home country and annual incomes in the upper one-quarter or one-third of the income distribution in their home country. All survey interviews were completed online.
Respondents were reached using random selection procedures and were required to pass a series of screening questions in order to ensure they are adults in the given home country. The margin of error for each general population sample is +/- 4% at the 95% confidence level and +/- 7% at the 95% confidence level for each sample of professionals with higher educations and middle-to-upper incomes.
People in Western democracies are losing trust in government, but that is hardly a surprise. Political mediocrity has caused leaders to make promises they cannot keep while shunning other points of view. Nothing less than freedom itself is at stake.
Many forms of government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” Winston Churchill uttered these words in 1947, and today they remain as true as ever.
Since democracy is better than all of the other forms of government we have tried, one might expect that in Western democracies, trust in government and its institutions would be high. This is not the case. For many years, the Edelman Trust Barometer has measured the relationship between people and their governments. Citing the 2022 edition of the measure, Reuters pointed out that it had fallen to “new lows.” However, it also showed rising scores in autocratic states like China.
“The biggest losers of public trust over the last year,” the article continues, “were institutions in Germany, down 7 points to 46, Australia at 53 (-6), the Netherlands at 57 (-6), South Korea at 42 (-5) and the United States at 43 (-5). By contrast, public trust in institutions in China stood at 83 percent, up 11 points, 76 percent in the United Arab Emirates (+9) and 66 percent in Thailand (+5).” Businesses, however, “retained strong levels of trust globally,” due to their role in “developing vaccines and adapting workplace and retail practices.”
These are woeful scores for the “liberal democracies.” But what might be the underlying reason?
Misuse of democracy
Like many good things, democracy is susceptible to misuse. Many systems label themselves “democratic” though they have no democratic qualities whatsoever. The former German Democratic Republic or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea come to mind.
Other places may have leaderships that act in a rather autocratic manner but have nevertheless been selected in a democratic way – Singapore is one example. In yet other places, there are successful democracies based on wide decentralization and the principle of subsidiarity, coupled with a strong element of direct democracy, such as in Switzerland. Most Western countries have systems of representative democracies with different degrees of centralization and federalism.
However, democracy is under constant threat – as is freedom. Just as freedom is a precious public good and must continuously be defended, so must democracy. The challenge for democracy is less autocracy, but rather two other phenomena: populism on one side and excessive bureaucracy (sometimes called “technocracy”) on the other.
Political parties are tempted to battle for ‘market share’ instead of defending their convictions and the public interest.
The pillars of democracy that should distinguish it from other systems are a guarantee of individual freedom and an efficient (as opposed to oppressive and arbitrary) rule of law. Democracy requires freedom of speech and opinion, and thrives on healthy debate between opposing views.
Because political parties compete for votes, they are tempted to battle for “market share” instead of defending their convictions and the public interest. They tend to disguise their populist, unsustainable proposals as ones that would serve that public interest.
A close look at the writings and debates of the United States’ founders reveals a worry that populism can take democracy hostage. They therefore introduced an elaborate system of checks and balances to contain the excesses of the majority. They designed institutions such as the Senate, in which each state, regardless of population, is represented by two senators.
Switzerland’s thriving democracy is based on a high degree of subsidiarity, granting the cantons broad autonomy and giving the municipalities a key role to play. The country also has a robust system of referenda, allowing for direct democracy. Frequently, decentralized systems have more resilient democracies and a stronger defense of individual freedom than more centralized ones. Subsidiarity is crucial.
Populism and bureaucracy
Another challenge to individual freedom and democracy is the rise of technocracies and bureaucracies. This trend diminishes magistrates’ responsibility and reduces the efficiency of administrative and political systems. The result is a torrent of rules limiting freedom of choice and adding huge societal and economic costs. The tentacles of state administration extend further and further, yet according to the constitutional concept adopted by most Western democracies, it is the parliament’s duty to keep public expenses under control and ensure that the state and its institutions do not become a burden on citizens.
Unfortunately, in many European democracies, populism is increasing and the state’s role in society and the economy is rising fast. The proponents of these changes like to camouflage this rising state interventionism as “technocracy,” to make it seem like experts are running things. As they gain traction, the traditional European dedicated civil service is transforming into an ever more bloated bureaucracy.
In many European democracies, populism is increasing and the state’s role in society and the economy is rising fast.
There are different varieties of populism. On the periphery are the more extreme types – some are radical, while some simply challenge what has become the accepted norms of the so-called “center.” Yet the traditional parties have long been engaging in their own type of populism. As they try to increase their constituencies, they water down their own policies, abandoning their stated convictions and using muddled rhetoric.
This is the populism of mediocrity. It leads politicians to avoid making decisions that are unpopular but necessary, and it makes it harder to find and implement good solutions. Examples are everywhere. In Germany, the Christian Democrats have taken a sharp turn to the left over the last 16 years to obtain more votes. The move worked at first, but by the end of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s time in office, the party had lost a huge chunk of its electorate. Moreover, the strategy emboldened radical groups on both the extreme right and left. When “centrist” parties engage in cheap populism, it radicalizes the political spectrum.
Political comfort zone
Unfortunately, the parties themselves have become very bureaucratic. Being a member of parliament has become a profession. As politicians increasingly rely on reelection for their income, they are less independent – they must bow to the will of the party bureaucracy if they want to be nominated.
As they try to siphon off votes from each other, the mainstream parties – the Christian democrats/conservatives and social democrats – have all begun to occupy the same cozy, center-left territory on the political spectrum. Any deviation from this philosophical zone is denounced as “radical.” As they try to maintain this balancing act, politicians increasingly make misleading campaign promises or take refuge in empty statements or even outright lies.
The fact that so many successful politicians are such shameless liars is not only a reflection on them, it is also a reflection on us. When the people want the impossible, only liars can satisfy.
Thomas Sowell
But with mediocrity on one side and radicalization on the other, what has allowed the citizenry to become so misguided? Convenience is one cause. It often takes a lot of work to understand policies and their consequences. It is reassuring to remain in a political comfort zone that the center-left purports is morally driven, especially in elaborate welfare systems. For a while, it can even seem like things are going well.
However, the uniformity at the center can make others feel resentful and left out, compelled to take to the political periphery. Others simply fall back on indifference – a social cancer that has become widespread and is toxic for democracy.
Economic populism
Rising inflation will further eat away at trust in institutions. The Edelman Trust Barometer shows that in Western countries, people have enormous doubt about their economic future. For years, the socialist political mantra has been that overspending by the state is unproblematic and that central banks can issue money at nearly unlimited rates without any negative consequences. That dishonest narrative is beginning to backfire. Inflation is here to stay, and the dire situation is clearly a failure of the state, not the market.
Another characteristic of the worsening quality of politics is how leaders create panic while both amassing power and remaining indecisive when it comes to real problems. The alarm over climate change and the incompetence in fighting Covid-19 are just two of the most prominent examples. In these cases, the leaders are often well-meaning and engaged, but lack the necessary understanding to deal with these issues and have grandiose ambitions about saving the world. They pose an immense danger to liberty.
Mediocrity, often presented as stability, is a breeding ground for decline.
This type of populism adopted by most of the West’s mainstream political parties, in which they ignore fundamental realities and promise more than they can deliver, has brought terrible results. It can be seen in post-Merkel Germany, in President Emmanuel Macron’s France, and in many other countries around the world, including the U.S. It has all of the toxic ingredients necessary to snuff out democracy and freedom.
Flimsy politics and a dependence on printing money have embroiled the European Central Bank – ostensibly a politically independent institution – in everyday politics. Former ECB President Mario Draghi (now prime minister of Italy) had political ambitions, while current President Christine Lagarde is a career politician. They have betrayed the institution’s mandate to preserve the value of the euro. Because it currently finances many of the European Union’s governments, the ECB has become Europe’s power center. This recalls Thomas Jefferson’s remark: “The end of democracy and the defeat of the American Revolution will occur when government falls into the hands of lending institutions.”
Freedom and democracy must not be taken for granted. Like all important public goods, they are constantly threatened by those who would seize power – be it autocrats, technocrats or weak politicians. Mediocrity, often presented as stability, is a breeding ground for decline.
It is citizens’ responsibility to defend their rights. Voters hold the key to change.
Robert Gates JANUARY 21 2022
Europe and the US wait anxiously to see if Russian president Vladimir Putin will give the order to invade Ukraine. For years, western statesmen and commentators have puzzled over what makes Putin tick.
After Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, then US secretary of state John Kerry complained: “You just don’t in the 21st century behave in the 19th-century fashion by invading another country on a completely trumped-up pretext.” Others have called Putin’s aggressive policies “inexplicable” and bound to lead to a “quagmire”. Yet, here we are in early 2022 waiting for Putin to call the shot.
I believe his actions, however deplorable, are understandable. Almost everything Putin does at home and abroad is rooted in the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, which for him marked the collapse of the four-century-old Russian empire and Russia’s position as a great power.
Internally, the Soviet collapse and subsequent period of “reform” led to chaos, lawlessness, poverty and a dramatic weakening of the central government at the hands of both oligarchs and regional authorities. Since becoming president in 1999, Putin’s objectives have been straightforward: to restore and expand central government authority (not to mention enhancing his personal dominance and wealth), and to return Russia to its historical role as a major power. In short, authoritarianism at home and aggression abroad.
The restoration of Russia’s role as a great power began with a return to its historical policy of creating a buffer of subservient states on the periphery — the so-called near abroad. Putin’s embrace of this strategy of securing the near abroad is seen in his actions in Belarus, Moldova, Transnistria, Georgia, the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, Kazakhstan and, most dramatically, Ukraine.
He has no desire to recreate the Soviet Union — he does not want to be responsible for the problems of former Soviet republics. What Putin wants is subservience, and for those now-independent states to bend the knee to Moscow — and to be a bulwark against the west and democracy.
Former US national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski observed that without Ukraine, there can be no Russian empire. Putin fears a Ukraine that is economically and politically orientated towards the west with an ever-closer security relationship with the US and other members of Nato — even if it is not a member of the alliance. He regards that as a critical security risk and, just as bad, an alternative economic and political model likely to be increasingly attractive to Russians — a dagger pointed at the heart of Russia.
Putin seems determined, therefore, to take whatever measures he deems necessary either to destabilise and bring down the current western-orientated government of Ukraine or to try to seize the country by military force.
Putin’s restoration of Russia as a great power has also involved significantly strengthening the country’s military capabilities, as well as pursuing an aggressive foreign policy, especially in the Middle East and Africa. He sees the US as the primary enemy and is determined to do whatever he can to exacerbate American tensions at home, disrupt relationships with our allies even as he interferes in their internal affairs, and weaken the US position internationally. In these endeavours, he has enjoyed an increasingly close partnership and commonality of purpose with the Chinese.
Because of Russia’s stunted economy, demographic challenges and other weaknesses at home, Putin has dealt himself a poor hand — but until now he has played it rather skilfully. He has received a great deal of unintended help from the US. Our domestic divisions and near-paralysis in Congress, our perceived withdrawal from the Middle East and, more broadly, from our six-decade-long global leadership role, and ignominious scuttling out of Afghanistan — together these have led many countries to hedge their bets and develop closer economic, political and security ties with both Russia and China.
Putin’s problem is that, as dictators are wont to do, he has overplayed his hand. His aggressive threats against Ukraine have galvanised Nato and reaffirmed its clarity of purpose. His menacing policies have made Ukrainians even more anti-Russian and driven the country further into the arms of the west. Any Russian military action will result in Ukrainian resistance as well as larger Nato military deployments on Russia’s western border, potential suspension of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline and painful economic sanctions.
Moscow has deployed some 100,000 troops to the borders of Ukraine. What now? Putin finds himself in a situation where Russian success is defined as either a change of government in Kyiv (with the successor aligned with Moscow) or conquest of the country. The 18th-century French diplomat Talleyrand is meant to have said: “You can do anything you like with bayonets except sit on them.” Putin must use those troops soon or face the humiliation of withdrawing them without achieving anything except pushing Ukraine closer to the west. In either case, he has placed himself in a difficult position at home and abroad. The US and its allies must do what they can to exacerbate his difficulties.
Read the original article on the site of the Financial Times.
“There will be no peace in Europe if the States are reconstituted on the basis of national sovereignty.” This warning by Jean Monnet—the crux of his seminal reflection from Algiers, Algeria in the summer of 1943—sums up the crisis Europe is currently experiencing nearly eighty years later.
Europe today, as in the aforementioned period, does not have a decisive voice in the great geopolitical issues that will define its future.
Let’s go back to the Algiers of 1943. In June, the French Committee of National Liberation was formed, with Charles de Gaulle as co-chairman and Jean Monnet among the five original members. That summer, the Red Army of the Soviet Union on the Eastern front and the Allied landing in Sicily marked a turning point in relation to Nazi Germany’s Wehrmacht. The divide was drawn between the supremacy of the Soviet Union (along with the United States) and the weakness of Europe and of the United Kingdom.
Importantly, at that time, and in line with a deep-rooted, historical tradition, the United Kingdom was considered European only in a broad, fluctuating sense, which also may include Russia. And so, the disputed delineation of Europe’s frontiers (which still hangs over our heads and has paralyzed, to a great extent, coordinated action in the twenty-first century) was already clear in these first designs of the post-war European order. Present, too, was the dilemma (as artificial today as it was then) between Atlanticist affiliation—based on fear of the Soviet protectorate—and Continentalist allegiance—stemming from reticence to the Anglo-American (now, simply American) hegemony.
The idea of building Europe beyond sovereignties (a need as conspicuous today as it proved to be in Yalta) is part of the reflection of the different groups of resistance (Algiers, but Ventotene’s Spinelli as well). The voice of de Gaulle’s Free France, bypassing the Vichy government, took the lead in this quasi-clandestine debate, as the powers that be engaged in dialogue exclusively among themselves. We are now living a painfully similar situation: Russia only recognizes the United States as a direct interlocutor.
In the objectively unfavorable context in 1943, Monnet laid the groundwork for the rebirth of Europe. And his idea, which became history, confronts us today.
It is true that we are not at war; but Monnet’s intellectual scaffolding presumes a state of peace. And although Europe’s challenge is not “rebuilding,” we Europeans have to accept that our survival as a society—one that can determine its future and defend its principles and values, liberal democracy, the rule of law, and multilateralism—depends just as much on collating national sovereignties as it does on a balanced, proactive transatlantic relationship.
It is said that Monnet, in those days of 1943 (the quote is part of a set of meditations dated August 5) paced back and forth, studying a wall map of the “great” Europe, pondering the nature of the structure that could undo the Gordian Knot of “the German question” (with Otto von Bismarck’s unification in 1871, the weight of Germany—stemming from its wealth and population—became a permanent factor of instability). Monnet’s deliberations revolved around how to create a framework that both integrated and disciplined Germany: a “European entity” with an economic and political vocation that he called a “federation.” The equivalent of addressing “the German question” in our days is the search for a single European voice in the three areas which define the twenty-first century: engagement with China, the health of the transatlantic bond, and Russian revisionism.
Let’s start with Beijing, a paradigmatic case of the trademark ambiguity that afflicts us in Europe: Europe seeks, above all, to be “understanding” (is China a “partner,” a “competitor,” or a “rival”?). This ambiguity transcends semantics—it is pure vacillation. Although our discrepancies with China are basic, rooted in disparate ways of seeing the world—the primacy of freedom versus security, citizen versus collective subject—the dispersion of our national interests and policies defies understanding.
Nor are we clear about what we want with the United States. On one side, we have French President Emmanuel Macron with his “we will see” take on US President Joe Biden; on the other, the countries of Eastern Europe that cling to NATO (and, therefore, to the United States) as guarantor of their defense and territorial integrity. And yes, the transatlantic alliance is, as in 1943, of vital importance for Europe. But Europe needs to be clear: The United States does not have the same relevance or the same interests as it did eighty years ago.
Today, it is a fractured society, whose foreign policy “for the middle class” is impregnated with confrontation (because, unlike us Europeans, the United States is clear about what to call its relationship with China). Although in an extreme situation the transatlantic bond would withstand, Europe is low on the totem pole, as was proven by the unfortunate development of the AUKUS storyline.
The urgency, the drama, and the potential catharsis come from Europe’s eastern neighbor. There are many Europeans who, out of ignorance, indolence, or even conviction play into the Kremlin mantra of Russia as a historical victim of hostility—from the outside world in general, and from the West in particular. After a period of weakness caused by the dismantling of the Soviet Union, in this view, Moscow has managed to regain great-power status without any help, despite the incomprehension—if not sabotage—of Europe and the United States. Russian President Vladimir Putin triumphantly leads the patriotic feat of fighting off alleged aggression and threats to the country’s security on its western border, which the United States is accused of having plotted in the aftermath of the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century” (the dissolution of the Soviet Union), in the words of the president. This is the philosophy behind his article published last July, which unexpectedly crystallized in Russia’s December 17 ultimatum.
Europe is once again absent from the key conversation surrounding a process that will undoubtedly impact its collective future. Putin has reneged on the Normandy Format and is only addressing the United States. NATO today, after years of European complacency and under-funding, is seen as little more than a multilateralist front for Washington. As for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe meeting, it is a sad fig leaf to (poorly) hide the shame of Europe’s belittlement. The US Deputy Secretary of State’s meeting with the EU High Representative was a consolatory (if appreciated) formal gesture.
Europeans don’t count—not through our institutions and not even through France and Germany, as in the Minsk Accords. Europeans cannot accept the situation. Europe has to participate as the European Union, coordinating the member states, particularly the large ones, not bundled up in the cloak of US power or waiting in the wings.
Europe has to react. Our reality is objectively no worse than the one facing Monnet in August 1943. But we have much to learn from the founding fathers of European integration: ambition of vision, strength of conviction, clarity of exposition, and self-confidence.
French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian last week made a subtle criticism of the US. He said there is no European security without Europeans, alluding to the bilateral US negotiations with Russia over the fate of Ukraine, which not only did not include Europeans but also did not have any Ukrainian representation, even though it is the subject of contention. One of Joe Biden’s key criticisms of Donald Trump’s foreign policy was that the former president acted in a unilateral manner, but isn’t Biden now behaving exactly the same as his predecessor?
When Biden was elected, Europe breathed a sigh of relief. Paris Mayor Anne Hidalgo tweeted, “Welcome back America.” She was welcoming Washington’s likely return to the way it used to deal with its allies: On an institutional and multilateral basis. Hidalgo was also welcoming the return of American engagement with Europe after a period of confrontation during the Trump administration. There was so much hope that Biden would undo the damage Trump’s policies caused to the transatlantic alliance. However, America’s European partners are getting increasingly frustrated, as they are now realizing that Biden is as unilateral in his approach to foreign policy as his predecessor, and this selfishness in international affairs is overshadowing the common good of the transatlantic alliance.
This unilateralism is a byproduct of short-sightedness and opportunism. Ultimately, the US has so much to lose by not involving its allies. America’s strength does not primarily stem from its formidable military machine, but from its ability to garner support across the globe. And its alliance with Europe has been the cornerstone of US power projection worldwide. In fact, since the Second World War, transatlantic relations have been at the heart of international politics. This does not seem to be the case anymore. The epicenter is moving to Eurasia, with a likely Russian-Chinese alliance. However, if this is the case, it is really bad news for the West and for the people who aspire to freedom and democracy. The main culprit behind the likelihood of this shift in power is definitely the US and not Europe.
While Trump campaigned on an “America first” platform, Biden said “America is back.” But America today is neither the first nor is it back. It is slowly losing its place on the world stage, driven by an obsessive isolationism that resulted in this unilateral approach. When you simply don’t care what is happening in the world and don’t want to lead, why would you care what your allies think? Actually, when you are not planning to be involved, why do you need allies in the first place?
The most flagrant symptom was last summer’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, which happened without any coordination with any of its allies. “The Americans just left,” one source told me. Washington left its allies to scramble to deal with the repercussions of its hasty decision. Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who fell short of directly criticizing the US, said that the withdrawal was an “extremely bitter development. Bitter, dramatic and terrifying.”
While the narrative of the Biden administration stresses democracy, human rights, institutional relations and multilateralism, the reality is totally different. The reality is different simply because the US no longer has a leading interest in world affairs and primacy on the world stage is no longer a goal on its own. The Biden administration is more focused on domestic issues. However, the US should remember that its robust economy and a large part of the prosperity the average American enjoys can be partly attributed to the country’s position on the world stage. For example, the oil concessions US companies benefited from in the Arab Gulf were awarded to “Uncle Sam” for a reason. In addition to the economic element, these countries’ alliances with the US played an important role.
The ideology of isolationism started with Barack Obama, who was catering to a popular mood after Americans grew tired of George W. Bush’s wars. It continued with Trump’s America first approach. However, it is now being taken to new heights by the Biden administration — and this isolationism is driving unilateralism.
US selfishness in international affairs is overshadowing the common good of the transatlantic alliance.
Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib
The underlying logic is “we do the minimum to secure our interests and the world needs to take care of itself.” Prior to entering any negotiations with the Russians on Ukraine, Biden made it clear that the military option was not a realistic one for the US. With Ukraine feeling threatened, the US said it would not be sending soldiers to defend its ally. When you have this attitude, how can your allies trust you? More importantly, when negotiating with the Russians, the US has not involved its ally that is under threat or its European partners. This unilateralism shakes the trust of allies and sends a sign of weakness to foes.
Russian leader Vladimir Putin seems very confident. He is facing the American threat of sanctions with his own threat of cutting relations with the US. Where is the respect America can impose on its foes? Today, as the US is also negotiating with Iran in Vienna, the Iranians are refusing to talk directly to Washington. How humiliating is that? You are negotiating with a party who refuses to talk to you.
For the US to regain its prestige on the world stage, it should start by showing a firm commitment to its allies and decisiveness when facing its foes. It should also demonstrate to its allies that its political narrative is not void and that it can be translated into action when needed. Unless the US does that, we will witness the waning of America as a world power, the decline of the West and a serious blow to liberal democracies around the world. If Washington does not want to reach this point, it should start reversing its unilateral approach and begin liaising with its allies on foreign policy matters.
